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This research investigates the vertical knowledge transfer from Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) to their indigenous Chinese suppliers. By adopting a 
qualitative processual methodology, the data from interview-based case studies 
is used to examine how the vertical supply relationship develops over time and 
the evolution of the knowledge transfer embedded within it. The research has 
yielded the following research findings:   
1. An evolutionary pathway for the relationship development with three 
interconnected sequential stages are identified, in which MNE customers’ 
evolving expectations and evaluations, and the supplier firms’ response and 
commitment, jointly move the relationship up through each of the sequential 
phases.  
2. Japanese MNEs are found to have different attitude and approach in transfer 
knowledge to their indigenous supplier firms from Non-Japanese MNEs. The 
difference is significant in the initiating stage of the relationship and decreases 
over time.  
3. The transfer of knowledge in the relationships evolves from explicit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge and from technological knowledge to managerial 
knowledge. Different types of knowledge involved with varied aspects of 
technology, management and ideology were accordingly transferred at different 
phases of the vertical cooperation.  
4. Generally, most supplier firms learn more managerial and operational 
techniques than products technology from their MNE customers. In addition, it 
is found that Private Owned Enterprises (POEs) and State owned enterprises 
(SOEs) have different advantages and disadvantages in their technological and 
managerial learning.   
5. SOEs and POEs demonstrate different knowledge levels (KL) and knowledge 
efficiencies (KE) due to their differing abilities to attract financial support, 
different organizational incentive structures and correspondingly divergent 
endogenous development paths.   
 
The empirical contributions of the research lie in that it is one of the first 
systematic investigations on MNEs’ vertical knowledge spillover in China. 
Compared to traditional research investigating the FDI’s spillovers in 
International Business field, this research has posed a pertinent question, 
adopted a penetrating methodology with fine-grained primary data, and also 
yielded rich and detailed explanations of the several important aspects 
associated with the vertical knowledge transfer. Practical implications for both 
firms and policymakers are also generated built upon the empirical findings.  
 
Apart from the empirical contributions of the study, the research also advances 
our understanding about some important theoretical issues of transaction cost 
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economics (TCE).  
1. A hidden assumption associated with the traditional TCE studies on ‘make’ 
or ‘buy’ decision is that ‘market’ is always available to provide the products 
and hence the decision only lies on the transaction cost. This assumption is 
revealed to be unrealistic when MNEs’ outsourcing strategy is constrained 
by the unavailable or incompetent ‘market’ in the host economy. Therefore, 
firms and markets are highly diversified properties across countries. They 
are both the evolutionary products of the division of labor and the conditions 
of transaction efficiency in different and segmented economies and neither 
of them can be treated as stylized across different contexts.   
    
2. It is found that the transaction cost per se cannot fully justify the 
relationship specific investment in the inter-firm cooperation. A dynamic 
perspective is needed to incorporate the total value and cost analysis to 
uncover a holistic understanding of the evolution economic organization.  
 
By basing the study upon multiple theoretical perspectives concerning the 
inter-firm cooperation and knowledge transfer, the empirical findings have been 
provided with robust theoretical explanations. It is an effort to put theory back 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
This thesis examines the vertical knowledge transfer from Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) to their indigenous Chinese supplier firms in the Electrical 
and Electronics industry in Wuxi, China. By adopting a qualitative processual 
methodology and semi-structured interviews, the study aims to reveal the 
inter-firm knowledge transfer process and the conditions that either promote or 
demote the desired knowledge transfer. In addition, with the in-depth fieldwork 
investigation, it endeavors to understand how different types of knowledge are 
transferred in the vertical linkages and how the local indigenous Chinese 
supplier firms utilize and assimilate the knowledge for their long-term 
development and growth. This study is one of the earliest investigations that 
systematically explore the vertical linkage between MNEs and Chinese firms 
and the embedded knowledge spillovers. The research findings presented in 
chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 are believed to have substantially improved our 
understanding of the MNEs’ vertical knowledge spillover in the Chinese context. 
In addition, by building up the analytical framework from multiple theoretical 
perspectives, the thesis also provides ample elaborations of the theoretical 
implications of the empirical findings. As such, the research is believed to have 
contributed to both the empirical and theoretical understanding of the subject 
under investigation.  
 
This opening chapter will introduce the research motivation of the study. Then 
how the research questions are refined within the general background of the 
spillover effect of FDI is introduced in section 1.4. The chapter ends with 




1.2 Research motivation  
China entered the 20th century as one of the poorest nations and entered the 21st 
century as the world’s most rapidly developing. Since the economic reform 
launched by the late President Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China’s economic 
development has attained great achievements and attracted world attention. 
With considerable institutional transition through increasing marketization, 
privatization, and decentralization (Child and Tse, 2001), the national economy 
has shown rapid growth and the overall strength of the country has improved 
noticeably. With GDP increasing at an average rate of around 10% annual in the 
1990s and 8% to 10% in the 2000s1, China became the sixth largest economy in 
the world.   
 
Among the strong economic reform and development policies that the Chinese 
government employs, the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been 
put high on its agenda, with the expectation of bringing the country new 
technologies, know-how and increased competitiveness to domestic industries. 
The adoption of this determined and consistent policy is based on the widely 
acknowledged belief that, generally, international direct investment is able to 
contribute to the host’s economic development, be it in Asia, North America, or 
elsewhere. As a matter of fact, inward FDI has been perceived as one of the 
most important economic engines that has stimulated the rapid economic 
development, industrial structural adjustment and employment in China.  
 
Within this general economic context, FDI inflows into China dramatically 
increased in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, China was among the top 6 FDI 
recipients in the world. By 1998, it was second only to the USA. In 2002, for 
the first time, China replaced the USA and became the largest FDI host in the 
                                                        
1 Data Source: Asian Development Banks, 2005.  
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world2. In addition, China has also integrated herself in the world economy 
through her membership of the WTO, ASEAN and other trade regimes. There is 
no doubt that inward FDI to China will continue and its impact on China’s 
economic development will persist. While the country is reaping the great fruits 
of economic liberalization and the accompanying inflow of FDI, an explicit 
understanding about how FDI influences the economic development becomes 
more imperative. It is argued that only with an explicit understanding of this 
matter, can the Chinese government and Chinese firms grasp how to gain, 
maintain, and stimulate the positive benefits of inward FDI, make effective 
intervention when necessary, and attempt to avoid the potential negative impacts 
that accompany inward FDI.  
 
Received theory has shown that FDI can exert multiple impacts on the host 
economies via discrete channels. On the positive side, first, demonstration 
affects allow local firms to learn by observing MNEs operating higher levels of 
technology. After noticing a product innovation or a new form of organization 
adapted to local conditions, local entrepreneurs may strive to imitate the 
innovation (Sinani and Meyer, 2003). As local business interacts with existing 
technology used, information is diffused; uncertainty is reduced and imitation 
levels increase (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Second, domestic firms may 
react to foreign competition by using the existing technology more efficiently or 
by investing in new technology in order to maintain their market share. Third, 
local employees trained by MNEs may move to jobs in domestic firms, taking 
with them with upgraded human capital. These people could make a substantial 
contribution by raising productivity when working for local firms or when 
setting up new entrepreneurial businesses. Fourth, spillovers could also take 
place through MNEs’ backward and forward linkages through business 
transactions with their local suppliers and customers.  
                                                        
2 The FDI here refers to the utilized FDI inflow into China in 2002. Data source is from MOFTEC - The 
Ministry oh Foreign Trade and Cooperation.  
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However, FDI is not without potential damaging effects on the local economy. 
On the negative side, firstly, MNEs may lower the productivity of domestic 
firms by taking market share from domestic firms. Thus, competition may have 
a negative impact on indigenous firm’s productivity, especially in the short-term 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Secondly, due to the wage differences, the 
probability of human capital moving from MNEs to domestic firms is much 
lower than the reversed movement from local firms to MNEs. Therefore the 
hypothesized positive spillover from the MNEs’ personnel movement is very 
small and could turn out to be negative when experienced personnel move from 
the domestic sector to MNEs and bring with them with the local knowledge and 
information that MNEs often lack. In this case, local firms may suffer from the 
difficulty in attracting and retaining the most experienced and valuable local 
talents. To sum up, FDI can generate a complicated set of impacts on local 
economy and both positive and negative net impacts are possible. Net effects 
depend on whether positive impacts outweigh negative ones.  
 
Most prior studies (Kueh, 1992; Zhan, 1993; Wang; 1995; Lan, 1996; Wu, 1999; 
Zhu & Tan, 2000; Buckley et al., 2002; Zhou et al., 2002) investigated the 
impact of FDI on local economic development at aggregated economy levels 
without discerning between the different channels and mechanisms through 
which the influence of FDI is delivered. Similarly, Sinani and Meyer (2003) 
have criticized that most prior studies measure only the net positive effect of 
knowledge transfer and the negative impact of competition both due to foreign 
presence in the market, and few authors explore the conditions under which 
positive spillovers occur.  
 
Consequently, the results of studies investigating the effects of FDI on local 
industry for both developed countries and for transition economies are mixed. 
For instance, Haddad and Harrison (1993) examined the effect of foreign 
presence on the relative productivity of local firms by comparing local firm 
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productivity with that of the best practice firm in the industry and find no 
evidence of spillovers in Morocco. In contrast, Griffith (1999) and Liu et al., 
(2000) found evidence that a foreign presence in the sector affects positively the 
productivity of domestic firms in UK. Feinberg and Majumbar (2001) found 
that, in India, MNEs gain from each others’ R&D spillovers, but domestic firms 
do not. Moreover, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that competition has a 
negative impact on indigenous firms’ productivity in Venezuela, especially in 
the short-term. Similarly, Konings (2001) found negative spillovers to domestic 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania, which suggests that the crowding-out effect of 
competition dominates the positive effect of knowledge transfer. Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) found a positive significant impact of FDI on the growth of 
sales for their entire sample for firms in Czechoslovakia; however, contrary to 
what is predicted, spillovers have a negative impact on the growth of sales of 
domestic firms. Nevertheless, a different picture is presented by Liu’s (2002) 
investigation of the correlation between FDI presence and productivity growth 
in China using industry-level data: there is a positive and significant effect of 
spillovers for the overall sample and for the sub-sample of domestic firms. 
However, these results may not be robust if using more disaggregated firm-level 
panel data (Sinani and Meyer, 2003).  
 
However, while not being exhaustive, the above examples have clearly 
indicated a complex picture of the varied mechanisms and consequences of 
FDI’s presence in a host economy and highlighted that our understanding about 
when FDI can exert positive impacts on the host economy, and what are the 
conditions promoting the desired impacts, are far from satisfactory. It is 
interesting to assess FDI’s impact at these aggregated levels and this stream of 
research will continue to generate insights into some general macroeconomic 
policy issues, such as whether continuous FDI policy is needed and whether 
FDI in general generates positive impacts on local economic development, etc. 
We have to recognize that without understanding the exact mechanisms and 
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processes through which FDI’s influence occurs, positive and rational 
intervention at the micro economic level might be hard to propose. The 
literature review of this stream of research shows that very little attention has 
been given towards documenting the exact manner in which FDI influences 
local firms. This noticeable research gap spurred the decision to undertake the 
present study. This study will endeavor to understand and explicate the 
processes of how, and by what means FDI, influences local economy 
development at the firm level. Since all the macro-economic progress is the 
accumulated outcome of the performance of the micro actors within an 
economic system, such a grounded study is believed to be desirable, worthwhile 
and constructive.  
 
1.3 Defining the research questions 
Among the varied channels through which FDI can exert impacts on the local 
industry, MNEs’ backward and forward linkages represent one of the distinct 
direct channels. Foreign firms may purchase intermediate goods from domestic 
suppliers to economize on transportation costs or to accommodate local content 
requirements. Development economics has emphasized the creation of what 
Hirschman (1958) has defined as ‘backward and forward linkages’, identifying 
the relationships that multinationals can activate with local suppliers and 
customers respectively. Hirschman (1958) suggested that FDI can create strong 
external economies in sectors that supply or buy from MNEs if new investment 
are undertaken to exploit them (Hirschman, 1958, p. 205-6). Lall (1978) found 
that MNEs improve the productivity of indigenous firms by providing technical 
assistance and training, by assisting them in the purchasing of raw materials and 
by pressuring suppliers to meet standards of reliability and speed of delivery. 
Evidence about the actual impact of FDI on linkage creation and on host 
countries’ development is scarce and that which exists is, contradictory as 
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reported inter alia by Dunning (1993), Barkley and MacNamara (1994), Turok 
(1994), see Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) for a recent survey. Blomstrom et al. 
(1999, p. 29) also observed that the degree to which international linkages 
generate appropriable spillover benefits for the host country ‘is an extremely 
important policy issue for which there is a disappointing amount of evidence’. 
Chen (2005) also found that this topic has attracted little attention from business 
scholars. In his search of the literature, among 2240 items in the database 
ABI/INFORM, which covers roughly 200 trade magazines and over 400 
academic journals, only 12 items were identified to be relevant to this topic.   
 
The lack of research attention paid by scholars to this area is evident from the 
small number of articles published in academic journals, which is in sharp 
contrast to the prevalence of outsourcing by MNEs in the business world. One 
of the reasons for the lack of empirical investigations might be due to the 
difficulty of obtaining data. Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004) also suggested that 
“owing to difficulties in collecting relevant data, there are few empirical studies 
of the extent to which TNCs provide their suppliers in developing host countries 
with technology assistance” (p. 242). The situation has slightly improved with 
some empirical studies conducted in Singapore (Wong, 1992; Brown, 1998), 
Malaysia (Giroud, 2000) and Northern Ireland (Crone and Roper, 2001) and 
India (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2004). However there are few empirical 
investigations focusing on MNEs’ local linkages in China.   
 
Given that China is becoming one of the most important destinations to which 
MNEs outsource their manufacturing and services, it provides us with a good 
opportunity to observe the direct linkages between MNEs and local Chinese 
firms and how the relationships influence the indigenous local firms’ 
development. It is believed that foreign MNEs potentially contribute to a more 
viable economic climate by associating closely with local enterprises, and 
assisting entrepreneurs by upgrading their technology and improving their 
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organizational skills (Lin et al., 1999). As local enterprises face continual reform 
and market rationalization, productive foreign multinational–local linkages offer 
them a unique, yet important, alternative development path – providing 
employment, tax revenue, and crucial expertise needed to build market-based 
and competitive firms, with advanced technology and modern organizational 
techniques. In particular, due to the inherent competitive strengths of MNEs, 
MNEs’ linkages with local indigenous supplier firms have empirically proven to 
be significant mechanisms for promoting the local firm’s technological 
development, competitiveness and growth (Wong, 1992; Foray and Lundvall, 
1996; Matthews, 1996). The significant potential of such a linkage between FDI 
and local economic development is emphasized by a UNCTAD (2001) study. 
‘A key factor determining the benefits the host countries can derive from 
FDI are the linkages that foreign affiliates strike with domestically owned 
firms. Backward linkages from foreign affiliates to domestic firms are 
important channels through which intangible and tangible assets can be 
passed on from the former to the latter. They can contribute to the 
upgrading of domestic enterprises and embed foreign affiliates more firmly 
in host economies’ (p. 282).   
 
Based on the importance of this research topic and the noticeable research gap 
identified, the present study attempts to provide an in-depth, scholarly 
examination of Chinese supplier firm’s vertical partnerships with foreign MNEs. 
Specifically, it endeavors to investigate the following questions:  
1. How is the vertical relationship between MNEs and local suppliers formed 
and developed?  
2. What types of knowledge are transferred in the process of such relationship 
development processes and why?  
3. To what extent is the knowledge transferred assimilated by the local 
Chinese firms? 
4. Does the ownership structure of the Chinese firm affect its knowledge 
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utilization; if so why?  
 
The significant practical implications of the research questions in the context of 
China are as follows. Whilst foreign MNEs have entered China largely for 
market and efficiency-seeking purposes (Dunning, 1993), they also recognize 
that quality components, produced at a required scale, are necessary to continue 
and expand their global sourcing requirements. As such, the skills on the 
Chinese market may need upgrading to fulfill these supply needs in terms of 
both improving component quality and manufacturing processes. On the other 
hand, knowledge transfer is very desirable for the Chinese suppliers and the 
Chinese government because opening up the Chinese market means the 
economy will be subject to the forces of global competition. The Chinese 
government has tended to view foreign MNEs as potential sources of 
knowledge – technological, managerial, and organizational, recognizing that if 
knowledge is transferred to the indigenous Chinese economy, it can assist in 
China’s economic growth and development. Indeed the acquisition of foreign 
advanced technology has long been one of the most important objectives behind 
China’s inward FDI promotion policy. At the local firm level, it is also in the 
interests of the local Chinese suppliers to get access to, and absorb as much 
knowledge as possible from the foreign customer in order to prepare themselves 
to compete on the global stage. In addition, the long-term linkages with strong 
foreign MNEs can emphatically provide the local Chinese firms with a platform 
for long-term development and growth.  
 
Despite the potential benefits of knowledge transfer to both the foreign 
investing company and the local host, previous research (e.g. Giroud, 2000) has 
demonstrated that MNEs are not always willing to transfer knowledge to 
develop their local partners. However, in the case of China, with the strength of 
government policies to control the amount and type of FDI entering its economy, 
and moreover, its huge potential as a market, it may be the case that foreign 
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MNEs are more willing to transfer knowledge to China in order to build up a 
degree of goodwill than they have been in other parts of Asia. Their willingness 
to transfer knowledge may also be heightened by the necessary, but insufficient 
need to establish ‘guanxi’ with various local agents, in preparation for more 
in-depth investment in future. Thus there are reasons to believe the knowledge 
transfer between foreign MNEs and their indigenous Chinese suppliers will 
occur. However the conditions which encourage this to occur, the extent of 
knowledge transferred, the processes underlying the transfer, and the 
implications to the growth of these Chinese supplier firms are far from clear. 
The understanding of these issues may have practical implications regarding 
how to manage inter-firm vertical knowledge transfer processes in China. More 
importantly, recommendations to Chinese supplier firms as to how to learn and 
benefit from such vertical relationships with foreign multinationals can be 
informed by in-depth case analysis. Finally, government policies regarding how 
to encourage foreign firms to transfer knowledge to their local partners are also 
expected. 
 
The empirical investigation also attempts to advance our theoretical 
understanding of inter-firm cooperation. Both economic approaches, such as 
transaction cost economics (TCEs), resource-based view (RBV), and social 
perspectives, such as the principles of reciprocity and trust, are integrated in 
exploring the unfolding inter-firm relationship. Instead of treating inter-firm 
knowledge transfer as a solely input-output flowchart (Autio and Laamanen, 
1995), the in-depth exploration of the relationship development process will 
provide us with a dynamic picture of how the knowledge transfer embedded in 
the vertical cooperation evolves. A robust and adequate explanation is expected 
by differentiating the development stages of the vertical relationship and 
integrating them with a dynamic yet unified theoretical explanation. Moreover, 
the study also differentiates the local indigenous suppliers by their ownership 
and assesses whether they have different cooperative behaviors and attitudes in 
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knowledge learning and utilization. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis takes the following structure. Chapter 2 presents an inter-disciplinary 
literature review on the central issues of inter-firm vertical cooperation and 
knowledge transfer. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical framework built out of the 
literature review, which is used to guide the empirical investigation of the 
present study. Chapter 4 provides a detailed justification and description of the 
research methodology, methods, data collection and data analysis processes. 
Research findings are presented in chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 9 presents the 
hypotheses developed from the research findings for future quantitative 
verifying. Finally chapter 10 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
study and justifies its empirical and theoretical contributions.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an inter-disciplinary literature review on the central issues 
of inter-firm vertical cooperation and knowledge transfer. First of all, an 
economic perspective based on transaction cost economics (TCE) regarding 
inter-firm cooperation is discussed. Weaknesses in its explanatory power are 
supplemented by using the resource-based view (RBV). As this research is issue 
driven, the two heterodox theories are therefore combined as complements. 
Secondly, a sociological perspective of inter-firm cooperation is compared with 
the economic perspective. Some empirical studies investigating the unfolding 
inter-firm relationship are then discussed to highlight the synergies of the two 
perspectives. In addition, empirical studies on knowledge transfer in varied 
contexts are presented to highlight the most robust empirical findings that may 
be relevant to the present study. Finally, a review of the impact of ownership 
structure on the firm’s performance in the Chinese context is discussed to 
understand their potential differences in cooperating with and learning from 
their MNEs customers. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the whole 
empirical investigation with multiple theoretical threads. The next chapter will 
then display a unified analytical framework drawn upon these diversified 
literatures as a guide for the empirical investigation.  
 
2.2. An economic perspective of inter-firm cooperation 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCEs) was originated by Coase (1937) with the 
attempts to uncover the ‘shadowy figure’ of ‘the firm’ in economic theory. His 
rationale for the existence of firms is that: ‘firms will emerge to organize what 
would otherwise be market transactions whenever their costs were less than the 
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costs of carrying out the transactions through the markets’ (1937, p. 7). As such, 
the main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm is that there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism (1937, p. 390). Coase defined transaction costs as 
follows:  
 
“….in order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who 
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal 
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw 
up the contract, to understand the inspection needed to make sure that the 
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on (1988, p.6) 
 
Although Coase’s argument is plausible, his theory suffered from a lack of 
operationalization and supporting empirical evidence. Only some thirty years 
later, with the development of the property-rights approach, transaction-cost 
economics, and contract theory, was a more elaborate microeconomic analysis 
put forward to explain the deeper problems of the firm as an enterprise, capital 
structure, and ownership issues (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, p. 328). Among 
the scholars who have contributed to the advance of TCE, Williamson’s works 
(1975, 1985 and 1999) have made substantial contributions to the empirical 
development of the approach. There are two behavioural assumptions in his 
model: bounded rationality and opportunism and three variables featuring in 
‘transactions’: frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. Of these, asset 
specificity has been given most significant explanatory power (Williamson 1975, 
1979; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Grossman and Hart 1986). The 
central argument is that the greater the levels of transaction specific investment 
in an exchange, the greater the threat of opportunism. The greater the threat of 
opportunism, the less likely that market governance will effectively reduce this 
threat and the more likely that hierarchical forms of governance will be chosen. 
In short, Williamson's answer to the question ‘why the firm exists’ is that 
hierarchy arises to resolve the problems of market governance with transaction 
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specific investments under conditions of uncertainty. Once under common 
ownership, the two parties in the exchange have less incentive to seek advantage 
over each other. Disputes are less likely to occur because hierarchy facilitates 
the development of codes and language that are unique to a firm which allow 
for more accurate and efficient communication (Arrow, 1974; Williamson 1975). 
As such, TCEs focuses on cost minimization as the organizational imperative; or, 
as Williamson (1975, 1985) argued that economizing is the best strategy.  
 
However, resource-based theory takes exception to this emphasis. The 
resource-based logic suggests that creating and exploiting transaction specific 
investments under conditions of uncertainty is essential if firms are to gain 
long-term success. Avoiding opportunism and minimizing governance costs are 
a secondary consideration because minimizing transaction costs is of relatively 
little benefit if a firm has no transaction specific assets that are highly valued by 
the market (Barney and Hesterly, 1996; Foss, 1999). Similarly, many scholars 
suggested that there are trade-offs between the optimal organization of 
production, transaction and innovation process and therefore economizing 
transaction costs cannot be the sole criteria in determining the optimal 
organization form (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Demsetz, 1993; Lundvall, 1993; 
Campbell, 1996; Cantwell, 2000; Hennart, 2000, etc).  
 
Empirical investigations based on Williamson’s model yielded mixed results. 
For instance, Joskow (1987) found the structure of vertical relationships 
between buyers and sellers is strongly affected by variations in the importance 
of relationship-specific investments, which include site specificity and physical 
asset specificity by the supplier firms. In a similar vein, Subramani and 
Venkatraman (2003) also found powerful evidence of the value of intangible 
assets in interorganizational relationships. The intangible assets contain two 
components: business process specificity and domain knowledge specificity. It 
is argued that specific investments in intellectual capital are more influential on 
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governance decisions than those in physical assets. Physical asset specificity 
was a significant determinant of governance in the industrial age but domain 
knowledge specificity has the potential to be a key determinant of governance 
choices in the knowledge-driven economy. 
 
However, in a very influential study conducted by Walker and Weber (1984), 
production cost is found to be an additional important factor in determining the 
decision of ‘make’ or ‘buy’. That is, the transaction cost scenario does not allow 
the influence of the production cost in such decision-making. In Madhok’s 
(1996) words: TCE literally neglects ‘production cost’ or simply treats it as 
‘stylized’ across firms. Furthermore, Vang (2000) and Madhok (2002) have 
suggested that to study the decision of ‘make or buy’, we have to base the 
enquiry on a Smithian approach (Smith, 1976) explaining the learning 
(dis)advantages of specialization (Loasby, 1999). In transaction costs economics 
the market is supposed to be the chosen mechanism for coordination unless 
‘hold up’ problems of the firm occur. In the division-of-labor approach, no such 
priority exists. The starting point is the division of labor between individuals. 
The individual who specializes in fewer tasks can focus his learning, thus 
improve the efficiency by developing new tools and techniques, as argued by 
Smith. Individuals freely establish and join in different firms based on the fit 
between their specialization and the firm’s production function. In turn, firms 
also improve their efficiency by focusing their learning. This means that firms 
should specialize in production where they have comparative advantages and 
buy from other firms where they possess comparative disadvantage.   
 
While in TCE, ‘make’ refers to internal production, ‘buy’ often refers to buying 
from another firm although it is more often abstracted as ‘ the market’. The 
completely decentralized market where every individual is acting as his own 
hierarchy is rare. That is what Madhok (2002) meant by ‘market exchange most 
amounts to exchange between firms (p. 539)’. To one firm, other firms often 
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represent the ‘market’. As such, a complete understanding of the ‘make or buy’ 
needs the exploration of the differences between firms. The division-of-labor 
approach shows that firms can take advantage of their own learning 
environments and engage in networks relationships with other firms that will be 
able to deliver cheaper or better products due to the learning advantage 
associated with their specialization. Therefore the costs of using the market also 
depend on the in-house competencies that are built up through direct 
participation in the production. The theoretical inability of TCE in featuring the 
production cost into its consideration turns out to be highly significant as has 
been reflected in several empirical studies of inter-firm cooperation, where the 
transaction cost minimizing scenario is clearly unable to explain the reality 
about when firms are willing to invest heavily in their cooperative relationships. 
This will be discussed shortly.  
  
In response to the recent proliferation of network organizational forms that do 
not fit neatly into either the market or hierarchy frameworks proposed by Coase 
(1988), Williamson (1991) has tried to come to terms with these networks forms 
by recognizing what he calls the hybrid form of governance. Hybrids combine 
aspects of market transactions and characteristics of hierarchies and fall 
between the two alternatives on a continuum. The paper concluded (Williamson, 
1991) that the hybrid form of organization is not ‘a loose amalgam of market 
and hierarchy but possesses its own disciplined rationale’. However, hybrid 
forms are essentially the product of a combination of intermediate level 
incentives, adaptability and bureaucratic costs. As such, the transaction cost 
minimization scenario remains. As Foss (1999) pointed out, TCE has difficulty 
in studying inter-firm relationships; hybrid covers too broad forms at an abstract 
level and much microeconomic specificity is lost. Moreover, production 
knowledge and organizational knowledge need to be intertwined to understand 




The growing number of empirical studies of a variety of hybrids has 
substantially challenged the TCE-based view. For instance, Dyer’s (1997) 
in-depth investigation of the automobile industry revealed how the nature of 
interaction between Japanese automakers and their suppliers shifted from a 
more safe-guarded to a more committed and mutually oriented one. This shift 
was characterized by a substantial increase in the investment in interfirm 
co-ordination mechanisms and relationship-specific assets (e.g. plants, 
equipment, systems, processes and people) on the part of both parties. The shift 
in attitude and behavior increased the value attained by the Japanese automakers 
through their relationships with their suppliers, both in terms of synergies, as 
well as, eventually lower transaction costs. Similar arguments have also been 
made by other numerous scholars (Joskow, 1987; Grandori, 1995; Maskell, et 
al., 1998; Jap and Gansen, 2000; Dahlgren, 2002）and their common point is 
that increased value and benefits resulting from high asset specific investment 
actually helps reduce conflicts and opportunistic behavior. As such, a 
transaction ‘cost’ argument turns out to be a transaction ‘value’ perspective 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Foss, 1999) in defending that joint value maximization, 
and the processes by which exchange partners create and claim value, are a 
more important concern compared to simple transaction cost minimization. Foss 
and Foss (2004) have insightfully summarized that we need to understand two 
issues about economic organizations: how economic actors increase the pie and 
how they divide it. The former stands for value creation and the latter concerns 
the value distribution. TCE exceedingly concerns the latter and RBV only 
studies the former (Foss, 1999). However, the two cannot be neatly separated 
and a sound analysis of economic organizations calls for the combination of the 
two.   
 
These empirical studies, and concerns that TCE does not consider the 
production cost, lead to a more fundamental question: can transaction cost 
minimization explain the firm, the market and all sorts of hybrid organizational 
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forms? While division of labor is a necessary condition for trade to exist, trade 
can be organized by the (decentralized) market. What can explain the 
emergence of the firm? It seems that transaction cost economics only, at most, 
provides us with a partial tool in understanding the development of trade and the 
emergence of economic institutions, such as the firm. In addition, the empirical 
studies quoted above show that a complete understanding should simultaneously 
consider all costs and benefits in its analysis and reveal under what 
circumstances each organizational form is a better choice in organizing 
economic activities (Demsetz, 1993; Hennart, 2000). What the leading 
economists (Liu and Yang, 2000; Yang, 2003) suggested is right: endogenous 
transaction cost is not essential for telling the story of the firm. The essence of 
the story is why endogenous or exogenous transactions costs of goods are 
replaced with endogenous or exogenous transaction costs of labour as the 
institution of the firm emerges.  
 
In addition, traditional TCE tends to understate the costs of organizing 
transactions within the firm (Jones and Harrison, 2001). The use of authority is 
assumed to resolve internal disputes more effectively than the market. Clearly, 
this is not always the case. Lengthy and costly haggling may often be more 
severe within a firm than between firms. As Eccles's (1985) study of transfer 
pricing showed, internal organization is often susceptible to costly bargaining 
and influence behavior. Indeed, TCE neglects the fact that the firm is also 
influenced by competition in the labor market. Theoretically, the belief that the 
firm, as a hierarchical form, is running with a different scenario to that of the 
market is only a fiction. The constitution of the firm is based on free association 
and employees (and employers both) can withdraw their contract subject to 
labor market competition. As a result, a different scenario from Williamson’s is 
in need to assess the firm and the market as alternative forms of governance.  
 
Therefore, the introduction of transaction costs is an important step beyond 
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standard (neoclassical) economics. But this advance has not yet moved 
completely. Yang (2003) has pointed out that the division of labour and the 
rendered transaction costs are the two fundamental mechanisms 
promoting/demoting trade. When positives outweigh the negatives, trade occurs, 
however trade can occur with the economic institution of the firm and without. 
Therefore it is not the transaction cost per se that determines the organization 
form. The ultimate criteria should be the ratio of economic rents based on 
specialization to the transaction (and coordination) costs involved. A new 
avenue for studying the firm has been pioneered by Liu and Yang (2000), Yang 
(2003), and Lam and Liu (2004), etc. However, little dialogue has been made 
between the newly developed economic theory and business/organization 
studies.  
 
Another criticism often levied at TCE is that it understates the role of social and 
cultural forces in economic activity (Granobvetter, 1985). While TCEs seeks to 
make realistic assumptions about human nature, it does take a decidedly 
calculative view (Williamson 1993) of humans that discounts the impact of 
social relationships and culture. Granovetter (1985) pointed out that, contrary to 
this atomistic view of economic exchange, transactions are embedded within 
networks of social relationships. These transactions are influenced by 
expectations that are formed by the history of the relationship. Abstract 
transaction dimensions such as aspect specificity and uncertainty do not alone 
determine the governance arrangements that we observe. These views from 
sociologists will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
2.3 A sociological perspective of inter-firm cooperation  
The mainstream sociological perspective of inter-firm cooperation is based on 
network theory. Networks are viewed as a form of governance, as social glue 
27/201 
 27 
that binds individuals together into a coherent system (Powell, 1987, 1990; 
Sabel, 1991, etc). Network governance structures characterize the webs of 
interdependence found in industrial districts and typify such practices as 
relational contracting, collaborative manufacturing, or multistranded interfirm 
alliances. There is an extensive division of labor in a network which means that 
firms are dependent on each other. Coordination between firms is not brought 
through a central plan or an organizational hierarchy, nor does it take place 
through the price mechanisms in the traditional market model. Instead 
coordination takes place through interaction between firms in the network, 
where price is just one of several influential conditions. As such, the inter-firm 
cooperation, as one of the most popular hybrid forms, is a special type (bilateral) 
of network between firms. Clearly, network theory provides a different 
perspective from what TCEs suggests.  
 
One important aspect of network theory is that the firm gets access to external 
resources through its network positions. This idea has a profound link to 
exchange theory in sociology by Lin (1982). It is suggested that at any point in 
time, the firm holds certain positions in the network; these characterize their 
relations to other firms. Positions nearer to the centre of the social structure not 
only have greater access to, and control of the valued resources but also more 
valued resources are intrinsically attached to the positions. Since the 
development of positions takes time and effort and since the present positions 
define opportunities and constraints for the future strategic development of the 
firm, the firm’s position in the network is perceived as particularly controlled by 
intangible market assets. Market assets generate revenues for the firm and serve 
to give them access to other firms’ internal assets. Because of the 
interdependencies between firms, the use of the asset in one firm is dependent 
on the use of other firm’s assets.  
 
Along this line of thought, the network research also suggests that position 
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renders power. As such, ‘power’ represents one of the key divergences between 
sociologists and economists. Sociologists believe that the more centralized 
position a firm takes in a network, the more advantages it has to access the 
resources that are needed for its development. But some economists relentlessly 
refute this idea. Williamson (1985, p. 238) suggested that the main problem with 
power is that ‘the concept is invoked to explain virtually anything’. He further 
contended that ‘power enthusiasts have not demonstrated that significant 
organizational innovations – those in which large transaction costs saving are in 
prospect – are regularly defeated by established interests’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 
124-125).  
 
In addition, the trust and reciprocity principles are widely discussed in the 
sociological approach as well. Trust and other forms of social capital are 
perceived to be moral resources that coordinate economic activity in a 
fundamentally different manner to physical capital. However, trust does not 
imply blind loyalty. Indeed, thoughtful commentators stress that trust must be 
deliberate or even calculative (Axelrod, 1984; Sabel, 1993; Scharpf, 1993). 
Trust is gradually built up by cooperation, in which consensus emerges as a 
by-product of success rather than as a precondition for it (Sabel, 1993). Seen in 
this light, interfirm collaboration that exemplifies trust-based governance has an 
enormous advantage. Generalized expectations of cooperation radically reduce 
the cognitive complexity and uncertainty associated with most business dealings. 
But not all forms of trust-based governance operate in the same fashion. In 
industrial districts the bonds of community are forged out of ties of place and 
kinship. Hence trust builds on norms of reciprocity and civic engagement 
(Putman, 1993). Therefore, network approach views an interfirm relationship a 
mutual orientation of two firms towards each other. This implies that the firms 
are prepared to interact with each other and expect each other to do so too. As 
such, it is believed that there is an important social element, such as trust and 
the reciprocity principle, embedded within the relationship development process. 
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However, it does admit that important technical, logistical, administrative and 
time elements are also at work.  
 
After reviewing the main thesis of network theory, the deficiencies of the 
approach are summarized as follows. Firstly, it is a very descriptive rather than 
analytical approach. For instance, to say firms are dependent on each other is 
hardly surprising. With ever-refined divisions of labor in society, who is not 
dependent on others? This approach does not enquire how the dependence 
comes into being in the first place. Secondly, its emphasis on ‘position’ and 
‘power’ in getting access to required resources appears to be persuasive yet 
superficial. We need to make sense of what drives the firm to reach a certain 
position and obtain certain degree of power. If all economic agents or actors 
start from being identical, what explains the developed divergence? As such, a 
curious irony of network research is that despite its focus on the causal 
importance of structures of relations among actors rather than properties of 
actors, the research treats network positions and power as properties in 
themselves (Davis and Powell, 1992). The remedy for the apparent primacy of 
method over substance in the network approach is to bring the content of 
relationships, rather than the merely structure back into the analysis. Thirdly, it 
is silent about how the economic institutions such as the firm and the market 
come into being in the first place. Instead, it takes firms as given economic 
actors and describes inter-firm long term cooperation as special case of market 
behaviour.  
 
Fourthly, to state that important concepts, such as ‘trust’, are advocated only by 
sociologists is not fair. As a matter of fact, economists as early as Arrow (1969, 
1974) have recognized the profound difficulties of the price system. Arrow 
noted that trust is an important lubricant of a social system (Arrow, 1974, p. 23). 
It saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word 
(Arrow, 1974). More importantly, Arrow suggested (1969, p. 62) that the lack of 
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trust is one of the causes of economic underdevelopment. The observation made 
by Arrow represents recognition of the instrumental role of morality - the 
overlap of economics and practical ethics. On the other hand, some economists 
do not like concepts such as trust. For example, Williamson (1993) refuted the 
necessity of this concept in economic studies. He ascertained that ‘calculative 
trust’ is a contradiction in terms, and non-calculative trust exists between family 
friends and lovers. (1993, p. 471). I believe such argument is narrow-minded 
because trust can be also an issue between family members and friends. In fact, 
game theory has wide applications in the areas of anthropology and physiology, 
where the relationships between family and partners are extensively studied (e.g. 
Darkins, 1989). In addition, the economic approach to the family has also been 
pioneered by Becker (1976, 1981). It implies the issue of trust does not stop at 
the ‘conventional’ economic boundary and therefore the argument that ‘personal 
trust is too restricted to be integrated into the theory of exchange’ (Williamson, 
1993, p.471) does not hold. As a matter of fact, all sorts of human behaviour can 
be perceived as various types of exchange. The only difference is the contents of 
exchange are different from those in conventional economic studies; however it 
does not stop the economic approach studying these different phenomena. 
Becker (1976) suggested that economic approach can be used to seek to 
understand human behavior in a variety of contexts and situations and the 
definition of economics in terms of material goods is the narrowest and the least 
satisfactory.  
 
With the point view that trust can reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
cooperation, no clear arguments are conclusive as to whether the social element, 
such as trust, can supplement or substitute the function of a contract in 
economic activities. Mollering (2002) provided one of the first empirical 
investigations to explore this question. The research found that the widely 
accepted transaction cost argument for trust as a parameter reducing hierarchy is 
dismissed. Market, hierarchy, and trust represent alternative mechanisms that 
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can be combined in a variety of ways for facilitating economic exchanges. It is 
explained that there are triadic forces (namely, hierarchy, market and trust) 
promoting economic coordination and economic theory has to be more complex 
and, notably, more pluralistic if the concept of trust is to be incorporated 
fruitfully. This is to a large extent due to the nature of trust, as it represents a 
phenomenon on the edge of reason that manifests itself in idiosyncratic ways 
via trust, social influences and the practical difficulties of intended but limited 
rationality. This affects the process of transacting more than the constitution of 
transactions. The author also suggested that trust is not easily quantifiable and 
therefore this area of research can be expected to benefit greatly from 
qualitative studies.  
 
Poppos and Senger (2002) conducted similar research and concluded that 
formal contracts and relational governance were complements. They argued that 
asset specificity emerges when sourcing relationships require significant 
relation-specific investments in physical and/or human assets. The presence of 
these specific assets transforms an exchange from a world of classical 
contracting in which the 'identity of parties is irrelevant' into a world of 
neoclassical contracting in which the identity of exchange partners is of critical 
importance (Williamson, 1991). The continuity of an exchange becomes vital to 
its effectiveness. The mechanisms through which relational governance 
attenuates exchange hazards are both economic and sociological in nature. 
Economists emphasize the rational, calculative origins of relational governance, 
emphasizing particularly expectations of future exchanges that prompt 
cooperation in the present. Sociologists emphasize socially derived norms and 
social ties that have emerged from prior exchange (Uzzi 1997: 45). Trust is 
therefore considered a trait that becomes embedded in a particular exchange 
relation. In essence, once an exchange partner is granted 'trustworthy' status, 
they are expected to behave in a trustworthy fashion in the future. For 
economists, the trustworthy status is conditional upon the benefits that accrue 
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from trustworthy status over time contrasted with the benefits that accrue from 
self-interested moves that break from the trustworthy status). This logic, 
common to game theory, argues that expectations of pay-offs from future 
cooperative behaviour encourage cooperation in the present (Baker, Gibbons 
and Murphy, 2002). Although Williamson (1996, p.97) concluded that the term 
trust is misleading, given the above economic logic, arguing that 'because 
commercial relations are invariably calculative, the concept of calculated risk 
(rather than calculated trust) should be used to describe commercial 
transactions’. Nonetheless, it is not hard to see that there is considerable overlap 
in the arguments of sociologists and economists surrounding trust and 
cooperation and any systematic distinction might be fruitless. Both sociologists 
and economists, for instance, argue that repeated exchange encourages effective 
exchange, and that repeated exchange provides information about the 
cooperative behaviour of exchange partners that may allow for informed 
choices of who to 'trust' and who not to ‘trust’ etc.  
 
It is noted that ‘trust’ as a distinct concept in economic studies represents 
important progress in the area. A much more complicated picture of economic 
organization is found to be governed by both economic and social forces, yet 
economic forces play a prominent role. However, concepts such as trust and 
power advocated by sociologists, do not sufficiently explain the difference 
between intra-firm exchange and inter-firm transactions. TCE has clearly made 
a big step out of the neoclassical production theory, where only the price and 
quantity are the major concern and organizations are mere actors delivering the 
numbers for economists to calculate the equilibriums. Yet TCE only fulfils a 
partial advance from neoclassical economics and it needs to be complemented 
with classical Smithian theory to complete a circle of the dynamic 
understanding of economic organizations and their interactions. Essentially, 
what RBV has been advocating in recent years is consistent with Smithian 
viewpoint of economics, where economizing is only an half of the story and the 
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other half is about value creation and dynamic capabilities.  
 
2.4 Research on the development process of inter-firm relationship  
This section will discuss how some studies have attempted to combine both the 
economist’s perspective and sociologists’ understanding to make sense of how 
the inter-firm relationships are developed and maintained over time3. Most of 
them are inductive, fieldwork-based investigations. The value of these studies, 
both conceptually and empirically speaking, is that they investigate their 
research questions with limited presumptions and fieldwork investigation often 
generates rich understanding of the issues under investigation. For instance, 
through an inductive field study of seven dyadic relationships established by 
high-growth entrepreneurial firms, Larson (1992) found that apart from 
economic incentives, the social dimensions of the transactions are central in 
explaining the formation and maintenance of the exchange structures. A process 
model of network formation was presented with three sequential phases: 
preconditions for exchange, conditions to build, and integration. The seven 
dyadics under investigation were found to be engaged in relatively stable 
sustained relationships characterized by multiple transactions and a high degree 
of cooperation and collaboration. Formal contracts, which might be expected to 
provide control, were only rarely discussed by the informants. More 
interestingly, the traditional picture of internally driven firm growth was 
replaced by the creative use by entrepreneurial organizations, of networks to 
gain footholds in markets and to serve as critical conduits to enhance revenues, 
gain information and technology, and stimulate innovation.  
 
Claiming that process is central to managing interorganizational relationships 
(IORs), Ring and Van de Ven (1994) also developed a process model of 
                                                        
3 It is noted that both network theory and TCEs can be applied to the intra-firm context. However, as the 
focus of this study is on inter-firm cooperation, the theoretical discussion and empirical review have 
concentrated on the inter-firm context.  
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cooperative IOPs based on the observation of the sequence of events and 
interactions among organizational parties that unfold to shape and modify and 
IOPs over time. A three-stage and cyclical model including negotiation, 
commitment and execution of the relationship was developed. Following the 
core idea of transaction cost economics, efficiency is the major criteria 
underlying standard models of the unfolding relationship. On the other hand, it 
added ‘equity’ as the other important criteria for assessing a cooperative IOP. 
‘Equity’ was defined as fair dealing, which does not require that inputs or 
outcomes always be divided equally between the parties. Instead, ‘equality’ was 
perceived in a processual manner. Trust is also discussed within the 
development of their model: (a) a business risk view based on confidence in the 
predictability of ones expectations and (b) a view based on confidence in 
another’s goodwill. But the model only concerned trust of the second type, 
which is believed to play a very important role in initiating and facilitating the 
social psychological contract that bind the partners. As a conceptual effort to 
understand the development process of IOPs, this work has clearly considered 
the insights generated from both economic theories (e.g. Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975), sociology (Coleman, 1990; Powell, 1990) and management 
scholars (e.g. Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Barney, 2001; Jones and Harrison, 
2001, etc). In this sense, it is a very eclectic model, which, if applied in 
empirical studies, researchers should consider the specific contexts of 
cooperative IOPs. For instance, in this global economy, cooperative IOPs are 
increasingly occurring between parties from different nation states, culture and 
institutional environment. In addition, vertical IOPs and horizontal IOPs might 
require varied perspectives in assessing the specific cooperative motivation and 
activities. The authors suggested that these elements are beyond the scope of 
their model, but have to be considered when specific research is to be conducted 
based on this model.  
 
Recently, supply chain literature starts paying attention to how the supplier 
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firms benefit from the cooperation with their customer firms. For instance, 
Bessant, et al (2003) asserted supply chain as a mechanism for upgrading and 
transferring appropriate practice to supplier firms. The study drew on a literature 
survey and a detailed study of 6 UK supply firms and found that supply chain 
linkage has different stages in the process of development. It is found that a 
setup phase where a variety of drivers converge around a commitment to action, 
often led by a champion individual or agency. When the relationship evolves to 
the operating phase, the learning framework becomes established and begins to 
address the chosen learning agenda concurred by two sides. However, the 
relationship will have to face the challenge of maintaining momentum and a 
high risk of failure afterwards. The research showed a dynamic and potentially 
divergent path for the firms that are temporarily in the supply chain cooperation.   
 
In a different study, the same research group (Harland, et al., 2004) presented a 
conceptual model for the creation and operation of supply networks. It is drawn 
from strategic management, channel management, industrial marketing and 
purchasing, organizational behavior and supply-chain management. The authors 
identified four different types of contextual factors relating to supply networks: 
market environment, nature of product and manufacturing process, network 
structure and focal firms’ network strategy. The model was tested in eight 
in-depth case studies and a validating survey of 58 focal firm networks. The 
study concluded that supply networks are nested within wider 
interorganizational networks and consisted of interconnected entities whose 
primary purpose is the procurement, use and transformation of resources to 
provide packages of goods and services. From this reference, it is still very 
much from a ‘buying’ (customer) perspective.  
 
It is found to be difficult to conduct an ‘appropriate’ literature review with 
respect to ‘inter-firm’ cooperation because of the large number of different types 
of hybrid organizations which are often based on essentially different purposes. 
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In contrast, qualitative studies concerning the process of relationship 
development are too few and scattered in completely different areas, such as 
supply chain management, organizational learning or marketing. Considering 
the extreme ‘hybrid’ nature of the area, the above review provides a selected 
overview of the literatures which are believed to have provided an innovative 
avenue in revealing a more complete account of the network organizational 
forms by combining both economic and social elements. They give both 
methodological and theoretical stimulation to my research design. Specifically, 
the processual perspective in understanding relationship development is 
stimulated by these studies. In the next chapter, a processual view hypothesising 
the relationship development between MNE subsidiaries and their Chinese 
suppliers will be presented as the important contextual background of how 
inter-firm knowledge transfer takes place over time in the context.  
 
2.5 A review of empirical studies on knowledge transfer  
The focus of this section is to review the empirical research on knowledge 
transfer. I have organised this review according to the specific contexts involved. 
Knowledge transfer studies in the intra-firm and inter-firm context are presented 
in 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. Section 2.5.3 reviews a small stream of empirical studies 
addressing MNEs’ vertical linkage with, and knowledge transfer to local firms 
in a host country. It is noted that knowledge transfer has become a significant 
research topic. The dedication of whole volumes of some important academic 
journals to this topic has clearly shown its importance. While it will be 
demanding to provide an exhaustive and up-to-date review, this literature review 
is believed to have revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the studies that are 
most relevant to my research with the purpose of building up a research 
framework for the empirical investigation. 
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2.5.1 Intra-firm knowledge transfer 
Substantial attention has been paid to the knowledge transfer of MNEs as they 
face more pressure for integrating and disseminating knowledge than firms that 
have a more national orientation (Foss and Pedersen, 2004). This stream of 
research explores how knowledge transfer within an organization is contingent 
upon the characteristics of that knowledge, the sender, the recipient, and their 
mutual relationships (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). This is an important stream 
of research because the efficacy of knowledge transfer within the firm is a 
primary rationale for knowledge-based view as both a theory of organization 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant 1996a; Kogut and Zander, 1996) and theory of 
strategy (Grant, 1996b).  
 
In pioneering the theory of the knowledge-based view of the firm, Zander and 
Kogut (1996) established their empirical testing on analysing the speed at which 
manufacturing capabilities related to product innovations were transferred 
across borders by Swedish firms. The impact of knowledge characteristics and 
the competitive environment on the speeds of both internal transfer and external 
imitation are simultaneously investigated using a detailed multidimensional 
construct for knowledge, including codifiability, teachability, complexity, 
system dependence and product observablilities by competitors. It was found 
that greater codifiability and teachability were associated with faster transfer, 
but not with faster imitation. The speed of imitation was positively related to the 
knowledge spillovers among firms and to the levels of common knowledge and 
competence across the industry. In addition, it was found that competition made 
firms more efficient in transferring capabilities and that continuous innovation 
impeded imitations by competitors.  
 
Research conducted by Szulanski (1996, 1999) attempted to understand the 
causes of ‘stickiness’ in the transfer of complex best practice. Knowledge 
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transfer was conceptualized into four stages, and the impediments, namely, the 
‘stickiness’ of knowledge transfer in different stages were hypothesized and 
tested based on descriptive data from a questionnaire survey. Important factors 
of knowledge transfer within MNEs, such as the attributes of knowledge 
(codification and ambiguity etc), transmission channels, the motivation and 
cognitive factors of partner units were routinely combined into research models 
and consistently proved to have an affect on the extent of knowledge transfer in 
these studies. His studies concluded that knowledge variables, instead of 
motivation factors, were the primary barrier to knowledge transfer within the 
firm’s boundary. In a similar vein, in understanding the influence of the 
characteristics of knowledge in its transfer, Birkinshaw, et al (2002) found that 
knowledge characteristics had a significant influence on the communication 
structure needed for the smooth transfer. They conceptualized ‘embeddedness’ 
as a distinctive characteristic of knowledge different from ‘tacitness’. System 
embeddedness refers to the extent to which the knowledge in question is a 
function of the system or context in which it is embedded. It consists of many 
interacting components, such as the level of interdependence between 
individuals and teams working on related activities, the level of experience of 
those activities, and the site specificity of an activity. They found that the more 
system embeddedness of the R&D unit's knowledge, the higher the level of unit 
autonomy. As such, their research concluded that system embeddedness was a 
strong predictor of organization structure. 
 
In contrast to the body of research above that emphasized knowledge 
characteristics, Lord and Ranft (1998) found that organizational structure and 
incentives were both significant factors affecting the effectiveness of knowledge 
transfer. Based on a survey of 104 market entries of multinational companies, 
the authors analysed the impact of knowledge characteristics and organizational 
variables on the internal transfer of knowledge about local markets. They 
concluded that, alongside tacitness of knowledge, the organizational structure, 
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communication mechanisms, and incentives were also significant. Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) also analyzed knowledge flows across 374 subsidiaries 
within 75 multinational corporations in a very comprehensive study of 
knowledge transfer in MNEs. The independent variables included the strategic 
value of the knowledge, motivation and absorptive capacity of the recipient, and 
communication channels, as measured in the transfer of seven types of 
procedural knowledge. The authors found that knowledge flow from the parent 
to subsidiaries was the most pervasive type of internal knowledge transfer. 
Further, the communication channel, absorptive capacity, and strategic value of 
the knowledge facilitated knowledge transfer while incentives to share 
knowledge had no effect.  
 
In a multiple method research on knowledge transfer in international acquisition, 
Bresman, et al. (1999) used both statistical methods and in-depth case studies to 
reveal the knowledge transfer process involved. Their findings were different 
from, but not in conflict with the previous findings. The more tacit form of 
knowledge was found to be best transferred through intensive communication 
with many visits and meetings. But when knowledge was relatively articulated, 
it could be made available to the other party with little regard for personal 
interaction. In addition, it was found that as time elapsed the less articulated 
knowledge, such as patents, was transferred from acquired unit to acquirer. 
Combining these different researches, the organizational and communication 
structure seemed to have interactive functions with the knowledge 
characteristics in the transfer process.  
 
To sum up these empirical studies, three groups of factors are found to be 
important in intra-firm knowledge transfer: knowledge characteristics, 
motivational factors and the structure of the organization and communication 
channel/mechanisms. However the consistency is rather mixed. In addition, in 
the context of the present study their direct application is not possible. One 
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obvious reason is that, the intra-firm knowledge transfer may involve various 
types of knowledge flows in MNEs, such as marketing knowledge 
(Schlegelmilch, et al., 2003), best practice, (Szulanski 1996, 1999), and others. 
However, knowledge transfer in the present study is in the context of vertical 
cooperation, that is, only the knowledge and information which directly affect 
the inter-firm production relationship, are likely to be transferred. As a result, it 
may be narrower in scope than knowledge transfer in the intra-firm context. 
Secondly, intra-firm knowledge transfer may have much less need for repeated 
negotiations and attenuates the hazards of opportunism, and is thus more 
advantageous than autonomous trading. Better disclosure, easier agreement, 
better governance, and more effective team organization and reconfiguration all 
result (Teece, 1981). But, all these issues often play crucial roles in shaping 
inter-firm knowledge transfer. Thirdly, most studies from this stream rely on 
quantitative methodologies and descriptive data from structured questionnaires, 
which, to some extent, prevents them from conducting in-depth analysis of the 
mechanisms that either drive or impede transfer. Consequently, the vertical 
knowledge transfer between independent firms could be much more complex 
than knowledge transfer within firms. As Argote (1999, p.176) noted “a greater 
understanding of the micro processes underlying the transfer of knowledge is 
needed”. Considering the complicated nature of inter-firm knowledge transfer, 
an in-depth qualitative study might prove more fruitful in explicating the 
mechanism of the transfer process.  
 
2.5.2 Inter-firm knowledge transfer  
A second stream of research addresses knowledge transfer across firm 
boundaries through alliances (Mowery et al., 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Simonin, 1999b). Although I entitle this section 
‘inter-firm knowledge transfer’, most studies reviewed here are actually in a 
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horizontal inter-firm context, whereas vertical inter-firm knowledge transfer is 
under represented. Nevertheless, this stream is significant because it sheds light 
on several fundamental theoretical assertions of KBV as a theory of strategy and 
of organization, namely that effective knowledge transfer is a source of 
sustained competitive advantage and that it is more effectively accomplished 
within organizations rather than markets (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). A key 
question that has been identified in the alliance literature is whether the extent to 
which knowledge is tacit or ambiguous affects the knowledge transfer processes 
(Inkpen, 1996; Simonin, 1999a). This, as discussed above, has been one of the 
key concerns of the studies on intra-firm knowledge transfer. Various 
dimensions of knowledge have been discussed primarily based on Polanyi 
(1966) who classified human knowledge as either ‘explicit’ or ‘tacit’. Explicit 
knowledge may be stored in databanks, standard operating procedures and 
manuals (Polanyi, 1966; Spender, 1996). Tacit knowledge however is expressed 
more comprehensively at individual and social levels, which may or may not be 
readily transferable to other individuals or groups (Spender, 1996). Simonin 
(1999b) empirically documented a positive and significant effect of tacitness on 
ambiguity and a negative and significant effect of ambiguity on knowledge 
transfer.  
 
Inkpen and Dinur (1998) built on Spender’s (1996) framework by theorising 
that the process of transferring knowledge from an individual to a collective or 
shared state varies by level, from interpretation at the individual level to 
integration and institutionalisation at the level of the collective. This approach is 
akin to the spiral of knowledge creation that moves upward in an organisation, 
becoming more structurally embedded through the ongoing processes of sense 
making and condition (Nonaka, 1994). Their research provides important 
insights on the knowledge transfer process in the context of strategic alliances.  
 
Apart from the objective charactertics of knowledge, partner characteristics on 
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the acquisition of new knowledge were also investigated. Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998) explored the impact of partner characteristics on the acquisition of new 
knowledge in the form of new skills and capabilities. Their study examined 31 
R&D alliances between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, where 
the pharmaceutical firm was the learning entity and the biotechnology firm was 
the teacher. In their view, tacit knowledge requires substantial absorptive 
capacity in the recipient firm. The authors constructed a three-dimensional 
measure to indicate ‘relative absorptive capacity’ and found that the similarity 
of basic knowledge was positively related to knowledge acquisition, while the 
similarity in specialized knowledge was negatively correlated. Presumably in 
the latter case, the knowledge of the sender was too similar to be of great value 
to the recipient. In addition, similarity in lower level management and research 
structures was positively related to learning, while similarity in top management 
and business decision structures was negatively related. Overall the results 
validate that knowledge transfer is dependent on measures of (knowledge base) 
similarity to the partner firm. Their study represents a conceptual advance on 
‘absorptive capacity’ advocated by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) by 
demonstrating the importance of relative absorptive capacity in clarifying the 
cognitive similarities between firms that enhance learning. 
 
Taking a slightly different avenue, Mowery et al., (1996) used data on patent 
citations to trace the changes in technological portfolio of partner firms as a 
consequence of alliances. Using a sample of 792 alliances including at least one 
US firm, the authors found that complex capabilities need strong ties to channel 
the transfer. In addition, alliances between partners with experience in related 
technological areas (greater sender-recipient similarity) resulted in greater 
knowledge transfer. The most interesting finding from this study is that the 
parents in a substantial subset of the alliances exhibited technological 
divergence. This sharply contrasted with the technological convergence that 
would be expected in alliances geared toward knowledge acquisitions and 
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capabilities transfer. Therefore one of the important conclusions was that while 
knowledge transfer constitutes one of the important components for strategic 
alliances partners, so too was the coevolution of the partners into increasingly 
unique roles. In this latter situation, knowledge transfer evolved into knowledge 
integration, while the overall system of relationships could not resemble a 
complex adaptive system based on partially connected and specialized partners 
(Anderson, 1999; Eisenhardt and Bhatia, 2001).  
 
Taken together, these studies also indicate that knowledge transfer is affected by 
knowledge characteristics and by the relationship between the partners. For the 
former, they actually replicate the studies of internal knowledge transfer. For the 
latter, the ‘relationship’ essentially refers to the degree of similarity in the 
knowledge base between partners in facilitating smooth knowledge transfer and 
leaning. In this sense, the ‘relationship’ still represents relative 
cognitive/knowledge characteristics that influence transfer process. It therefore 
signals one of the deficiencies of the empirical enquiries, that is, the incentive 
aspect on the knowledge transfer is under-studied, which makes these studies 
rather theoretically barren (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). Clearly knowledge 
especially those containing competitive advantage has strategic implications for 
the firm. Inter-firm knowledge transfer is always faced with both costs and 
benefits, so that the transferor has to weigh up what knowledge and how much 
can be transferred. Therefore the motivation of transfer and the evolving 
inter-firm relationship should be critical factor shaping the boundary and 
intensity of knowledge transfer. It is argued that only by incorporating the 
analysis of this incentive component associated with inter-firm knowledge 
transfer, can this stream of research advance its theoretical insights as to the 
critical economic factors determining knowledge transfer.  
 
At another theoretical level, most knowledge transfer studies are primarily 
derived from resource-based view of the firm, however, this research stream 
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does not sharply answer the critical questions of whether external knowledge 
transfer is either more difficult than or qualitatively different from internal 
knowledge transfer. Yet the essential assumption of KBV as a theory of 
organization is that knowledge transfer is facilitated within organizations as 
compared with markets. Few studies actually compared intra- and inter-firm 
knowledge transfer per se and thus the core theoretical tenets of KBV have not 
been greatly advanced by the empirical investigations. This shortcoming renders 
the KBV a weak theory of organization and of strategic management 
(Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). In addition, Mowery et al. (1996, p.90) lamented 
the fact that despite a substantial literature on these topics, the empirical 
analysis of strategic alliances and inter-organisational knowledge transfer relies 
on a great extent on poor indicators of the constructs in question.  
 
Last but not least, most of the studies quoted above concentrate on the Western 
context, where strategic alliances and multinational corporations are the major 
foci of scholars’ attention. In fact, not surprisingly, most empirical 
investigations and the papers are from strategic management and knowledge 
management areas, where giant corporations could naturally be the main 
subjects of these researches. Studies in developing countries context and on 
small- and medium-sized firms seem to be insufficient. The following section 
therefore addresses a small number of studies researching knowledge transfer 
from MNEs to their local partners firms in developing countries’ context.  
2.5.3 Empirical studies on MNEs’ knowledge transfer to local suppliers 
Chung et al, (2003) investigated the two mechanisms through which FDI 
influences host industry productivity - technology transfer through direct 
linkage and the competitive pressure. Using unique data on interfirm linkages, 
they assessed these two mechanisms' relative importance by investigating the 
productivity of US component suppliers from 1982 to 1991. They found that 
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Japanese auto-transplants' increased presence in North America significantly 
influenced the industry's productivity's growth during this period. But they also 
found that the productivity of local suppliers that sold components to the 
Japanese transplants did not grow faster than the productivity of unaffiliated 
suppliers. It was therefore concluded that competitive pressure appears to be the 
primary cause of the productivity growth of local supplier firms. Nevertheless, 
the investigation based on differentiation between the local supplier firms with 
and without connections to MNEs is innovative and pointed out the importance 
of the competition mechanism in improving the local component industry’s 
productivity. Rather than differentiating the local firms into MNEs connected 
and non-MNE connected groups, Smarzynska (2002) examines FDI’s spillovers 
through vertical and horizontal channels. Based on a firm-level dataset from 
Lithuania, the author found evidence of positive spillovers from FDI taking 
place through MNEs’ backward linkages. The results also showed that 
spillovers through backward linkages take place only if the technological gap 
between domestic and foreign enterprises in the supply industries is moderate in 
size. In addition, it was suggested that there was no evidence of positive 
spillovers taking place through multinational presence in the same sector. These 
two studies partially overlap with the focus of the present study although they 
cover a broader range of issues associated with FDI and adopt different 
methodologies. However, the innovative research design and sharp contrast of 
FDI’s impact on non-affiliated suppliers and affiliated suppliers and on MNE’s 
vertical and horizontal impacts suggest that more systematic investigation 
focusing on the sub-categorized component of FDI is desired to provide a more 
adequate and explicit understanding.   
 
Cyhn (2002) examined technology transfer in ‘original equipment 
manufacturing’ (OEM). It was argued that the key to Korea’s spectacular growth 
has been through its participation and learning from inter-firm arrangements 
with foreign MNEs. A number of firm-level case studies on the Korean 
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electronics industry support this argument. It was also found that the 
government was effective in providing financial incentives for the firms' 
technological upgrading efforts, but its supplying of direct technological 
assistance had limited success. However the investigation is largely descriptive 
and there are no conclusions defining the key factors either facilitating or 
prompting the inter-firm knowledge transfer. Another study conducted in 
Singapore by Brown (1998) also provided scattered evidence of MNE’s 
knowledge transfer to their local supplier firms, but the research suffers from a 
similar problem, that is, the research design and methods appear to be very 
descriptive and research findings lack of theoretical explanations.  
 
Giroud (2000) provided one of the first systematic investigations of foreign 
MNE’s linkage with local firms and knowledge transfer in recent years. Based 
on Malaysia’ electrical and electronics industry, a very (MNE) customer-related 
perspective is adopted in her study. In particular, a number of stable traits of the 
foreign customer firms in influencing their transfer of knowledge to local 
suppliers were tested. The country of origin of the customer firms received 
specific attention and was empirically tested as a significant factor in explaining 
the degree of transfer. Japanese, European and U.S.A firms were found to have 
various degree of willingness to transfer knowledge to their local suppliers. The 
differences are largely due to their different strategies in Malaysia. The research 
concluded that the knowledge transfer from the foreign investors to their local 
suppliers is quite limited. With structured-questionnaires as the main method, 
the research offers us important insights into the different behaviour and 
strategy of foreign investors in Malaysia.  
 
However, the research neglected an important aspect governing the inter-firm 
knowledge transfer, namely, the inter-firm transaction and relationships 
characteristics, which embody the actual transfer process. Although transaction 
cost economics (TCE), as one of the relevant theories, was discussed in her 
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theoretical review, the central idea of TCEs was not incorporated into the 
hypothesis generation. There is a gap between the theoretical review and 
empirical design of the research. It is argued that stable traits of the customer 
firms matter, but to capture the underlying and possibly dynamic inter-firm 
knowledge transfer process, it is indispensable to observe the repeated inter-firm 
transaction, long-term co-operation, and co-ordination. Only by doing so is it 
possible to theoretically identify the fundamental mechanisms of the inter-firm 
knowledge transfer. Another limitation of the study is that the measure of the 
inter-firm knowledge transfer is primarily based on the existence of transfer 
channels, which can hardly represent the degree of the realisation of the 
inter-firm knowledge transfer. It might be an inherited disadvantage associated 
with quantitative methods in tackling the question, as some concepts, such as 
knowledge, and knowledge transfer are very difficult to accurately 
operationalize and quantify.  
 
Wong’s study (1992) drew on ‘network theory’ in investigating technological 
development through subcontracting with foreign customer firms in Singapore. 
Based on case study methods, he found that the position of the supplier firms in 
the network play a key role in determining the inter-firm knowledge transfer. 
That is, supplier firms with higher volume and more value-added activities gain 
more in technological development from the co-operative relationship. Across 
the data of 16 interviews, five processes of technology development are nicely 
summarised. But the development process of inter-firm dyadic relationship and 
the transfer influence on the local firms still did not receive sufficient analysis. 
The adoption of qualitative methods facilitated this research to provide very rich 
information about this topic; however, the small sample size of cases makes it 
impossible to make statistically valid generalisations (Wong, 1992 p.38).  
 
Based on the opinions of senior managers within MNEs operating in Northern 
Ireland, Crone and Roper studied (2000) the potential for local learning from 
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multinational plants. They argued that 'intentional' knowledge transfers by 
foreign MNEs (supplier development efforts) are only likely to occur where 
MNE plants perceive there to be some benefits, such as improved quality, 
reduced costs or improved service (Dunning, 1993). From the local supplier's 
point of view, however, knowledge transfer from MNE customers may 
ultimately enable them to compete more effectively for business with other 
customers (Dicken, 1992). In this situation, the social benefits of knowledge 
transfers from MNE plant (accruing both to the MNE plant and its supplier) 
may exceed the private benefits (accruing to the MNE plant only). They found 
that quality audits, contractual arrangements and visits to suppliers are helpful 
to transfer knowledge. However they concluded that although the main 
empirical objective was to measure the impact of knowledge transfer activities 
on the business performance and competitiveness of local suppliers, this was a 
methodologically challenging exercise. Without a detailed analysis of individual 
supplier firms, which was beyond the resources of the study, it was difficult to 
make an objective assessment of these impacts. 
 
In summary, a critical deficiency associated with these studies is that inter-firm 
transactions and interaction have not been explicitly identified as a core 
construct of analysis in studying inter-firm knowledge transfer (an exception is 
Wong, 1992). This dearth is serious because the long-term vertical material 
linkage and co-operation is both the impetus and media of the vertical 
knowledge transfer. The under-exploration of this dimension prevents us from 
having both a theoretical and practical appreciation of this phenomenon. 
Secondly, the vertical division of labour between firms may vary accordingly 
over time, and consequently the inter-firm relationship and transactions are 
actually a living entity. Insufficient understanding about this may prohibit us 
from observing the dynamic aspects associated with the corresponding 
inter-firm knowledge transfer. To emphasise this view, it is argued that in 
actuality it is not the firms themselves that attract each other; it is what they can 
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offer to each other that facilitates and sustains the relationships, and knowledge 
transfer. Therefore focusing on some stable traits of firms can neglect important 
dynamic factors influencing the vertical cooperation and knowledge transfer. 
The possibility of dynamic inter-firm cooperation and embedded knowledge 
transfer also pose a challenge to choosing an appropriate methodology to study 
this phenomenon. The methodological implication for this thesis will be 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 
In addition, the absorption process of new knowledge in the supplier firms and 
its implications for their growth have not received sufficient analysis in these 
studies, which renders few practical recommendations to the supplier firms as 
how to cooperate with, and benefit from, such valuable yet demanding external 
linkages. As I have discussed, supply chain management studies have generated 
abundant recommendations for the buyer firms to benefit from suppliers, so it is 
reasonable to expect that studies taking a more supplier-related perceptive 
should generate the same practical recommendations for the supplier firms to 
benefit from their customers. These weaknesses identified from current research 
will be considered in my conceptual framework that will be presented in next 
chapter.  
 
2.6 Ownership structures of the indigenous Chinese firms – Will it make a 
difference? 
The transition economy of China gives rise to firms with a variety of ownership 
structures. Apart from foreign invested firms with inflowing FDI, state-owned 
firms (SOEs), domestic private-owned firms (POEs), collectively owned firms 
(COEs) and township-owned firms (TOEs) have co-existed in this transition 
market dominated by the Chinese gradualist reform policy. However, it is often 
found that there is some degree of ambiguity with the ownership of domestic 
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firms. For instance, Kynge (2000) noted that about half of all firms that call 
themselves collective should be relabelled as private. In addition, some SOEs 
having undertaken comprehensive privatisation often still identify themselves 
SOEs rather than POEs and lots of TOEs are literally private firms but stick to 
the label of TOEs for taxation reasons or other potential political and economic 
advantages that can be gained from the government regulations. Pyke et al. 
(2002) also found some confusion regarding the identification of COEs 
(specifically POEs may identify themselves as COEs) and dropped the 
differentiation in the analysis of their study. This raises a caution in identifying 
the real ownership of the firm under investigation. Therefore some studies (e.g. 
Fulin, 2001) simply categorized the domestic firms into SOEs and non-SOEs 
for a contrasting study of SOEs.  
 
It is noted that with the mass privatisation of the state sector, booming FDI and 
a developing private sector, the private sector is playing an increasingly 
important role in the country’s economy (Koretz, 2001). However, despite the 
phenomenal growth of the private sector, it is also believed that the Chinese 
government will not give up its manipulation of large scaled SOEs, especially 
those in so-called ‘pillar industries’ to sustain their financial domination (Yang, 
2003). While the debate of the role and function of SOEs is ongoing, it should 
be safe to assume that for a quite long time, SOEs will retain quite a stable 
status in the Chinese economy. Consequently, SOEs and other ownership 
structured firms have often been the subject of comparison in the search for the 
understanding of the inefficient state sector. For example, Zheng et al (1998) 
found that, with regarding to technical efficiency4 , relatively large TOEs 
surpassed SOEs by a large margin during their study period (1986-1990). COEs 
are less efficient than TOEs, but more efficient than SOEs. Meyer (2001) found 
that overcapacity, a persistent problem in China’s state sector, means that China 
                                                        
4 Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of observed intput to output on the production frontier, given 
the input levels.  
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needs technology that leads to innovation and improvement, rather than the 
traditional turnkey factories employed by foreign firms. In a series of studies 
focusing on the industrial reform and economic growth in China, Zhang (2003) 
found that SOEs have the lowest profitability compared to both POEs and 
foreign invested firms in China. The penetrating insight is that SOEs’ high 
capital-labour ratio negatively correlates with their profitability level. It 
confirmed what Meyer (2001) argued as the overcapacity problem with SOEs. 
However, some studies found that many assumed differences among ownership 
types are reducing, which suggested that SOEs have and are making progress in 
their management and resource utilization in the early part of this century (Pyke, 
et al., 2002). To sum up, there has been some scholarly consensus regarding the 
contrasting performance of state sector and non-state sector in China. 
 
However, few studies examine the different behaviour of SOEs and non-SOEs 
in their relations with MNEs. The literature review shows that three studies 
explored the link between ownership structure, spillovers and absorptive 
capacity. Buckley, et al (2002) found that foreign presence does not positively 
affect the productivity of state-owned firms, in contrast to its positive effect on 
collectively owned firms in China. The authors inferred that SOEs exhibit a 
lower level of competitiveness, absorptive capability, and motivation to learn 
relative to COEs. Another example is from a study on Poland. 
Zukowska-Gagelmann (2001) found that foreign presence has a significant 
negative impact on both state-owned and private firms in industries with high 
competition in Poland. In contrast, state-owned firms benefit from spillovers if 
competition is low. Sinani and Meyer (2003) found that spillover is positive and 
significant for all types of firm ownerships in Estonia; however the magnitude 
of the coefficient is significantly larger for outside-owned firms5. Their results 
are consistent with the conclusion that privatisation to outside firms is beneficial 
for firm restructuring and corporate performance. Outside-owned firms may 
                                                        
5 Outside-owned firms refer to privately owned firms.  
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benefit more from spillovers because they are restructuring proactively and 
seeking new ideas about business management from foreign competitors. 
Absorptive capability depends not only on human capital but also on 
organizational structures and cultures (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) and SOEs 
have comparatively lower absorptive capability even though they may possess 
advantages in terms of human capital. These studies shed light on the 
differences between SOEs and POEs in their learning ability and reaction to 
increased competition due to the presence of MNEs.  
 
However, none of the studies above directly addresses the domestic firms’ 
cooperation with MNEs. Since the present study primarily concerns how the 
domestic firms, including both SOEs and non-SOEs, cooperate with and learn 
from MNEs, this will be one of the first empirical investigations addressing the 
differences between SOEs and non-SOEs in their vertical linkages with MNEs. 
Similar patterns between SOEs and non-SOEs to those found in the prior studies 
might occur, however, it is not clear to what extent the linkage with MNEs will 
increase or reduce the divergent performance between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
The reason is that, for instance, the direct cooperation between domestic firms 
and MNEs might provide a convergent mechanism for the indigenous firms, 
despite their different ownership structures, to assimilate new knowledge from 
their MNE partners and therefore the differences resulting from the ownership 
structure might be much smaller than in the context of being influenced by 
competition from MNEs’ presence. Or, SOEs will experience difficulty in 
cooperating with MNEs due to their inherited bureaucratic administrative 
system while non-SOEs may demonstrate higher commitment and flexibility in 
their cooperation with and learning from their MNE partners. As such, the 
ownership structure of the Chinese supplier firms is another observation angle 
in studying their cooperation with MNEs. It is hoped that the framed inductive 
fieldwork will not only show the differences between them but also can explain 
what accounts for these differences.  
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2.7 A summary  
Literatures have been reviewed from both theoretical and empirical angles 
relating to the topic of inter-firm knowledge transfer in order to provide the 
empirical investigation with a reference or thread and yet allow new and 
inductive insights to emerge from the data. The next chapter will clarify the 
‘eclectic framework’ drawn upon these literatures as guidance for the conduct of 
the research.  
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Chapter 3 Research framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has provided a review of literatures on the central issues of inter-firm 
vertical cooperation and knowledge transfer. While not being repetitive, this 
chapter presents an ‘eclectic’ analytical framework built from those literatures 
as guidance for the conduct of the study. First of all, a process-oriented 
framework of the unfolding relationship is proposed to reveal the process of 
inter-firm relationship. The second line for the investigation is to understand 
how knowledge of different nature is transferred in this unfolding context. 
Thirdly, observation will be made as to whether the Chinese firms with different 
ownership structures cooperate with, and learn from their MNE partner 
differently. The purpose of the framework is to provide multiple observational 
angles for studying the central issue of inter-firm knowledge transfer. Therefore, 
it should be distinguished from pure deductive hypotheses generation.  
 
3.2 Inter-firm knowledge transfer process  
Among various forms of inter-firm cooperation, or in Williamson’s terms, 
‘hybrid forms of organization’ (1991), vertical linkage represents one of the 
most significant channels where firms can capitalize on the economics of 
complementarity (Hirschman, 1958; Meyer, 2004). The linkage between MNEs 
and local firms in a host country allows even more potential for such 
complementarity due to the fact that they come from dramatically different 
(level) networks of division of labor. While developing countries have 
comparatively underdeveloped division of labor and specialization, MNEs from 
developed economies often find that either there are no such ‘local’ (host) 
markets for them to source required periphery products and components, or the 
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‘local markets’ are not mature enough where the local firms have inadequate 
production ability due to their underdeveloped specialization. Therefore a 
certain degree of knowledge transfer and assistance from MNEs (subsidiaries) 
to their local partners becomes necessary if the MNEs want to capitalize on the 
advantage of focusing on their core competences by sourcing periphery 
products from local suppliers. For the local firms, supplying the MNEs provides 
them with a platform upon which to developing their specialization of 
production capability. As such, high motivation of learning is expected. As all 
relationships start at certain point of time and develop with the expectations and 
efforts of both sides, a processual perspective to understand the unfolding 
relationship development between firms can help reveal the important 
contextual factors that either promote or deter the knowledge transfer embedded 
in the business relations.  
 
Based on prior empirical investigations on inter-firm cooperation (Larson, 1992; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Bessant, et al. 2003) and relevant theories, such as 
TCE, some stages of the relationship development can be hypothesized. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that for the firm to ‘buy’ rather than 
‘make’, the transaction cost involved from the ‘buy’ scenario must be lower 
than that from the ‘make’ decision. A relaxed discussion on the hybrid forms of 
organization (Williamson, 1991) suggested that hybrid forms represent an 
intermediate level of asset specificity, market power and administrative costs. 
As such, the asset specificity of the inter-firm exchange is supposed to be lower 
than that within the firm and also with relatively lower frequency and 
uncertainty. This might portray the initial stage of the relationship, where firms 
have a limited amount of relationship-specific investment and an intermediate 
degree of transaction frequency. This view seems to make sense for the MNEs 
which pursue local sourcing strategies to capitalize on transportation costs and 
production costs, but it implicitly takes the local firms (‘market’ or ‘buy’ 
solution) for granted, which means whenever the MNE decides to buy, local 
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firms are able to provide them with the desired components and products. 
However, reality is not always this simple.  
 
As a matter of fact, Chi (1994), Ismail (1999) and Sutton (2004) suggested that 
despite of the increasing amount of MNE’s local sourcing in Malaysia, China 
and India, the local availability has been a common bottle-neck preventing 
MNEs from more aggressive scales of local sourcing. As such, the ‘buy’ or 
‘make’ scenario of TCE contains an implicit assumption that to a certain firm 
(MNE in this case), other firms (represented as ‘market) have similar abilities in 
production and thus the decision of ‘make’ or ‘buy’ naturally falls on the 
transaction costs alone since production ability and costs are treated equal 
across firms (Madhok, 2002). However, MNEs from developed countries might 
find a different degree of specialization and networks of division of labor in the 
host developing country, where the local ‘market’ is available yet incompetent 
or simply unavailable. None of the traditional TCE studies have considered this 
situation. The reason probably is that most TCE studies focus on a ‘single 
market or single country’ context, where the network economy of the division of 
labor develops on a unified social/economic infrastructure and the ‘firms’ as an  
abstract category, as opposed to the ‘market’, are assumed to have unified 
production abilities. Cross-country studies, however, will face the additional 
difference of the firms’ production ability/competence of the host country which 
results from a dramatically different country/market context and the subsequent 
different degree of specialization. This renders the traditional scenario of 
transaction cost studies incomplete in studying such ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision of 
MNEs. While TCE has been focused on the ‘transaction cost’ alone, the 
substantial cost advantage of developing countries which has been responsible 
for the large scale outsourcing of MNEs seems to make the TCE scenarios less 
relevant. Therefore, a complete understanding should include both the TCE 
thesis and the dramatic difference of production cost/ability between countries 
into a cohesive analysis.  
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Accordingly, MNEs either have to ‘make’ in the foreign market even if they 
have the intention to outsource; or ‘outsource’ and provide some assistance to 
the local supplier firm to improve their competence. It does not exclude the 
possibility that the local firms happen to be competent in certain area of 
production. However, the logic suggests that the former two situations might be 
the rule rather than exception. It is believed both these two situations co-exist 
depending on the extant degree of specialization that the local firms have 
achieved. Since the focus of the thesis is on the MNE-local vertical linkage, the 
situation of unavailable components from local market is not studied here.  
 
Combining the traditional TCEs (Williamson, 1985, 1991) and the special case 
of developing countries (Chi, 1994; Ismail, 1999; Sutton, 2004) such as China, 
it is hypothesized that the relationship also starts with an intermediate degree of 
uncertainty. The MNEs have to identify the local firms which have the potential 
to produce qualified components for them. Accordingly the early stage of the 
relationship has to consider both economizing transaction costs and production 
ability of the local firms. Catellani and Zanfei (2002) found that the experience 
accumulation multinationals' subsidiary in a host environment has a positive and 
significant impact on collaborative linkages with local firms because it enhances 
their capacity to select, and interact with, local partners and institutions. The 
process of selecting the supplier firms is so that the MNEs can reduce the 
‘uncertainty’ associated with the supplier firm’s production ability. 
‘Uncertainty’ could also come from the behavioral attributes of the supplier, 
however since the linkage with MNEs represent an important channel for them 
to upgrade their production ability, the opportunism that can jeopardize 
cooperation and learning opportunity is supposed to be low. On the other hand, 
due to the weak intellectual property right enforcement in China, the 
opportunism of the local supplier firms to approach the unwanted contagion of 
technology and information can be expected. Although the two mechanisms 
both can enhance the local supplier firms’ capability, the foreign MNEs need to 
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have proper control of the unwanted information leakage.  
 
In addition, local firms that have already possessed strong ability should have an 
advantage in attracting the MNEs, while those that do not may have difficulty in 
convincing MNEs to give them the chance to be a supplier. However, even for 
competent suppliers, communication and learning are needed for them to know 
the specific requirements that MNEs have for the products. As such, the 
knowledge transfer may start from the supplier firms learning the specific 
requirements that MNEs have for the components. Therefore, some increase in 
transaction costs may be unavoidable if closely complementary capabilities are 
to be developed (Loasby, 1999), and it is no accident that transaction costs, as 
well as distinctive transaction capabilities, are more prominent in highly 
productive economic activities. Such considerations do not diminish the 
importance of the effective management of transaction costs; but they do 
indicate the need to manage transaction and production costs together, 
especially when seeking to increase productivity through the Marshallian 
combination of differentiation and integration (Loasby, 1999).  
 
Adam Smith declared that the division of labor is important as a more efficient 
means of using varied skills than as a means of developing them (Loasby, 
2002)6. In this inter-firm knowledge transfer, the assistance of MNEs represents 
an effort to refine the division of labor with the local firms. Only by improving 
the production competence of the supplier firm, can the MNE focus on its core 
competence and both sides benefit from the economics of specialization based 
on a refined division of labor and so further develop comparative advantage. 
Therefore the co-ordination of the specialized activities which result from the 
                                                        
6 To ascertain that division of labor results from the differences between individuals make the differences 
between individuals unanswered. A more profound theory should start from treating all individuals being 
identical and the specialization based on division of labor is a developed economic strategy for economic 
actors to obtain the end of improving wealth and overall well-being (Yang, 2003). Therefore the degree of 
internalization is a criterion to assess the explanatory power of theories, that is to say, the explanatory 
power of a theory depends on to what extent it can explain the differences by starting from identical.  
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division of knowledge between firms by communication and learning require 
the development of what is called a firm's 'external organization' (especially 
MNE), a source of transaction costs which are deliberately incurred in order to 
obtain productivity benefits (Loasby, 1999). 
 
Once the relationship can be initiated, the healthy development largely depends 
on the performance of the firms. Satisfactory performance of the supplier firm 
can encourage the MNEs to give more assistance, facilitate open 
communication and probably favorable sourcing deals. Good market 
performance of MNEs can also favor the inter-firm cooperation because the end 
product demand can deliver the positive impacts of the demand of MNEs from 
local suppliers. Booming vertical linkage is very important in promoting 
knowledge transfer because by producing more products for the MNEs, supplier 
firms obtain more opportunities to learn about the specific requirements of 
products. It represents a deeper division of labor between firms, where supplier 
firms will eventually master more knowledge and techniques in the production. 
In contrast, poor performance will drag the business development and hamper 
the learning opportunity. Apart from economic incentives, social elements may 
also incrementally increase in influence over time (Powell, 1990; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994). Personal networks between firms may solidify the 
communication structure and therefore promote information and knowledge 
transfer. Another social element studied in Van de Ven (1994) is ‘equity’. In the 
MNE-local linkage, power asymmetry may be prevalent, but it is not clear 
whether power asymmetry will always translate into ‘inequity’ in the 
relationship. However, it can be imagined that chronic inequality will damage 
the motivation of business partners and will demote open communication and 
trust, while comparatively equitable relationships should be more beneficial for 
the long-term development of both sides. It will be interesting to observe 
whether power asymmetrical business partners can develop and sustain 
comparative equal relationships and why. If not, what other counterpart 
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mechanisms are helping sustain the relationship? 
 
The local supplier firms’ technological sophistication and capability increase 
with the previous success of knowledge transfers, which makes it possible for 
partners to pursue higher value added activity. Also in sharing more congruent 
goals, concerns about a partner’s opportunism may be surpassed by the trust and 
the desire for joint value creation. Empirical investigations such as that by Dyer 
(1997) found such evidence. In this case these incentives can further promote 
inter-firm knowledge transfer that is needed for the higher value added activity. 
This can take the form of joint supplier-buyer R&D programmes (Wong, 1992), 
contractual cross-licensing of technologies, or information cooperation 
(Hakansson and Laage-Hellman, 1989). Renegotiations and new supplemental 
agreements may emerge to resolve only the contestable issues and all other 
terms and understandings contained in the relational contract remain in effect. In 
this way, the ongoing knowledge transfer can be preserved and promoted. Thus 
a new cycle of knowledge transfer starts, but presents more value-creating 
opportunities.  
 
However the opposite situation can occur as well. That is inter-firm knowledge 
transfer can decline over time. The seeds of the decline are:  
(1): the knowledge gap diminishes. This can occur as a natural outcome of the 
inter-firm division of labor. The supplier becomes more knowledgeable in a 
certain component’s production, design and development. The ‘student’ 
develops a level of expertise in the area of the production. However the vertical 
exchange can continue where firms can fully realize the economic of 
specialization which is developed by prior effort and cooperation.  
  
(2): the knowledge gap exists, however the existing level of knowledge transfer 
to the supplier firm and its subsequent performance has been able to sufficiently 
meet the foreign MNE’s needs and its incentive to further transfer knowledge 
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declines. This is largely contingent upon the MNE’s motivation for outsourcing. 
When the advantageous production cost of the local firms is the major incentive 
for the outsourcing arrangement, knowledge transfer may stop when the MNEs 
find the product quality and cost structure of the supplier firm have reached 
their expected level. However inter-firm cooperation can be dynamic and firms 
can adjust their cooperation purpose over time. If the desire to engage in more 
cooperative activities, such as joint product development, is enticed with the 
deepening relationship, knowledge transfer can continue.  
 
(3): a potential paradoxical situation will arise between the degree of 
complementarity and potential substitution of MNEs and their indigenous 
suppliers. As the inter-firm vertical linkage is the means for the firms to 
capitalize on their comparative advantage, the lower production cost in China 
and the improved technology capability of the supplier firms may lead the 
Chinese firms to desire downstream integration and in that case they will 
become MNE’s competitors. With this potential of the indigenous supplier firms, 
MNEs are reasonably expected to have concern over this and try to protect their 
knowledge. As it is not practical to calculate to an accurate degree what 
knowledge can be passed onto the supplier firm and what cannot, the MNEs 
have to address the paradox of providing necessary assistance to the supplier 
firms and also protect their core-competence to avoid creating potential 
competitors. This may become a barrier preventing further knowledge transfer 
from MNEs to the local suppliers even though some proportion of knowledge 
transfer may still remain within the domain of complementarity rather than 
substitution.  
 
3.3 Knowledge attributes 
Theoretically, the general understanding of knowledge is that much technical 
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knowledge is inarticulate and tacit (Polanyi, 1966) and can be transmitted only 
at a cost through imitation and apprenticeship. This passive perspective creates a 
difficulty for knowledge-based theories of growth to the extent that when 
knowledge is tacit in this way, it behaves like an ordinary private good, and its 
role in generating increasing returns is lost. One response to the problem of tacit 
knowledge has been to create a clear distinction between knowledge that is tacit 
and that which is codified (Nonaka, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1996). Codified 
knowledge is knowledge that has been, or can be, converted into symbols for 
easy transmission, replication and storage. Such knowledge thus partakes of 
Arrovian public-good properties (Arrow, 1974), which makes it a potential 
source of increasing returns. Under this stratagem, the significant role of tacit 
knowledge in social learning does not invalidate growth theory so long as there 
also exists codified knowledge in suitable quantities. In fact, technological 
change and economic growth have had the effect of tipping the balance between 
tacit and codified knowledge. More knowledge is becoming codified and 
accelerated the pace of social learning and economic growth.  
 
Apart from this dualistic view of codified/tacit knowledge, Hayek (1978) 
provided a more integrated understanding of knowledge. He suggested that all 
knowledge is primarily a system of rules of action, assisted and modified by 
rules indicating equivalences or differences of various combinations of stimuli 
(p.41). To study the growth of knowledge is thus to study the evolution of 
systems of rules of actions. The conceptualization of knowledge as involving 
rule-following systems is certainty consistent with the general understanding of 
tacit knowledge. Nelson and Winter (1982) have associated Polanyi's concept 
with the notion of routines, which they see as the basic element of human action. 
Routines are habitual patterns of behavior that embody skill-like knowledge. 
Such knowledge cannot be articulated or transmitted explicitly but must be 
acquired over time through a process of apprenticeship and trial-and-error 
learning. A structure of routines - in an individual, an organization, or a wider 
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institution - is clearly a system of rules of action and a knowledge structure 
(Langlois and Foss, 1997). Tacit knowledge need not, in fact, be idiosyncratic. 
There is no compelling ground for associating the tacit knowledge of either 
technologists of scientists necessarily with skills that are specific rather than 
generic in their applicability. Knowledge is not simply a body of abstract 
information, but is inherently social, embedded in terminology, in procedures, 
in physical equipment and in products. Well-functioning teams and 
organizations can operate effectively with little communication. In the case of 
organizations and institutions as in the case of technology, standardization is 
arguably the fundamental source of increasing returns. In fundamental sense, 
institutions are standards that orient behavior (North 1990). 
 
Meanwhile, knowledge’s attributes have been acknowledged to influence its 
transfer in most empirical studies (see chapter 2.5). The above understanding of 
knowledge shows that both tacit and codified knowledge are important and both 
can be transferred from MNEs to local firms. However, empirical studies on 
knowledge transfer have persistently found that tacit knowledge is more 
difficult to transfer. A processual perspective should be able to highlight how the 
firms cope with different types of knowledge and learning and what types of 
behaviour can help speed up the desired knowledge transfer (Langlois, 2000). In 
addition, combining Hayek’s view on knowledge, both tacit and codified 
knowledge will eventually be integrated into the supplier firm’s system for 
proper utilization. Therefore knowledge transfer will also help them adjust their 
internal system of learning and utilizing, in which case, the inter-firm 
knowledge transfer can deliver long-term implications to the supplier firms.  
 
Apart from the cognitive difficulties that are associated with transferring 
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, deliberate effort can reduce the 
difficulty of knowledge transfer. Lundvall (2002) has suggested that 
codification can be understood as a process of generalizing the specific, and 
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translating messages into a common and shared language. It involves the 
establishment of technical standards and of basing technical development on 
general scientific principles. Therefore, appropriate action can be taken to 
increase the codification of knowledge for its transfer. For example, knowledge 
codification is found to be a very effective mechanism for integrating the 
acquired unit in post-acquisition management practices in the U.S. commercial 
banking industry (Zollo, 1998). As such, observations can be made as to how 
the firms deal with the tacit problem in transferring knowledge, and what 
measures are taken to promote desired knowledge transfer.  
 
Secondly, as Lord and Ranft (1998) and Birkinshaw et al. (2002) pointed out 
knowledge is a contingency variable predicting organizational structure. This 
implies that the attributes of knowledge can impose constraints and 
requirements on inter-firm cooperation such that the firms must adapt certain 
management and communication structures to facilitate its transfer. For instance, 
when the knowledge involved is highly tacit, close face-to-face communication 
and interaction becomes not only necessary but also critical in realizing the 
smooth transfer. Therefore the attribute of knowledge, communication structure 
and the effort of codifying knowledge may have interactive functions in 
promoting knowledge transfer. 
 
3.4 Supplier firms as knowledge recipients  
A third observation angle is the ownership structure of the indigenous supplier 
firms. Certain difference between SOEs and non-SOEs are expected with both 
positive and negative implications. SOEs are generally bigger and more 
bureaucratic than non-SOEs in China. But it is not clear whether SOEs will be 
bureaucratic in dealing with MNEs. The reason is that China is adopting a dual 
track legal system in treating and attracting FDI (Huang, 2005) and therefore 
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MNEs have privileged status compare to most indigenous firms. Will SOEs, 
which are primarily run by the government be ‘hostile’ to and threatened by the 
MNEs, which the government deliberately attempts attract, or will they embrace 
them because of their prestige? Will SOEs treat the cooperation with MNEs 
differently to those with other indigenous Chinese firms? If so, will the SOEs’ 
inherited administrative systems allow them to do so? This question will be 
brought up in the fieldwork. Secondly, observation needs to reveal whether 
non-SOEs are generally more efficient than SOEs. If so, what makes them so? 
Is it due to superior human capital, technology, their entrepreneurship, or private 
ownership or anything else?  
 
Moreover, caution needs to be taken to investigate the real ownership structure 
of the firm since China is undergoing large-scale privatization. There is a certain 
degree of ambiguity and chaos with the ownership of Chinese firms. In addition, 
for firms that have completed or are undergoing privatization, analytical 
attention should consider the inertia that is inherited from their previous 
ownership structure rather than expect them to immediately behave as firms that 
have always been privately owned. For firms in a transition period, research 
needs to explore what are the advantages of the privatization process and what 
are the difficulties and how these connect to their cooperation with MNEs?  
 
3.5 A summary 
Three analytical threads drawn upon the literatures have been summarized in 
this chapter as the guidance for the conduct of the research. However some 
space is also left to allow induction through fieldwork data. As such, the 
research combines both deductive and inductive approaches to the enquiry of 
the inter-firm knowledge transfer. The next chapter will explain the research 
ontology, methodology and the research design.  
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter firstly clarifies that a research ontology based on realism is held up 
in the study. Its implications in studying social reality are then discussed. 
Secondly, a qualitative methodology and multiple case study method are 
justified for the conduct of this research based on its strengths in studying the 
research questions rather than based on a refutation of quantitative methodology 
per se. The research setting and data collection process are described in the third 
section and the final section explains the qualitative data analysis process.   
 
4.2 Research philosophy - what is social reality?  
The distinguishing feature that separates science from art and philosophy is 
methodology. Methodology is the intelligent tool that science utilizes to search 
for the explanation and comprehension of mankind and his environment. 
Different methodologies often reflect varying ontological and epistemological 
beliefs. In this research, philosophical realism is held up as the ontological 
stance. Realism, as Searle (1995, p. 153) defined it, is simply ‘the view that the 
world exists independently of our representation of it.’ Based on this stance, I 
believe that science, to be science, must have a real object of enquiry (Hodgson, 
2001).  
 
Although the enquiry that science takes in investigating reality is always fallible 
and provisional, it is not a refutation of the existence of the real world. The 
difficulties of objectively mirroring reality result from both the human being’s 
limited cognitive ability and the complexity of the reality (Tsoukas, 1989). In 
turn, science is an ongoing enterprise for searching for the truth, even though 
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the absolute truth is beyond our immediate grasp. In fact, the continuity in the 
search for truth itself justifies the sustainable being of science. An analogy can 
be derived from economics, where Richardson (2002), for instance, suggested 
that markets generally operate not despite, but because of some imperfections of 
competition. And ‘perfect competition’ is therefore a state of ‘rest’ compared to 
the continuity that our daily life experiences and demonstrates (Loasby, 1999). 
In a similar logic, if science could deliver us the absolute and perfect truth for 
once and for all, it is the time that science ceases to exist. 
 
In contrast to the natural world, social reality is even more complex. The 
following figure illustrates my understanding of social reality. The X-axis 
represents the flow of time. If we put it in a broader context, it can represent the 
evolving history of human society, from primary society, feudalism, capitalism 
(and/or socialism) to the unfolding future. The Z-axis refers to the geographical 
dispersion of societies. Although physical reality also contains time and place 
dimensions, the general laws that natural science is searching for and 
developing are constant across time and place. A vivid example from Williams 
can bring this point home:  
‘….in the 19th century, two scientists independently in France and 
England, using observed anomalies in the orbit of the planet Uranus, 
predicted that a detailed examination of a certain part of the sky would 
reveal a previously unknown planet. When they carried out the 
investigation and found the planet (Neptune), this was not the prediction 
of a future planet, or of any future event, but merely a prediction of what 
would be found when and if certain actions were carried out’. (Williams 







Figure 4.1: Social reality: continuity and variety 
 
Therefore the departure between social reality and physical reality lies in the 
fact that human beings are not only the constituting element of social reality 
(like a particle of matter in a physical world), but also are motivated beings 
which can actively initiate (and react to continuously reconstitute) the social 
reality which they are part of (Rothbard, 1972; Giddens, 1984; North, 1990; 
Williams, 1996). Motivation, represented by the Y-axis in Figure 4.1, is 
therefore the distinguishing characteristic associated with human action and the 
constituted social reality. In addition, the motivations of human actions are not 
static or constant. Instead, they change and evolve with time and place and 
become the principle force behind the evolving continuity and variety of social 
reality. 
 
The important difference between physical reality and social reality has a 




































threefold implication on the methodology of studying social reality. First is the 
need for caution in the imitation of the methods and language of natural science 
in the study of social reality. For example, Hayek (1977) suggested that human 
society is the product of human action but not human design; as a society is not 
a system of quantities but a system of relationships and its essentials cannot be 
measured. Similar views can be found from Rothbard (1972). In discussing the 
limitation of using mathematics in studying social reality, Rothbard suggested 
that mathematics is of greatest importance in physics because it deals with 
certain observed regularities of motion by particles of matter that we must 
regard as unmotivated. As such, in physics, causal relations can only be 
assumed hypothetically and later approximately verified by referring to precise 
observable regularities. Furthermore, in physics the quantitative relationships or 
laws are constant and are considered to be valid for any point in human history. 
In contrast, the causal force in social reality is motivated, purposeful human 
action directed towards certain ends. In addition, social actors can define and 
redefine their purposes over time. Consequently, Rothbard came to a very 
similar conclusion to that of Hayek: that the only natural laws in human action 
are qualitative rather than quantitative. As such, quantitative research contains 
the risk of ignoring the differences between the natural and social world by 
failing to understand the 'meanings' that are brought to social life (Silverman, 
2000).  
 
On the other hand, to fairly assess the credit of mathematics in studying social 
science, we cannot forget that mathematics, as a branch of science itself, also 
has its own evolving process and therefore its application in social science (into 
science generally as well) could be often conditioned by its own development. 
For instance, Yang (2003) suggested that 
‘Since the application of mathematics in the research of economic 
development is a gradual evolutionary process, usually the most simple 
and thereby very unrealistic mathematics models are developed before 
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more sophisticated and realistic ones. Hence it is common that very 
ingenious ideas are too complicated to be formalized by any mathematical 
models that economists can command, while tractable models are too 
simple and naïve. Therefore the following two extremes are both 
inappropriate: one is to worship mathematical formalism and ignore 
nonmathematical insights into economic development. The other is to 
totally ignore the implications of mathematical formalism.’ (p.18) 
 
The second is the limitation of general theory in social science. Hodgson (2001) 
suggested that while general theories or unified explanation is desirable, some 
of them are based on high abstraction and therefore could be of low empirical 
relevance: “A theory that every event is caused by the gods is an explanatory 
unification, but it is of little scientific significance. Likewise, as a non-fallible 
general theory such as ‘everyone is a utility maximizer’ is also of little 
explanatory value” (p.4). Similarly in studying evolutionary theory of 
economics, Vromen (2004) suggested “if a study of proximate cause leads to a 
better understanding both of processes in which new variants appear and of 
processes in which some of the extent variants are selectively retained, that this, 
rather than Universal Darwinist’s general formula, gives us a profound insights 
into the ‘beef’ or the ‘crux of the matter’” (p.27).  
 
Therefore, instead of simply stating ‘self-interest’ as the driving force of every 
single observable behavior, adequate explanations have to contain the concrete 
analysis of the varied contexts where people find themselves and the varied 
motivations that they have for in engaging in certain (self-interested) activities. 
That is, ‘particularities’ have to be captured and explained under the 
acknowledged general principle. So general law, instead of being the ultimate 
target that we pursue, should be better seen as the guidance that we use to direct 
our exploration for particularities to achieve adequate scientific explanation and 
understanding. This is particularly important for social science considering that 
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we are faced with the problem that social/economic reality changes in a way 
that physical reality does not. This point is also borne out in the example given 
by North (1994):  
‘Since all motivation comes out with certain reasoning and perception, 
what determines the actor’s perception of the world and reasoning about 
it? That they vary as between say a communist party official in the former 
Soviet union, a Papuan tribesman and a business woman in the United 
States is obvious; more important for us is that faced with identifiable 
problems these actors would frequently make different choices. (p. 2)’. 
 
The limitation of general theory also gives rise to the consideration of the role 
of deduction and induction in social research. It is often believed that the two 
approaches have a division of labor into deductive theory testing and inductive 
theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). The deductive method is a process 
attempting to derive universal conclusions from a few professionally general 
and fundamental propositions (Hodgson, 2001). Most of them are based on 
mathematics in reaching their research results. It is certainly ignorant to deny 
the substantial contributions of those successful quantitative studies in 
social/economic areas. But to leverage the advantage of this research technique 
requires a considerable level of understanding and careful research design to 
formulate relevant and meaningful hypotheses and correspondingly 
sophisticated (or suitable) mathematical knowledge to conduct robust analysis. 
When these conditions are not well met, qualitative investigation and induction7 
need to be blended into the process of research.  
 
Philosophical realism does support that theory has primacy over facts (Hodgson, 
2001), because concepts and theories are required to formulate any factual 
statement. However, that does not mean that science always works by first 
                                                        
7 However there is no implication here to state that qualitative methodology is always associated with 
induction while quantitative methodology is associated with deduction even though in most cases they are 
closely connected.  
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formulating a theoretical explanation and then testing it. There are many cases 
in the history of science where facts have first emerged without a theory that 
explains them. Science may subsequently triumph by supplying a theoretical 
explanation. In this manner, facts may proceed or impel the formation of 
theories (Hodgson, 2001). As such, deduction and induction are genuinely 
complementary to each other and could well be combined in a single research to 
pursue a better understanding of the research questions.  
 
From an opposite angle, in discussing how deduction can supplement induction, 
Pettigrew (1997) suggested that the real creative process of research takes place 
in a constantly iterating cycle of deduction and induction. In this interactive 
process, where the researcher is constantly going back and forth from one type 
of research activity to another, the preliminary analytical framework will be 
affected by what is discovered during the data generation and sense-making 
process (Coffey and Atikinsson, 1996). This kind of process sounds more 
convincing than pure induction since few researchers enter the field with an 
empty head waiting to be filled with evidence. On the other hand, 
predetermined conceptual frameworks may restrict the researcher and create a 
gap between the perspectives of the researcher and the persons in the reality 
under scrutiny (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore research should not be 
unnecessarily constrained by having to adhere to previously developed theory. 
On the other hand, too loose a framework might lead to indiscriminate data 
collection and data overload. As a result, it is important to enter into research 
settings with some theoretical background (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). To 
summarize the two streams of argument that these scholars have on the role of 
induction and deduction, I follow what Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested: 
induction and deduction are linked research approaches. In searching for the 
answers to our research questions, different research approaches, whether 
inductive, deductive or a blend of both, should be selected in a way that is 
productive in investigating and discovering the truth.  
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Thirdly, due to the complex nature of social reality, it is crucial to choose an 
appropriate level to analyze research questions because reality should be 
conceived as consisting of different ontological levels. This is what Hodgson 
(2001) suggested that in studying social/economic phenomena, different levels 
of analysis and varying degrees of abstraction should be adopted to fit in with 
the particularity of the research questions:  
“There may be a level relating to matter addressed by physics, a level 
relating to molecules addressed by chemistry, a level relating to living 
organisms addressed by biology and so on. These levels may 
themselves be subdivided. Within physics, for example, quantum 
physics and mechanics address different levels. Accordingly, different 
scientific theorists maybe relate to different levels of reality” (p. 11)  
 
Similarly, Yang (2003) has clearly spelled out that there are five levels in 
studying economics development. The first level is geopolitical structure, which 
determines the evolution of ideology, norms, moral codes and political and legal 
institutions. The second level determines the evolution of commercial 
institutions, industrial organization and business practices. The third level 
determines the evolution of the division of labor and related economic structure. 
The fourth level determines aggregate productivity and welfare and the fifth 
level affects the evolution of ideology, norms, and institutions (North, 1994). 
Simon (1991) also suggested that since most natural and social systems do have 
hierarchical structures, different levels of analytical focus need to be adopted to 
fit with the research subjects and purpose. Therefore it is crucial to choose an 
appropriate observational level to investigate specific questions. In sum, social 
reality is context-bounded, multi-level and evolving phenomena. In searching 
for the ‘truth’ of social reality, choosing the appropriate observational level is 




4.3 Research methodology and methods 
Based on the above discussion of the realist social ontology and its 
methodological implications, this section justifies why a qualitative processual 
methodology is adopted in this study. This will be followed by an explanation of 
the choice of a multiple case study research method. Prominently, the purpose 
of the research is to explore a few important issues associated with inter-firm 
knowledge transfers. It can be hypothesized that change is an evident part of 
any inter-organizational relationship. Organizations interact with each other and 
develop relationships in order to exploit and develop their resources. As a 
consequence of interaction between the parties, relationships evolve over time. 
They are inherently dynamic and characterized by continuous processes which 
make them living structures. Therefore a processual perspective, which means 
inter-firm relationships are perceived to emerge, evolve and (possibly) dissolve 
in a continuous and interactive process, is adopted. My intention is to identify 
and examine the features and mechanisms of relationship development and 
assess the knowledge transfer embedded in the unfolding relationships. In some 
studies, the interest is only in the result of the process, not in the process itself. 
By describing how things develop over time, the processual research is capable 
of generating sound knowledge not only of the outcomes but also of why and 
how outcomes are shaped by processes (Van de Ven, 1992; Pettigrew, 1997).  
 
On the other hand, my literature review has shown that the evolving inter-firm 
relationships are under-studied with only a small number of empirical studies 
investigating the inter-firm knowledge transfer (see chapter 2.4). Clearly, our 
understanding of the internal working of such relationships is limited. In 
addition, no previous empirical investigation has been identified in the Chinese 
context, which makes quantitative analysis (deduction) even harder and may 
prove to be fruitless if attempted before a sensible understanding has been 
reached to generate a sound model and pertinent hypotheses. As such, a 
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qualitative and processual research strategy based on a combination of induction 
and deduction is deemed to be able to provide me with an opportunity to collect 
‘rich’ and ‘real’ data revealing the ‘depth’ and ‘scope’ of the research questions 
under investigation. It should prove useful especially when the research focus is 
on the ‘process’ of instead of mere ‘input-output’ correlations of the inter-firm 
knowledge transfer (Autio and Laamanen, 1995).  
 
Secondly, the qualitative methodology facilitates a flexible research process 
where inconsistent theoretical viewpoints could be debated (or combined) and 
improved understandings can be built upon. As a result, on the one hand, in the 
deductive manner, prior theories and literatures have been critically 
appropriated into an analytical framework of the study (chapter 3). They are 
valuable to inform the initial data collection and incrementally induce a more 
systematic apprehension of the research questions. On the other hand, more 
inductively, new concepts and theories will be incorporated based on what is to 
be revealed in the data collection with convincing and sufficient data in an effort 
to understand the research questions by integrating the existing theory with new 
empirical evidence and thus facilitate theory development. It is suggested that 
both (prior theory and theory emerging from the data) are always involved, 
often simultaneously, and that it is impossible to go theory-free into any study. It 
is consistent with what Miles and Huberman (1994) concluded, that induction 
and deduction are linked research approaches. In addition, the ultimate purpose 
is to achieve explanatory adequacy of the interested research questions. 
Preoccupied attitudes that either methodology is superior to the other are wrong. 
Instead, methodology should be chosen based on criteria that determine which 
is more appropriate or effective in reaching objectives the set on the way to a 
distant goal (Homans, 1961). As such, a blend of deduction and induction are 
perceived as appropriate and potentially effective. 
 
Based on the qualitative and processual principle explained above, a multiple 
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case studies approach is chosen as the research method to search for a holistic 
understanding of the research questions. Specifically, semi-structured interviews 
will be used to collect data from both customer firm and supplier firm to 
facilitate the analytical focus of the inter-firm relationship. The strengths of 
using the case method is significant when  
(1) ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed (Yin, 2003) 
(2) causal links are complex 
(3) research focuses on ‘process’ (Stoecker, 1991) 
(4) the main goal of the study is to refine and generate novel theory that is 
empirically valid and testable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).  
 
As described by Yin (2003) multiple case design contains more than one single 
case of analysis in the same investigation, and thereby permits a comparison 
across cases. The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust 
(Herriott, and Firestone, 1983); however, each case’s integrity and 
idiosyncrasies need to be maintained to avoid the risk of simplistic and the 
linear logic of thinking which may or may not be the case (Stoecker, 1991). In 
addition, case comparisons which attempt to preserve the integrity of each case 
typically also create a situation where we have the accumulation of numerous 
variables typically greater in number, by an order of magnitude, than the 
number of cases being studied, which makes traditional statistical techniques 
irrelevant (Yin, 2003). Compared to a structured statistical approach, the 
in-depth and ‘intensive’ research methods will allow me to observe the causal 
interconnection between actual properties and people within an actual setting, 
probe the dialectical and dynamic process of the phenomena under investigation, 
better grasp its complexity and suggest possible new theoretical and 
generalizable principles (Stoecker, 1991). In addition, a retrospective study 
makes possible the identification of continuities, different development periods 
and cycles (Halimen and Tornroos, 1995) of inter-firm knowledge transfer. An 
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intensive investigation of the historical causal process that reveals the 
commonalities of the vertical knowledge transfer across cases is also expected. 
The following section explains the research setting and data collection process. 
Data analysis will be presented in 4.5 of this chapter.  
 
4.4. Research setting and data collection  
4.4.1 Justification of the research setting 
First of all a decision was made to focus on the electrical and electronics (EE) 
industry in the city of Wuxi as the research setting. The decision is based on the 
following considerations. Since the research looks into the vertical cooperation 
between MNEs and their local indigenous Chinese suppliers, an industry with 
ample linkages between MNEs and local firms needs to be chosen to ensure that 
there are sufficient research resources to be drawn upon. According to the 
industrial statistics, EE industry is not only one of the identified 
‘pillar-industries’ by the Chinese government, but also attracts the highest 
amount of FDI with a growing rate of 25% annually in the last ten years. 
Massive incentives are being provided for electronics development projects and 
customs duties have been reduced on all electronics equipment, as a result, the 
total value of industrial output was over US$ 140 billion and total electronics 
export value was over $80 billion in 2002. Up to 2002, this industry has 
absorbed foreign investment value of US $ 70 billion, and the number of related 
joint ventures reached over 10,000 accounting for 15% of Chinese total joint 
ventures.  
 
A study conducted by the US National Science Foundation’s World Technology 
Evaluation Center (WTEC, 1997) concluded that “this industry in China had 
developed significantly and plants there are now assembling a growing number 
of final products”. In addition, the current global slow-down actually benefits 
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China. The search for a low cost and flexible production base has encouraged 
more companies to shift manufacturing to China. China has become the largest 
producer of color TV sets, recorders, VCD players, telephones, calculators, 
refrigerators and air conditioners. China is also the world’s number one cellular 
phone market and third largest PC producer. Through her membership of the 
WTO, ASEAN and other trade regimes, China is poised to become the world’s 
largest electrical and electronics manufacturing site. With the large amount of 
inward FDI and rapid development of this industry the demand for 
parts/components suppliers is significant. The growth of the local Chinese 
subcontracting industries has been boosted by the increasing role of China as an 
important manufacturing center of the world.  
 
Wuxi City is geographically located beside mainland China’s economic center – 
Shanghai. As one of the most important integrated circuit design and 
manufacturing centers in China, it has a strong electronics industrial 
manufacturing base and has attracted substantial investment into this sector. In 
fact, of the foreign direct investment flows into the city, electrical and electronic 
investors generated over half the total amount of industrial output value in the 
past five years, making this industry the most important sector for the city’s 
economic development (Wuxi statistics, 2003). The strong industrial base of 
Wuxi attracts highly qualified foreign electrical and electronics (customer) firms, 
such as Siemens, Panasonic, Toshiba, Sony, GE, etc, which increasingly create 
opportunities for local firms to produce peripheral components and products for 
them. Trade between them and the local Chinese supplier firms has gone beyond 
simple spot market transactions and thus provide local firms valuable 
opportunities to develop their capabilities and build up competitiveness. As such, 
the electrical and electronics foreign multinationals clustered in Wuxi 
Electronics Industry Zone provides us with a rich setting to investigate the 
research questions of the study. Another reason for choosing this city is out of 
pragmatic considerations, that is, my personal contacts in the city provides 
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advantageous access for the data collection. In turn, it is hoped that the research 
outcomes will give rise to numerous propositions about the vertical cooperation 
between foreign multinationals and their local indigenous suppliers in other 
regions and industries in China.  
4.4.2 Data collection process 
The data collection proceeded in three stages. First, in April 2003, with the 
assistance from Wuxi New District Committee, a questionnaire survey was 
distributed in Wuxi Industrial Zone by fax to identify the foreign electrical and 
electronics multinationals with local procurement8. Altogether 52 electrical and 
electronics foreign multinationals were identified and contacted, 50 responded 
and 28 of them were found to have local purchasing arrangement with 93 main 
local suppliers9. Of these 93 local suppliers however only 22 were indigenous 
Chinese firms10. Thus these MNEs with relationships with the 22 indigenous 
suppliers were selected for my study. Since I only identified MNEs with 
on-going supply relationships with indigenous Chinese suppliers, this 
introduced selection bias into the sample and I am unable to report on failures.  
 
In the second stage, the research framework and interview questions generated 
from the literature review were refined through four pilot interviews that were 
conducted in May 2003 (see appendix 1: pilot interview questionnaire). Finally, 
extensive fieldwork was conducted from November 2003 to March 2004 where 
semi-structured interviews were used to gather retrospective information for the 
case study analyses (see appendix 2: interview questionnaire). Interviews were 
                                                        
8 The data of the MNEs in EE industry in Wuxi was accessed from Wuxi Statistics report, 2003.  
9 It is noted some giant MNEs have hundreds of suppliers, supplying all sorts of products and services 
from product package to computer chips. The information on their local supplier firms provided by the 
MNEs was certainly not complete and no MNEs’ purchasing department would like to provide an 
exclusive list of all their suppliers. As such, the information they provided in the survey included main 
suppliers they have. This was found out in the subsequent interview, where some purchasing managers 
showed me their exclusive supplier lists. The ‘local’ sourcing refers to MNEs’ sourcing in China.  
10I make a deliberate distinction between local firms and indigenous firms because ‘local’ includes foreign 
suppliers who have located in China and who partner MNE customers. ‘Indigenous’ suppliers are firms 
with Chinese origins and ownership. 
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conducted in Mandarin and all interviews were then simultaneously transcribed 
and translated into English. Access was gained to 17 of the 22 indigenous 
Chinese suppliers identified (5 SOEs, 2 COEs and 10 POEs) and to 16 foreign 
MNEs (11 Japanese, 3 European and 2 American firms). Appendix 3 provides a 
list of interviewed companies where companies’ names are kept anonymous.  
 
There are 16 complete sets of data. By ‘complete’ it means that access to both 
the customer and supplier side of a dyadic relationship were obtained. Each set 
of complete data contained between 2 to 6 interviews depending upon access to 
personnel. In some instances data is not complete when access was only 
obtained from either the customer side or the supply side. In spite of their 
‘incompleteness’ they are treated as an additional source of data when 
considering the perspectives of one side of the relationship where appropriate. 
This information is also included in appendix 3. Purchasing managers and 
general managers of the customer firms and supplier managers are the key 
interviewees and relevant staff such as technology supervisors and middle level 
management were interviewed when possible. Altogether 49 interviews were 
conducted giving 67 hours of interviews. NVivo (Bazeley and Richards, 2000) 
was used as the supporting software package to categorize and analyze data. 
 
4.5 Qualitative data analysis – opportunities and challenges 
Case selection is supposed to follow the following three principles in case study 
research: (1) theoretical sampling, i.e. cases are selected for the replication or 
extension of the emergent theory, not for statistical randomization purposes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989); (2) maximization of variance in construct to enhance the 
explanatory power of cases (Stoecker, 1991); and (3) capitalization on personal 
relationship between the researcher and the key respondents from companies to 
ensure interview access and high quality of data (Inkpen, 1997). In this research, 
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effort has been made on all aspects, but with more success in (1) and (3) and 
less in (2). The locational focus of Wuxi is responsible for the biased 
over-presence of Japanese firms compared to American firms and European 
firms in the research sample11 which in turn makes the maximization of the 
variance of the origin of foreign MNEs not possible in the study. Since the 
country of origin of the MNEs has been an important aspect in studying inward 
FDI’s behavior in a host country (which could also involve some different 
managerial styles of Japanese firms and non-Japanese firms), this has been one 
of the limitations associated with data constraining a more pronounced 
comparison across cases. This will be discussed in chapter 5.3.  
 
The data analysis is based on three procedures from coding, within case analysis 
to cross case comparison (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; 
Floger and Turillo 1999; Langley, 1999; and Pentland, 1999). The coding 
process was both open- and close-ended. Those concepts from the analytical 
framework (see chapter 3) are the guidance for the initial coding. As such, the 
study distinguishes itself from grounded theory advocated by (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) where pure induction is the major process for coding. However, 
when new data emerged and where the analytical framework did not provide a 
clear clue, open coding is used to capture the fresh insights from the data. Axial 
coding (Floger and Turillo, 1999) is then used to summarize the 
interconnections between codes to reach a holistic understanding of each case. 
In the coding process, tremendous effort was made to make sense of the first 
few sets of data to get a holistic understanding of the inter-firm knowledge 
transfer story. It is important because only by capturing a solid understanding of 
the research questions as a whole, as represented in the first few sets of data, is 
meaningful comparison across cases possible. There is a risk of being lost in so 
much rich data both within a single case and cross 16 cases. In this sense, a high 
level of theoretical sensitivity (Floger and Turillo, 1999) and solid 
                                                        
11 Wuxi is reported to have the largest number of Japanese invested firms in China in 2004.  
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understanding of the first pieces of data are both very important to facilitate a 
structured yet creative analysis of the rest. Without the former, the data analysis 
will become a pure storing telling process with no core theoretical guidance 
intertwined for its direction and the advantages associated with qualitative 
investigations of generating fresh insights from rich data may be lost.   
 
After the in-depth sense making of each case, a more general picture emerged 
which mapped out the main patterns across all the cases in the study, including 
their similarities and differences. As such, the cross-case comparison imposed 
the final orderliness on the data, with a certain degree of abstraction and 
theorizing. It was also felt that since qualitative data analysis is an ongoing 
activity through all phases of the research, continuing the literature review after 
the completion of fieldwork was also helpful for theorizing the data. In the end, 
the first two findings strongly reflect a process-oriented understanding of the 
context and content of the knowledge transfer (please see chapter 5 and chapter 
6); and the other two findings presented in chapter 7 represent the aggregated 
outcomes of the impact of the inter-firm knowledge transfer on the local 
supplier firms.  
 
One interesting aspect of collecting data is that my focus was on factual events - 
‘doing’ or ‘happenings’ rather than what the interviewees were ‘thinking’ or 
‘perceiving’. Certainly a hard line was difficult to draw in some cases, but 
whenever possible, I asked what they did instead of what they thought. I believe 
it is the researcher’s role to make sense of, and possibly theorize, the data. 
Perceptions from interviewees could be of help in some cases, but could be 
misleading in others. It is also noted that similar to the difficulty of presenting a 
‘how-to’ manual in analyzing qualitative data, it is also demanding to 
comprehensively describe qualitative data processes. However, the main 
purpose of the above is to show the logic of the data analysis process to 
demonstrate that the data has been processed and studied in a scientific way.  
83/201 
 83 
In the next three chapters, research findings will be presented and discussed in 
an order consistent with that of the research questions posed in chapter 1. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to decipher the evolutionary process of the relationship 
development; the build-up process and function of different types of trust are 
also discussed. In addition, the difference between Japanese MNEs and 
non-Japanese MNEs in their style of assisting local suppliers is also discussed 
as tentative summary from the fieldwork data. Chapter 6 presents the different 
types of knowledge transfer at the different stages of the vertical cooperation; in 
particular, it is reported that the knowledge transferred mainly follows two main 
directions: from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge transfer and from 
technological knowledge to managerial knowledge transfer. Theoretical 
explanations are provided to make sense of the empirical evidence. Chapter 7 
focuses on the different level of technological knowledge learning and 
managerial knowledge learning by the Chinese suppliers; in addition, the 
differences between SOEs and POEs in their knowledge level and knowledge 




Chapter 5 Assessing the context of vertical knowledge transfer 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an evolutionary path of the relationship development 
between MNEs and their local Chinese suppliers. Three interconnected, 
sequential cooperation stages are identified and it is found that the customers’ 
evolving expectation and the supplier’s commitment jointly move the 
relationship into different stages. Secondly, the MNEs’ different ‘teaching’ 
attitudes and styles along the evolutionary path of the relationship development 
are addressed and the explanation concentrates on how the knowledge transfer 
intensity is associated with different cooperation stages with Japanese and 
non-Japanese firms.   
 
5.2 Is there a common relationship development pattern?  
As a processual12 study, a common relationship development pattern across all 
the dyadic relationships emerges from the empirical data. This answers the 
question raised by Abbott (1990)13 as to whether a typical pattern in the 
development process exists or not. The empirical data shows a strong order of 
important events knitting the development paths of the vertical relationships 
from the past to their present. The associated knowledge transfers within the 
cooperation are correspondingly found to serve different purposes initiated by 
the customer firms, and the supplier firm’s positive reaction and commitment 
would in turn materialize different knowledge transfers at different stages.  
 
                                                        
12 It is noted that the interview data is not longitudinal data, which would be ideal as a data collection 
method but practically difficult to conduct due to the geographical distance between China and England. 
The time scale permitted for PhD and restricted financial resources. However interview questions were 
designed to deliberately collect the historical data relating to the development of the relationship (See 
appendix 2) .  
13 Abbott (1990) suggested that the pattern questions begin with the central issue of existence. Basically it 
needs to answer whether a typical sequence exists in a certain system.  
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The importance of such processual understanding is clear. First of all, it reveals 
the fundamental economic motivations of the inter-firm knowledge transfer in 
various situations. Economic actors, it is found, are not merely passive reactors 
but also true actors who continuously define and redefine their purposes and 
behaviors to either initiate, or adapt to, the changing environment that they 
found themselves in (Langlois, 1986). Secondly, with a picture containing both 
the ‘depth’ and the ‘order’ of the on-going business cooperation, preferable 
knowledge transfers that are associated with a particular sequence of activities 
can be captured as good references for the Chinese supplier firms which want to 
promote favorable business cooperations with foreign MNEs and stimulate their 
learning opportunity. Thirdly, as one of the early empirical studies on foreign 
multinational’s supply chain activities in China, the processual investigation is 
also expected to provide an apprehension of the special Chinese business 
context, which can be a unique benchmark for those MNEs with intentions to 
develop and foster their local sourcing strategies in China. These practical 
implications will be further discussed after the presenting the research findings.  
 
The analysis shows that in spite of considerable variety in across the sets of data, 
such as the nationality and ownership structure of the foreign customer firms, 
the duration of the relationship, the products sourced from suppliers, etc, strong 
consistency in the evolutionary paths of relationship development emerges. 
Figure 5.1, derived from the fieldwork, represents the conceptual framework 
about how a successful cooperation might develop. It shows that the 
relationships incrementally unfold with the evolving expectations of MNE 
customer firms on the one hand (Y axis) and the type of activity executed by the 
supplier on the other (X axis). The interaction of the two leads the relationship 




























The common evolutionary path reveals that the customer’s expectations (Y axis) 
provide an incentive and direction for the supplier firms to invest in knowledge 
absorption and learning. Moreover, demonstration of commitment and the 
successful fulfillment of these expectations by suppliers provide the customer 
firms with further motivation to raise their expectations of the supplier firms 
and also give them greater responsibilities in the inter-firm cooperation. Clearly 
both expectations on the customer side and activities developed on the supplier 
side interact and evolve with time. As such, the extent to which a cooperative 
relationship might be deemed successful is represented by the gradual 
movement up the diagonal trend line from phase A to phase C14. These represent 
the movement through what are called the ‘initiating’, ‘developing’ and 
‘intensifying’ stages of relationship development. The movement from one 
phase to another is not always smooth and may be punctuated with periods of 
                                                        
14 It is recognized that given the relative temporal dimension on our axes, it may be that the trend line is 

































stagnation. However stagnation of the relationship at a certain phase does not 
necessarily imply the underperformance of the vertical cooperation. Stagnation 
might be due to the causes from either, or both sides since customer’s 
motivation and the supplier’s reaction play equal role in the evolution of the 
relationship. For instance, if the customer faced stagnated market share, this 
would restrain the demand of certain components sourced from local suppliers. 
A worse situation could be that some end products become obsolete and the 
business relationship would terminate unless the customer firm decided to 
source different components from the supplier to rescue a ‘good’ business 
partner. The reasons on the supplier side include limited manufacturing capacity 
making it impossible to substantially increase the magnitude of exchange. The 
other possibility is that the limited technology capability of the supplier firm 
makes it hard for the vertical cooperation to move up to a technology 
cooperation stage. To sum up, there are various causes for the stagnation of the 
business relationship. Also, any relationship, once initiated, shows a varying 
degree of inertia.  
 
All the relationships in the study have moved up to the second stage of 
cooperation, but only three of the bilateral relationships were explicitly 
identified as having reached phase C. It is found that whether a relationship can 
move to phase C seems contingent upon both the dynamics of the end market 
and the capability of the supplier firms to learn. In addition, the customer’s 
desire to establish a more value-added cooperation is also a promoting factor. 
The following is a detailed discussion of each stage of the evolving vertical 
cooperation.  
5.2.1 Phase A – Initiating 
Initiating describes the first stage of relationship establishment where a 
‘cognitive distance’ (Foss, 1999) exists between the firms and they must get to 
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know each other to reduce the distance. This generally proceeded in two steps. 
First the customer firm visited the supplier firm and conducted a ‘spot’ 
evaluation of the potential supplier i.e. potential productive capacity, age of 
equipment and facilities, the enthusiasm and commitment of personnel, ISO 
9000, 9001 certification potential or its maintenance. Secondly, sample tests 
would proceed. Meeting the customers’ expectations on output quality standards 
was the basic condition for further exchanges to occur and was the primary issue 
of concern to both parties at this stage. This is consistent with the empirical 
evidence from Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004). In their research, it is also found 
that “Indian suppliers were visited and evaluated regularly in the early” stage 
(p.252). 
The audit process included two elements. First of all their technical staff 
had a check of our ‘hardware’ capability, namely the availability of the 
appropriate manufacturing facilities, second they check if we have the 
quality control systems. And thirdly they checked if all the quality system 
was truly implemented and maintained. The second element is sample test. 
(Dataset 2, customer firm). 
 
The assessment process includes checking technology, manufacturing & 
quality management. (Dataset 4, supplier firm) 
 
Their relevant staff visited us. They checked out our manufacturing facilities. 
After that, we provided them with sample products based on the blueprints 
they provided. (Dataset 8, supplier firm).  
 
“The assessment started from our visit. Our general manager, vice manager, 
and quality manager visited them. We felt they are generally OK. After that 
we sent them the blueprints to do sample products. The results of sample 
tests assessed by the headquarters were satisfactory. In fact their sample 
products failed two times before the final approval. It took them so long time 
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because of some of their equipment could not achieve the required degree of 
precision. They had to do lots of manual work to compensate that. (Dataset 
10, customer firm). 
 
“The main content of the assessment was about the operation control. They 
examined detailed operation procedures, including the materials we use, 
operation equipment, and maintenance of the quality system… Yes we got 
much improvement in operation at the initial state of the relationship”. 
(Dataset 10, supplier firm) 
 
Our multiple-task team visited their factory for spot assessment. It was to 
see their manufacturing equipment, quality system, and control ability of the 
operation process, etc. We assessed according to a detailed ‘supplier 
evaluation book’. They would be provided the chance to submit a bid price if 
the final market was approved. If we think the price is acceptable, we would 
ask them to produce sample. Our engineering personnel will inform them 
the technical requirements of the sample products and there were 
discussions between engineering personnel to ensure the production of the 
components were feasible. If they passed the sample test, formal relationship 
could be set up. If not, they were probably asked to do the sample again, but 
if the failed again, we would give up. (Dataset 15, customer firm).  
 
Bresman et al.’s study (1999) of international acquisitions found that in the early 
stage, communication is mostly one-way from the acquiring firm to the acquired 
firm. Similarly, the communication pattern between foreign MNE customers 
and indigenous Chinese suppliers also appeared to be very one way – from 
customer to supplier. The customer firm provided the supplier with their 
technological requirements for the sample products. The necessity for the MNE 
customer firms to provide the lead is expressed as below:  
    “Basically the supplier firm needs to achieve what we require to step into 
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the supplier chain. We have developed a mature supplier selection 
process and what they need to do is to achieve the basic criteria” 
(Dataset 3, customer firm) 
 
“We need to communicate and we need to lead the suppliers. We cannot 
follow them as we need to lead them. We need to have a good plan and 
forecast to let them have enough time to prepare. We gave them 
instructions” (Dataset 4, customer firm). 
 
    “In the cooperation, customer’s expectations and requirements are our 
targets. It is understandable. The components we produce will be part of 
their end products. If we cannot achieve what they require, how can 
they accept our products? We understand this, and always cooperate 
with them. We both wish the final products gain more market share and 
profit. We are in a same boat. So whatever they wanted, we strive to do, 
especially at the beginning, we did not have much experience and were 
not able to provide our own ideas. So we just followed them” (Dataset 9, 
supplier firm) 
 
It is difficult to provide a concrete estimate of the duration of this phase of 
relationship development, but the cases identified a period varying from 2 to 12 
months. There are two contingent factors that may either reduce or prolong the 
time scale of this stage. One is the partner’s previous cooperating experience. 
Communication appeared relatively easy to establish between firms which 
previously cooperated with each other or who have prior experience of other 
international supply relationships. In contrast, indigenous firms which have little 
experience in cooperating with foreign firms may undergo a lengthy assessment 
process. The difficulties were reflected in two aspects. The first was the 
difficulty in communication and coordination. For Chinese firms with little 
experience and limited human resources, they find it difficult to adapt to the 
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sudden language requirements (such as blueprints translation) and business 
cultural difference. The demanding criteria of the foreign customers made it 
hard for them to make sense as to why a simple sample product could involve 
such a complicated checking process. A second difficulty was normally 
associated with the low standard of operation equipment of the supplier firms. 
Degree of precision was repeatedly reported to be the key problem preventing 
the supplier firms from rapidly accomplishing the sample product quality 
required by the customer firms. However these difficulties and challenges 
provide these inexperienced suppliers with valuable opportunity to learn. This 
evidence is consistent with what Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004) found that the 
technological assistance by Volvo to large experienced international suppliers 
with substantial in-house resource has less impact on performance as compared 
with the same assistance provided to small, inexperienced suppliers. 
 
The second contingent factor is the foreign customer firm’s assessment style. 
Japanese firms appeared to be more cautious in their assessment process 
compared to US and European firms. They demonstrated concern not only for 
the ultimate quality of the sample products, but also of the whole manufacturing 
system of the supplier firm from which the sample products were sourced. Such 
concern called for them to have a more comprehensive examination of the 
supplier firms in the first stage of cooperation, which is the major factor leading 
to a lengthy assessment process. The difference between Japanese MNEs and 
non-Japanese MNEs and their influence upon the vertical knowledge transfer 
will be shortly discussed in section 5.3.  
 
It is noted that the relationships where the supplier firm failed to pass sample 
tests could not proceed to the next stage. It is similar with what Ivarsson and 
Alvstam (2004) found that those Indian firms failed to reach Volvo’s standards 
and were excluded from their supplier list. In other words, such relationships 
simply terminated. Therefore, the present study is only able to capture those 
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‘survived’ relations.  
5.2.2 Phase B – Developing 
All the relationships in the research proceeded to the second stage. Having 
evaluated the supplier’s basic capability and sample tests, the expectations of 
the customers clearly evolved. Suppliers were now expected to demonstrate the 
ability to maintain product quality standards within mass production operations. 
Mass production has higher requirements on the stability of product quality, 
satisfactory delivery performance and cost control.  
They must have the manufacturing capacity; keep quality stability and price 
advantage. It becomes a more comprehensive requirement. (Dataset 8, 
customer firm) 
 
Mass production demands systematic attention. We need to ensure quality,   
price control, delivery performance (Dataset 13, supplier firm) 
 
The apparent change with the relationship is we only discussed the sample 
quality initially. But afterwards, things are not so simple. A few departments 
need to communicate and coordinate to ensure the delivery service, quality 
and quantity. (Dataset 15, supplier firm)  
 
At the beginning we only required them to have qualified sample production. 
But now we want them to keep the stability of quality and delivery 
performance. Actually our requirements were comparatively tougher over 
time. We could not set too high requirements at the beginning; otherwise we 
would not get any supplier. But now we are ‘coaching’ them, and the 
incremental changes in them would make big difference over time. (Dataset 




Naturally problems emerged which were mainly due to the knowledge gaps 
associated with moving from piecemeal output that could pass sample tests to a 
fully integrated manufacturing system. Accompanying this, numerous 
managerial deficiencies were found to be the reason for failed products or low 
delivery performance. As a result, supplier firms were required to 
comprehensively upgrade their system capabilities - technologically and more 
importantly managerially. This required greater input from both sides and were 
found to be facilitated in a number of ways.  
 
5.2.2.1 Face to face communication 
One way was by using face-to-face discussion of emergent problems in 
production and subsequent joint-problem solving to ensure successful 
technological knowledge transfer. A common communication ‘code’ began to 
develop as an output effect of cooperation in the earlier phase and was 
incrementally developed by face-to-face meetings in this phase. Clearer 
communication facilitated more cooperation because the two parties gained 
familiarity with each other and were able to express their need and wants more 
explicitly. As transfers became more frequent the content of the knowledge was 
likely to become more sophisticated and be accompanied by more tacit 
knowledge. Importantly, supplier firms were gradually required to be able to 
analyze technical problems and provide elaborate technical analysis reports and 
action plans for problem-solving. These activities are crucial in that it not only 
forces the supplier firms to solve specific problems that emerged in the 
production process, but also induce the development of the more general 
analytical and problem solving capabilities and support the supplier firm’s 
growing independence. It is these types of capabilities that lead to the Chinese 
supplier’s fundamental, long-term technological capability development.   
Relevant staffs in different departments get familiar with each other. 




We hold quite a few seminars to make them understand the design of our 
end product and how the component they produce is supposed to function 
with the main product…such knowledge may make them understand why we 
are so demanding about quality. They will understand a failed component 
may lead to the total failure of the end product. It helps improve their sense 
of what ‘quality’ means to us (Dataset 5, customer firm)  
 
What we learned from the cooperation is efficiency and accumulation of 
skills. We cannot stop at any time. Continuous improvements are always 
expected and over time we get used to it and internalize such external 
requirements into internal routines…..we were asked to prepare false 
product report to present an analysis of the problem identified and an action 
plan. It was hard at the beginning, but now it is one of our technical routine 
for us to evaluate and assess quality (Dataset 10, supplier firm)  
 
5.2.2.2 International standards criteria 
Managerially, if they are not already in place, the attainment and maintenance of 
quality systems such as ISO 9000, 9001, 14000, QS, etc., becomes a target for 
suppliers set by the customer’s expectations. Such internationally adopted 
standards are an important acknowledgement of the knowledge and experience 
possessed by the firm (Boiral, 2003). In this study, 16 out of 17 Chinese 
suppliers interviewed were ISO 9000/9001 certificated at the time of 
interviewing, 9 having attained this prior to the partnership with the identified 
MNE and 7 as a result of the relationship with the MNE.  
 
The concept of managerial systems has not been taken seriously by Chinese 
managers until recently, but is now recognized as not only important in itself, 
but also for the fact that it is intimately connected to the technological capability 
of the firm. Operationally speaking, the quality systems require the systematic 
maintenance of operations documents and process reports. All Chinese suppliers 
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felt that they greatly benefited from such practices, although they were painful 
and costly to implement at the beginning. It is clear that such management 
upgrading has multiple direct implications for indigenous firms’ organizational 
systems. For one, it helped these organizations to ‘codify’ their knowledge and 
experience and embed them into durable organization structures. The 
codification and routinization became important ‘knowledge’ retention 
mechanisms (Argote, 1999). Secondly, better and more consistently recorded 
documentation helped train operations personnel and speeded up the diffusion 
of new work tasks based on articulated instructions. That is, knowledge 
‘codification’ promotes knowledge ‘dissemination’. Finally, it also makes it 
easier to trace problems and allocate employee’s responsibilities and rewards 
along the whole production process. Additionally, the achievement of 
internationally recognized quality standards clearly enhances the probability of 
the indigenous supplier’s ability to win potential cooperation with other 
multinationals in any bid situation and also greatly reduces the transaction costs 
at the initial stage of the relationship by allowing the initiating phase to be 
completed more rapidly (Nobeoka et al., 2002; Ivaesson and Alvstam, 2004).  
 
5.2.2.3 Cost control 
Once stable product quality and satisfactory delivery performance have been 
achieved, continuous cost control is put on the agenda. Most end products of the 
vertical supply chain within the electrical and electronics sector face fierce price 
competition and fast changing technological conditions. This compels the entire 
chain to achieve high cost efficiencies with much pressure being placed on 
suppliers for continual price reduction. In fact, MNEs’ expectations for 
indigenous Chinese suppliers to generate annual price reductions have become 
routine in most of the relationships in the study. The Chinese suppliers, learned, 
through exchanges with their MNE customers, how cost reduction can be 
realized through numerous avenues apart from salary or wage cutting. Such 
alternatives included: altering product design, altering input materials, more 
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effective and economical means of materials sourcing, and cost analysis of 
product portfolios. Cost management of this more eclectic sort demands that the 
supplier firm has efficient management across multiple aspects of the firm. 
Supplier firms gradually learned to control cost from effectively managing their 
own suppliers, adopting effective management practices and reducing 
unnecessary waste, etc. Clearly the downward pressure for cost reduction is 
finite and the stagnation of the relationship would ensue when the cost space 
became exhausted. However, the relationships could get reinvigorated by 
eventual requests for new product exchanges from the MNE. Thus, with the 
stabilization of inter-firm cooperation during the ‘developing’ phase, not only 
did the purchasing volume increase but also the product scope provided by 
suppliers. This virtuous circle of increasing scale and scope in the cooperation 
can only continue as long as the market situation for the end products of the 
MNE customer continues to be favourable. When the foreign MNEs hit hard 
times themselves, the cooperation magnitude, namely both scale and scope are 
likely to be negatively influenced.  
 
The duration of this phase of the relationship’s evolution is even harder to 
quantify than the initiating phase. As mentioned above, the majority were still 
within this phase at the time of interviewing. Only three relationships have 
subsequently entered the intensifying phase. On average, the developing stage 
lasted 3.5 years which shows that time is a necessary but not sufficient factor in 
the movement of the relationship development into the third phase. The 
development of relationships from one stage to another is not a simple function 
of time, but it depends on a number of other factors.15  
 
                                                        
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this comment on a conference paper presented at EIBA 2004.  
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5.2.3 Phase C - Intensifying 
3 of the 16 relationships indicated that they had advanced to the intensifying 
phase. They either recognized that there is ‘a significant qualitative change in 
their cooperation’ or that there was ‘important technology cooperation’. The 
expectations of the customers and the basis upon which they evaluate suppliers 
shifted towards relationship effectiveness and value added. Greater 
technological cooperation and increased interdependence resulting from a 
mutual desire to develop new products or markets signalled a qualitative change 
in the relationship; in particular, the indigenous supplier’s strengthening 
technological capability has a significant influence here.  
 
Once the MNE customer identified the potential of fruitful technological 
cooperation, conversions of the supply relationship into strategic partners were 
explicitly sought. Firms sought to pursue greater added value in production 
from the combination of their different capabilities. To facilitate the strategic 
partnership some investments by the supplier of the more generic type (such as 
building more sophisticated information platforms) and highly specific type 
(such as tailored manufacturing facilities and equipment) were made. This 
enabled the joint design and development of products by the partners.  
 
Communication in the intensifying phase became very reciprocal and had 
greater tacit content. However surprisingly, in contrast to our expectations as 
derived from Bresman, et al (1999) and Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) that 
communication frequency would be higher, the three cases indicated that the 
communication frequency between partners actually fell. This is because 
communication has two functions within supplier relationship development: one 
is to transfer important information and knowledge to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of cooperation; the other is to reduce conflicts, 
misunderstandings and solve errors. Only the former is positively associated 
98/201 
 98 
with vertical knowledge transfer. For established relationships, the latter often 
reflects the low efficiency of vertical linkages, especially if it is still present in 
the later stage of cooperation where an effective communication pattern is 
supposed to have already developed. In older supply relationships, over-loaded 
communications could actually be interpreted as a signal of inferior cooperation. 
Of course a certain amount of communication is necessary in the intensifying 
stages, but it can be very tacitly and intimately embedded within the relevant 
staffs and in their communication ‘codes’. In addition, such close technology 
cooperation often occurs in parallel with high-level strategic communication 
regarding the development direction of the relationship. Communication 
patterns became very straightforward and developed with the division of labour 
for operational/technological cooperations and strategic integration between the 
different levels of the firms.  
5.2.4 A Summary 
Based on the above illustration, a potential limitation of this finding is discussed. 
It is noted that this stage model built upon the in-depth qualitative data can 
reflect the foreign multinationals’ local sourcing behaviour in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in China. Although China has been open to foreign direct 
investment since late 1970s, the large scale sourcing from China by large 
manufacturing MNEs only started in 1990s. This evolutionary model is a good 
demonstration of how both foreign MNEs and local Chinese firms started to 
develop such cooperation and that relationship development tends to be cautious, 
incremental, and phased. Over time, with the dissemination of the cooperation 
experience and knowledge on both sides, there is the possibility that some of the 
foreign-local linkage development may skip some of the stages that have been 
observed in this study. For example, some MNEs might have clearer targets as 
to what type of local firms and what type of vertical cooperation they need, 
either focusing on cost efficiency or on more value-added activity. Accordingly 
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some of the inter-firm cooperation might quickly leap to the second stage and 
remain in the second stage if manufacturing capacity and lower costs are the 
major drivers behind local sourcing. Or in some other cases, some MNEs might 
skip the second stage and quickly move the relationship to the third stage where 
technology ability is the target that they are looking for from local firms. While 
not excluding such possibilities in the future, it is suggested that this staged 
model provides us with a comprehensive understanding about the general 
development path that most vertical cooperation underwent in late 1990s and 
early 2000s in China, at least in the Electrical and Electronics industry in China.  
 
5.3 Does the customer firm’s country of origin (COO) matter?
16
  
In the International Business field, the COO effect has been found to affect 
MNEs’ location decisions (He, 2003), entry mode choice (e.g. Zhao, 2004), 
business performance (e.g. Kessapidou and Varsakelis, 2002) and HR 
management (e.g. Ferner, et al., 2001). Other studies have pointed out the 
country of origin should be an important construct in examining knowledge 
transfer (e.g. Young and Lan, 1995; Giroud 2000). However, some studies found 
limited COO effects. For example, Child and Yan (2001) discovered very 
limited COO effects on MNEs’ strategic orientation, training, management 
controls and other management dimensions among the multiple countries from 
which the foreign partners in JVs in China originate.  
 
Giroud (2000) provided one of the first systematic investigations of foreign 
MNE’s linkages with local firms with a specific emphasis on the COO effect. 
COO is found to be significant in explaining the existence of vertical knowledge 
                                                        
16
 This section has been published as Duanmu, J.L. (2006) Country of origin effects on knowledge 
transfers from MNEs to their Chinese Suppliers: an explorative investigation, in F.M. Fai and E.J. Morgan 





transfer, but less so in the explanation of the degree of transfer. Transfers by 
Japanese firms are reported to be scarce compared to European MNEs and U.S. 
MNEs, and Western MNEs are more likely to transfer knowledge to the local 
economy compared to their Asian counterparts. The research concluded that 
overall, the knowledge transfer from the foreign investors to their local 
suppliers is limited.  
 
Nevertheless, our understanding of the COO effect on the knowledge transfer 
issue is not satisfactory. The problem is that the COO effect could be interpreted 
differently depending on the perspectives taken. We are not clear whether the 
COO effect is in essence indicative of managerial preferences arising from 
difficult cultural traits of decision makers of the MNEs; is it more a reflection of 
MNEs’ business strategy in a host country, or are there any other reasons? We 
are also not clear about the possible paths through which the country of origin 
actually influences knowledge transfer. Is it through cultural distance that makes 
effective communication for knowledge transfer difficult, or is it MNEs’ attitude 
in protecting or exposing relevant information and knowledge to their suppliers, 
or a combination of both? As such, a micro-level examination is needed to 
reveal the actual mechanisms associated with MNEs’ knowledge transfer to 
their local suppliers and then in turn we can see whether and how the COO 
exerts influence upon the process.  
 







Figure 5.2a: U.S. firms           Figure 5.2b: Japanese firms 
Time 







A B C 
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The section will summarize what is found in this study regarding the COO 
effect on knowledge transfer. First of all, it is found that Japanese multinationals 
do behave differently to those from other countries, especially US ones17. As 
only 16 dyadic relationships are sampled in the study and being a qualitative 
investigation, there is no intention to produce generalized results. But since the 
sample of the study is strongly biased towards Japanese firms due to their higher 
concentration in the city of Wuxi, it is worthwhile to examine the different 
behavior between Japanese MNEs from those of other countries. As such, 
Japanese and U.S. multinationals here stand for two camps of customer firms 
and European firms are located between the two ends.  
 
The horizontal axis of Figure 5.2 is derived from Figure 5. 1, showing the stages 
of the developing relationships and knowledge benefits associated with the 
stages. The vertical axis represents the intensity of knowledge transfer of the 
customer firms. The study found that US firms prefer local firms with higher 
initial technology capability (see the dotted line in Figure 2b). In such cases, 
they can quickly set up a vertical relationship. Therefore the initiating stage A in 
the Figure 2b is often very brief, and relationship will soon move to the 
developing stage where both the quantity and quality of purchasing volume is 
rapidly increasing. To ensure the quality stability of the supplied components 
from suppliers, US firms are very willing to provide intensive and systematic 
training and relevant assistance to nurture the supplier firms. Such training does 
not simply focus on the technical details; instead managerial training is 
surprisingly abundant with the aim of infusing their management culture into 
the suppliers’. As a result, the developing stage B is very knowledge transfer 
intensive and the occurrence of knowledge transfer appears to have a relatively 
short time span.  
                                                        
17 Although only two American firms were sampled in the fieldwork, they show very distinctive and 
strong management style from other firms. In addition, American firms’ style is frequently mentioned by 
any other Chinese firms who have had cooperation experience with them. Thus it is perceived to be 
worthwhile to establish such comparison.  
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However it can be demanding to sustain long-term cooperation with U.S. firms, 
especially because they are particularly focused on cost reduction measures. So 
even if the cooperation goes well with American firms, the relationship can be 
terminated when the customer firm finds a ‘better’ candidate, i.e. a new supplier 
which can provide similar products at lower price level. As a result the stability 
of vertical relations is relatively low. For example, one American firm’s 
purchasing manager reported that: 
  “Yes, we keep searching better suppliers. We often switch to better ones’. 
(Incomplete dataset 1, customer firm)   
 
As a result, it is demanding for the local Chinese firms to move the relationships 
up to the intensifying stage and knowledge transfer intensity can drop 
dramatically once the relationship stabilizes or simply replaced by new 
suppliers. In contrast, Japanese firms are willing to engage with indigenous 
firms which do not possess strong existing competence. What counts is whether 
the supplier firms can pass the sample product assessment. Supplier firms 
normally had to go through longer and stricter assessment process in the initial 
phase. Japanese firms were described as very ‘passive’ in providing necessary 
technical information and assistance in the early stage. It seems that the 
interviewed Japanese firms’ perception is that if the Chinese supplier firm 
wanted to build up the relationship, it is supposed to reach the requirements 
mainly by itself.  
   “We were kind of passive at the beginning; they were supposed to be active if 
they want to be our supplier”. (Dataset 6, customer firm) 
 
“We are happy to provide assistance. But in the beginning we would like to 
see the supplier firm put much effort in achieving our standards. So initially it 
is their job to get things done. Once they passed the sample test, we would 
have more confidence in both their motivation and capability and we are 




Relevant technical information needed was generally obtained by perceived 
‘relevant’ request from supplier firms. Such a passive ’teaching’ attitude is one 
of the reasons that the initiating stage for supplier relations with Japanese 
customer firms is lengthy and for this reason the initial stage is a critical period 
for the supplier firms to upgrade and learn. Despite these difficulties, no 
Chinese supplier firms gave up the opportunity of becoming these Japanese 
firms’ supplier in the study18 because of the potential benefits for sustainable 
survival also arose. Chinese firms reported that once they are able to involve 
into the Japanese firms’ value chain system, relationships are more dependable 
and stable compared those with American firms. The evidence on one hand 
shows very high learning commitment of local indigenous firms, especially 
those from private sector. All the supplier firms were actually reported to be 
willing to afford the cost involved with the initial assessment and sample 
production; in fact a strong awareness of ‘backwardness’ permeates among 
Chinese firms and their eagerness to build up relationships with and learn from 
foreign multinationals cannot be more obvious. On the other hand the data 
vividly shows the different style of Japanese firms from U.S. firms. During the 
cooperation process, Japanese customer firms would also raise their 
expectations and requirements. But they appeared to be more likely to patiently 
assist the supplier firm to achieve the improvement that they require. Numerous 
Chinese firms have sensed such differences and reported as follows:  
“Western firms have shorter assessment process once they get 
satisfactory sample, that is all. But Japanese firms are fussy; they tend 
to be more conservative. They not only check the sample products, but 
also the whole processes that delivered the products. But once you 
become their partner it is difficult to break up. But western firms tend to 
be more changeable. They are always seeking cheaper or more capable 
                                                        
18 Again it might reflect the unavoidable bias of the sampled research subjects, where failed relations 
simply slide away from possible access. 
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supplier. But if the same situation occurs to Japanese customers they 
will help extant suppliers to reduce price but not change the suppliers”. 
(Dataset 9, supplier firm) 
 
“This Japanese firm monitors all our manufacturing process from 
material purchase, self assessment-book to quality system etc. they are 
different from Western firms. We could not understand why they cared 
about so many details, but we now know it is so important”. (Dataset 8, 
supplier firm) 
 
“Japanese firms are more bureaucratic and conservative; but once we 
become their supplier, the relationship will not easily break up. They 
care about long-term cooperation. When they get (market) information 
that there are other firms that can provide cheaper (same) components 
or with higher quality standard, they won’t easily dump us. What they do 
is set those standards as the new requirements and help us to improve” 
(dataset 11, supplier firm) 
 
The evidence and analysis probably help solve the puzzle that emerged in 
Giroud (2000, 2002) that Japanese firms were found to have little technology 
transfer to their indigenous Malaysian suppliers compared to U.S. firms, 
although in supply chain literature Japanese firms have established reputation 
for their long-term commitment to suppliers (Sako, 1992; 2004). Context-free 
studies derived from cross-sectional study might have difficulty revealing the 
context-bounded fact. The fact displayed here is that in the short-term very able 
local supplier firms can get a good deal of knowledge from their US partners. 
Such benefits are based on extensive managerial training and intensive technical 
communication. To sustain such source of benefits and the relationship, local 
firms have to keep very high standards of operational efficiency and product 
quality. Although renewed quality requirements or/and delivery performance 
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actually can be achieved by extant supplier firms, the time scale that US firms 
can bear for the suppliers to progress is limited, which often drives them to shift 
from extant suppliers to new ones. Thus longer-term cooperation with American 
firms is demanding for local suppliers. It is just as Chinese firms managers 
expressed, 
 “We feel uncertain. We do not know when they may find better ones.” 
(Dataset 15, supplier firm) 
 
Consequently in the short- to medium-term, U.S. firms appear to have rapid 
knowledge transfer to their local supplier firms. The substantial benefit can be 
sustained if the local firms are able to quickly improve their competitive 
performance. This evidence is fully in line with other investigations about US 
firm attitudes to cost and capabilities. For example, Helper and Kiehl (2004) 
found that financing is a constant pressure for U.S. on supplier firms which 
often lead them to ‘fight fires’ instead of building capabilities for the long-run. 
Sako (2002) also expressed similar views and she quoted Hajim Ohba, director 
of the Toyota Supplier Support Centre in the USA:  
“My experience is that much of American’s revitalization has been focused 
on short-term cost reductions to improve profitability. This has resulted in 
an emphasis on ‘quick fix’ programs and applying technical tools on the 
shop floor. While these technical tools are part of TPS (Toyota Production 
System), taken alone they are isolated islands. (Ohba 1997, Cited in Sako, 
2002, quoted from Helper and Kiehl, 2004, 104).”  
 
By contrast, Japanese firms are willing to engage with some relatively ‘weak’ 
local firms to be their suppliers once they can achieve their initial 
requirements19. Passive ‘teaching’ attitude will turn out to be positive after the 
suppliers went through all the assessment, and would become more positive 
                                                        
19 This evidence is similar with what Chung et al., (2003) found: Japanese assemblers often purchased 
components from local suppliers that had lower initial productivity levels, and in turn, the relationship with 
Japanese transplants extended the survival of low productivity tie-in suppliers. 
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with more patience in assisting over time. Such practice appears to be more 
beneficial to local economy in that it actually gives ordinary firms extraordinary 
opportunity. Thus we can see that in the short-term perspective, U.S. firms tend 
to transfer more knowledge to the supplier firms than Japanese firms. However 
if a long-term perspective is taken, the difference between U.S. firms and 
Japanese firms in their transfer of knowledge to local suppliers firms diminishes. 
In addition, in the longer-run, Japanese firms are more likely to establish close 
and stable cooperation with local suppliers, which in turn can promote the 
potential for continuous knowledge transfer. Consequently the time dimension 
needs to be appropriately considered when assessing the extent of knowledge 
transfer by MNEs of different nationalities in a host country.  
 
This study also finds that European MNEs have no distinguishable ‘European’ 
supply chain management practice. It seems practices differ by European nation: 
some of them attempt to imitate the Japanese model because of the great success 
that Japanese MNEs have achieved in the automobile and electronics industry 
since 1980s; some of them keep a close affiliation with U.S. practices due to 
cultural and language similarities; and some of them are found to be highly 
‘localized’ to the context of the Chinese market. It is quite hard to generalize 
them as a highly unified group as highlighted in the two interview extracts 
below: 
“The Italian firm is much less rigid than, for example, our German customer. 
German firms barely change their design once they give you the components 
blueprints. It is helpful for us to produce. However, the Italian firm is much 
less strict and often changes their design. It makes our job difficult and 
sometimes the sample products we produced become obsolete because they 
have changed their ideas! …They are different but at the same time, they all 




“I find the Swedish firm is so localized. Sometimes we joke they are 
becoming very ‘Chinese’. I feel U.S. customer firms seem to deliberately 
keep their original style because they are big and very successful. But this 
Swedish firm is not big and seems to be willing to adapt to our (Chinese) 
culture”. (Dataset 13, customer firm).  
 
Generally, it seems European firms are less easily distinguishable in their 
development of relationships with suppliers than Japanese or U.S. firms and 
therefore I suggest that their behaviours and attitudes lie between the Japanese 
and US positions presented here. The limitation of the finding is that sampled 
dyadic relationships are biased towards Japanese firms, which makes 
representation of the above discussion hard to generalize. But on the other 
hand, the higher concentration of Japanese firms represents a general picture 
of MNEs in Wuxi’s electrical and electronics industry. As a result, the above 
discussion can be an avenue for future empirical studies on the behavior of 
MNEs of different country origins. As illustrated above, time dimension needs 
to be appropriately considered in future empirical investigation since it has 
been revealed as an important moderating factor, which might conceal the real 
differences of different MNEs.  
 
5.4 A summary 
This chapter has discussed the evolutionary path of the relationship 
development between MNEs and their local suppliers. A comparison between 
Japanese MNEs and non-Japanese MNEs in their approach and attitude in 
transferring knowledge to their local suppliers is also discussed. The next 
chapter will present the second finding regarding the types of knowledge 
transferred at the different stages of the vertical cooperation.   
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Chapter 6 Assessing the types of vertical knowledge transfer 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has focused on the process of relationship development 
and the differences of the knowledge transfer behaviour between Japanese and 
non-Japanese MNEs. This chapter will concentrate on identifying the 
knowledge content transferred at different phases. First of all, knowledge is 
categorized into technical knowledge and managerial knowledge for the 
simplicity of analysis. Technological knowledge is understood as the bodies of 
knowledge, or understanding and practice that underpin product design and 
manufacturing (Brusoni, et al., 2001). Managerial knowledge is defined as the 
skills and techniques for managing and organizing production and transaction20. 
This conceptualization was induced from the empirical data where interviewees’ 
response has strongly demonstrated a need to put this dimension in when 
analyzing the knowledge in transfers.  
 
The knowledge transfer process was time-consuming and filled with trials and 
errors. Learning was found to occur in an incremental manner and as such the 
types of knowledge transferred evolved over time as learning both deepened and 
broadened. Consistent with theories, difficulties were found to arise from the 
learning of unarticulated or unarticulable aspects of knowledge. Therefore, 
following the analytical framework in chapter 3, tacit/explicit is another 
dimension for the analysis of the knowledge in transfer. Consequently a 
typology of knowledge types is shown in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 contains two 
dimensions of the knowledge that are transferred in the vertical relations, 
namely technological and managerial knowledge; tacit and explicit knowledge. 
At the same time, within this typology I have tried to indicate the evolutionary 
                                                        
20
 Very good examples of this include JIT, EPR practice in management. Evolutionary theory in effect 
perceives the two as ‘productive routines’ and suggest that they are closely interconnected and co-evolve 
with each other.  
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pathway of knowledge transfer. What the two arrows show are the two patterns 
of knowledge transfer in the vertical cooperation. One is from technological 
knowledge to managerial knowledge transfer and the other is from explicit 
knowledge and tacit knowledge transfer.  
 
Table 6.1: four components of knowledge in transfer 
 
Knowledge Technological Managerial 
Explicit 
1. product blueprints; 
2. product assessment reports;  
3. product analysis reports, etc 
4. new facilities/equipment use21 
5. quality system maintenance;  
6. Product cost portfolio analysis; 
7. environment protection 
requirements 
8. material souring information 
9. market information 
Tacit  
14. product quality analysis skills 
15. operation techniques (material 
processing skills; machine 
maintenance tips, etc)  
16. Product design knowledge 
17. New product test knowledge  
18. R&D management  
10. Material management; 
11. Supplier management; 
12. Customer management;  
13. Ideology  
 
Key:  normal font = identified in initiating stage 
Italic font = identified in the developing stage 
Bold font = identified in the intensifying stage 
 
6.2 Knowledge content – imitating stage  
It is found that in the early stage of vertical cooperation, knowledge transfer 
started from explicit technical information, such as types 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the 
upper left zone in table 6.1. This type of knowledge transfer was highly relevant 
to the sample test process where product specifications and standards were the 
major concern. The transfer was mainly realized by the blueprints sent by the 
customer firm, and occasionally accompanied with physical samples as 
reference. Technical personnel had moderate degree of contacts, depending on 
                                                        
21 This is relevant to those that invested in hardware equipment or facilities.  
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the degree of product complexity and their prior experience. Since technical 
language is relatively objective and standard, misunderstanding is limited. 
However miscommunication did occur in some circumstances. It is found that 
language can be an issue at this stage. Some blueprints need to be properly 
translated, but due to the lack of human resource, the process was often delayed 
by the supplier firm. Chinese employees of the foreign firms often play an 
important role in handling this issue by offering the lacked resources of the 
supplier firm. On the other hand, in reviewing literature, cultural distance 
(Mowery et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999) is also often quoted as an important factor 
affecting inter-firm communication. No firm in this study, however, 
acknowledged the significant influence of cultural differences in their 
cooperations, especially those which have had relevant prior experience. For 
those firms which have not had such prior experience, they reported that they 
sensed differences in working attitude and business practice between each other. 
But due to most contactable personnel from the foreign firms are Chinese, such 
differences can be quickly explained to and adapted by the local Chinese 
suppliers and therefore the so called ‘cultural distance’ often quickly diminished 
and did not cause difficulty for the desired knowledge transfer. At the same time, 
some managerial knowledge transfer occurred, but generally was limited due to 
the constrained managerial personnel contact. 
 
6.3 Knowledge content – developing stage 
This stage has a broad time scale compared to the others and thus unsurprisingly 
most knowledge is transferred during this stage. Relationship-specific 
technological investments undertaken by some Chinese suppliers started. 
However although the investment may be associated with a particular MNE 
partner, this is not generally in highly specified, partner-tailored equipment. In 
fact most investments made by suppliers at this stage acted as key attributes to 
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attract other similar customer firms. This is consistent with what Nobeoka et al., 
(2002) suggested that lots of knowledge that supplier firms learn from the 
cooperation with their customers are re-deployable knowledge, which helps 
them expand their customer base in the long-run. Hence these technological 
investments provide a foundation for growth for most suppliers in the study. For 
instance:  
“I do not think the investment that we made can only serve this one 
customer firm. No. Actually we have a few customers and we provide 
them with very similar products, so most investment we made in our 
hardware can be utilized for serving multiple customers. (Dataset 5, 
supplier firm)  
 
“They require us to have pressing parts with smoother surface. They 
also requested us to improve the precision degree of our equipment. It 
was about upgrading the hardware. We invested about 40,000 RMB to 
reach the requirements. But the investment can be used to serve other 
customer firms”. (Dataset 11, supplier firm) 
 
As the vertical supply relationship evolved from the initiating to the developing 
stage, shared communication codes between staff responsible for coordinating 
activities began to develop. Staff from both sides worked together to improve 
extant products and face-to-face discussion and joint problem solving activities 
started to facilitate knowledge transfers with a greater tacit component. 
Therefore the type of technological knowledge transferred gradually expanded 
to include product quality analysis and operation techniques, etc. 
Simultaneously with the shift from piecemeal production for sample testing in 
the initiating phase to fully integrated mass manufacturing operations in the 
developing phase, smooth value chain cooperation was required. This calls for a 
partially ‘channelled’ administrative system between firms (Foss, 1999). Thus in 
addition to both codified and tacit technological knowledge transfers, various 
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types of managerial knowledge (types 5 to 11) were either deliberately 
transferred through ‘teaching and coaching’ by the customer firms or indirectly 
gained by supplier firms through ‘imitation’ and ‘adaptation’. As a result, the 
system upgrading is repeatedly emphasized as the major benefit of their 
cooperation with foreign MNEs.  
“Since the cooperation with XXXX, we paid enormous attention in 
implementation and maintaining the quality control and system” (Dataset7, 
supplier firm) 
 
“On a soft aspect, we adopted EPR
22
 in 2003 to be consistent with their 
managerial practice” (Dataset 10, supplier firm)  
 
“Eventually we found what counts is the formal quality system. It was a 
completely new concept to us but we learned the importance of it in 
ensuring good quality products. …the most significant benefit that we get 
from cooperating with XXX is that the quality system has accomplished a 
substantial improvement.” (Dataset 11, supplier firm).  
 
“The results of the joint projects were reflected in the quality improvement 
of the starting cabinet we produce. The production cycle has been optimized 
and shortened; the stock has been greatly reduced and the productivity has 
been elevated through the adjustment of operation processes.” (Dataset 15, 
supplier firm) 
 
“The quality system is vital for us and for our customers. Any trivial quality 
problem can lead to serious failure of the end products. We therefore need to 
control each process in our production and so we did. The overall quality 
system helps us realize this purpose.” (Dataset 16, supplier firm) 
 
                                                        
22 EPR refers to enterprise resource planning.  
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With the sustained infiltration and adoption of manufacturing and management 
knowledge from MNE customers, in many cases, the ideology of the indigenous 
Chinese suppliers altered over time (type 12). While the process of this change 
in ideology was incremental, the impact of the process was fundamental and 
significant. In fact all the suppliers firms mentioned and recognized its 
significance, although the speed of transformation in ideology in these firms 
may vary from one to the other.  
“In the past much effort was not put on problem solving, but on’ Guanxi’. 
The cooperation with XXX waged us a new understanding of business. 
Business is business. Guanxi should be after business. Generally 
speaking, we have to reconstruct our concepts about what is business 
and shift our attention and effort on the real issues in companies”. 
(Dataset 2, supplier firm)   
 
The benefits that we gained from such cooperation mainly lie on the 
management ideology. It is not about what technology we have 
learned. It is about the way of thinking. (Dataset 9, supplier firm) 
 
“Plan economy dominated China for long time and some notions, 
concepts and ideologies have subsequently dominated out thinking, 
changes in this aspect need time. The cooperation with the American 
firm over these years has gradually changed my thinking and I 
informed these ideas to our management team and employees. I feel 
our company has been changed. (Dataset 14, supplier firm) 
 
“It is our (the supplier firm) new ideology that leads us to achieved 
continuous good performance.” (Dataset 15, supplier firm)  
 
In some cases, the change in ideology is also explicitly acknowledged by 
the MNE customers:  
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“They (the supplier firm) are a new firm now. A lots of practices have 
been improved and I think their managers understand better what is 
market competition, what is long-term cooperation, etc. it is an 
important aspect for our cooperation. “(Dataset 8, customer firm) 
 
“Their (the supplier) managers’ concept and ideology have changed. 
With such changes, their effort is put to the right direction. What they 
got from us is not only profit, but also these changed conceptions and 
notions”. (Dataset 15, customer firm) 
 
Such fundamental changes in ideology undoubtedly alter both the supplier 
firm’s strategy and behaviour in facing market competition and its internal 
responses in terms of structural organization (Chandler, 1990). In this sense, 
cooperation with multinationals moves these indigenous supplier firms into a 
distinctive market ‘zone’ which is a dramatically different sub-environment 
from doing business with indigenous Chinese customer firms even though both 
exist within the overarching Chinese macro-economy. This evidence confirms 
Lin, et al’s assertion (1999) that MNEs can convey real benefits to the host 
economy by introducing and demonstrating not only best practice techniques, 
managerial competence, product quality and market efficiency but also more 
importantly, new commercial and work ethics into Chinese business firms. In 
this way they incrementally contribute to the creation of a more viable 
economic climate in the host country.  
 
However prior empirical studies either focusing on intra-firm or inter-firm 
knowledge transfer did not pay attention to this subtle yet important aspect. 
According to new institutional economics (North, 1999), such changes are more 
important and fundamental than the influence of mere technology learning. One 
of the reasons for such neglect might be because the influence brought by 
ideological change does not show itself in the short-term, even though this can 
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have a substantial impact on the long-term transition of the firm (North, 1990). 
However, more studies need to devote some attention to this issue since, as 
North (1990) suggested, while technology provides an upper-bound to realisable 
economic growth, incentives that are intimately associated with ideology are the 
underlying determinates of economic performance. An in-depth understanding 
of the economic development and growth of Chinese firms cannot be 
satisfactory without considering this aspect. The implication of ideology on 
economic performance will be discussed in section 7.3.  
 
6.4 Knowledge content – intensifying stage 
In this stage, knowledge transfers related to R&D management, new product 
design development and prototype/design and testing knowledge got the chance 
to be transferred to and integrated by the supplier firms (Types 15-17). The 
interviewees reported that as new product development is always associated 
with uncertainty, no concrete knowledge was readily ‘picked up from shelf’ and 
transferred to them. Instead, intensive communications between the technical 
staff of the respective firms became the major mechanism for the information 
exchanges. Supplier firms reported that almost all the new product development 
projects will end up with design proposals which are joint products of the 
partner’s cooperation, but importantly, the supplier firms found the technology 
cooperative processes subtly provided them with the knowledge of ‘managing’ 
R&D activity within their organizations system:  
‘For example we know how foreign firms control the procedure from the 
product proposal, evaluation of the proposal, R&D effort to sample 
production. I mean the whole process. Such learning helps us integrate 
our practice and system; such knowledge has wide implications to our 
technology development. It is not an assimilation of a new technology A 
or B; it is a learning of the methodology’. (Dataset 9, supplier firm) 
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We obtain much knowledge on the R&D processes…..Because it is our 
first time to produce the PC chip for fridge; we have got great benefit 
from it. The cooperation process helps us standardize our technology 
development process. Although we have had our own practice, some of 
them are not standard enough. And such learning from the foreign 
customer helps us gradually build up a standard and more scientific 
technology development processes. (Dataset10, supplier firm) 
 
Such ‘methodological’ knowledge is different from concrete knowledge or skills 
about specific problems. It is more general and highly valuable in that it can be 
widely used and reused. It is an important source of increasing returns that 
generates firm’s growth (Langlois, 2000; Nobeoka et al, 2002). Compared to 
other specific knowledge transfer, this type of ‘methodological’ learning is 
helping the supplier firms build up a R&D system and accumulate more 
experience and expertise in controlling and promoting their technology 
capability development. In this sense, this type of knowledge has more system 
features (Hayek, 1978) which can facilitate increasing return for the 
development of the supplier firms.    
 
To sum up, the main patterns of knowledge transfer within the vertical 
cooperations, first of all, the transfer of knowledge started from technical and 
articulated knowledge; in the second developing phase, the transfer of tacit 
technical knowledge and articulated managerial practice started to emerge. After 
certain time scale, both tacit technical and managerial knowledge transfer 
increased. Relatively speaking, tacit managerial knowledge, such as ideological 
adaptation took longer time for the suppliers to fully digest and integrate. It is 
because managerial knowledge is often system-related and its full 
implementation will involve systematic effort. Technical knowledge transfer 
was centered on operation skills and techniques, which is not surprising that for 
a mature manufacturing industry innovation efforts might lie more on the 
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incremental improvements. For those vertical relations going up to technology 
cooperation stage, R&D knowledge and its management were the significant 
benefit for the supplier firms. Such tacit yet general knowledge is a fundamental 
engine to the long-term technology development and growth of the supplier 
firms.  
 
Although in the short term, tacit knowledge appears to be hard to transfer 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Ranft and Lord, 1998; Simonin, 1999), it does not 
necessarily lead to a lower transfer level, as found in this research. Time is an 
important mediator to deviate the linear relationship between the difficulty of 
transfer and the transfer outcome. As a matter of fact, even if it is relatively 
simple to transfer ‘explicit’ knowledge; such transfer of ‘off-the-shelf’ 
knowledge does not last long because the customer firms do not have so much 
knowledge, which is both pertinent to the vertical cooperation and 
non-threatening to their competitive advantage, to ‘teach’. That is, explicit 
knowledge learning will level up to a ‘saturation’ state, whereas ‘tacit’ 
knowledge is often more subtle, less concrete, and not strategy-relevant yet 
fundamental to the long-term performance of the firm.  
 
As such, the data does not show the linear connection between the 
characteristics of knowledge and its transfer; instead time and motivation can 
overcome the difficulty of tacit knowledge transfer. It is also noted that the 
influence of different types of knowledge transferred on the firm is interactive 
with and interdependent on each other. This finding supports Birkinshaw et al’s 
(2002) study that knowledge is a contingency factor influencing its transfer 
process. Their study uses ‘system embeddedness’ to categorize knowledge and 
find that the deeper the knowledge is embedded in organizational system, the 
longer times it takes to transfer. Although they claimed that system 
embeddedness is a distinguished dimension of knowledge from tacitness, it is 
felt in this study that system embedded knowledge, especially those are related 
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to organizational structure and ideology, are tacit in nature and their transfer 
takes relatively more time than the transfer of specific knowledge.  
 
From another angle, these evidence also support the organizational learning 
literature (e.g. Argyris and Schon, 1970; Senge, 1990; Argote, 1999, etc) that 
knowledge is embedded in the different levels of the organization structure and 
in turn different types of learning, such as ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ 
learning enhance different types of knowledge of the organization. Although 
organizational learning is not the primary theoretical perspective that this 
research takes in understanding the knowledge transfer process, with the reason 
that these literatures take an internal perspective in understanding learning in 
organization while the present study focuses more on the inter-firm process of 
knowledge transfer; nevertheless, the data emerged in the fieldwork, especially 
those on how the supplier firms learned and assimilated knowledge, does show 
supporting evidence of these literatures.  
 
6.5 A summary  
This chapter has presented the second major finding of the research, namely the 
types of knowledge that were transferred to the local Chinese suppliers at the 
different phases of the unfolding vertical cooperations. The in-depth information 
on the knowledge transferred at different stages is an important contribution to 
this research topic since most studies only concern the aggregated outcomes for 
the supplier firms in their cooperation with foreign MNEs. The in-depth 
analysis above provides suppliers (and MNEs) with a clear picture of the 
occurrence of knowledge transfer at different cooperation stages, therefore can 
be of important practical relevance to as what they can expect from the 
cooperation and how they can proactively adjust their practices and strategies to 
promote desired knowledge transfer. This further confirms the strength of using 
119/201 
 119 
qualitative processual methodology in investigation the research issue.  
 
Apart from these received and assimilated knowledge from their MNE 
customers, a by-product for all these suppliers are that their improved capability, 
both technological and managerial, and their successful cooperation with MNEs, 
substantially improve their business opportunities with these extant customers 
and also improve their business opportunities with other customers. Over 50% 
suppliers reported that their business deals with the MNE customers are 
increasing and for some of them even gain business opportunities with MNEs 
abroad. This, in turn, becomes an export promotion for these suppliers and 
therefore for the whole economy. As a result, the vertical linkage between 
MNEs and local suppliers can promote export by improving the local supplier’s 
technological capability and market credit. This evidence is consistent with 
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004) that most Indian supplier firms have improved 
business opportunities with Volvo after establishing cooperative relationship and 
satisfactory performance. In addition, these Indian firms get more business 
opportunities with other customers due to their improved manufacturing 
capability and credit.  
 
The two chapters (chapter 5 and this chapter) have summarized the general 
evolutionary pathway of relationship development between MNEs and Chinese 
local suppliers and the types of knowledge transferred. Section 5.3 has 
distinguished MNEs of different country of origin in their influence of vertical 
knowledge transfer. The following chapter (chapter 7) will discuss trust and 
ideology issues emerged from the interview data and demonstrate that how trust 
at inter-firm level and ideology at the macroeconomic level can both affect 
economic performance. Chapter 8 will then assess which, technological 
knowledge or managerial knowledge, is more easily to be learned and 
assimilated by local Chinese suppliers. The Chinese suppliers firms are then 
categorized into State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Private-Owned-Enterprise 
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(POEs) and their different learning behaviour and aggregated learning outcome 
are compared and contrasted.  
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Chapter 7 Trust and Ideology 
7.1 introduction 
This chapter aims to summarize the development process and function of ‘trust’ 
in the inter-firm cooperation that has emerged from the fieldwork data. 
Secondly the ideology adjustments occurring in the supplier firms are discussed 
in line with how this can, in a large scale, affect the economic performance of 
the economy. The purpose of the chapter is to highlight the ‘motivational’ issue 
at both microeconomic (inter-firm) and macroeconomic level and how they can 
affect the economic performance in their respective domain.  
 
7.2 Think Twice about ‘Trust’  
The discussion of ‘trust’ at the inter-firm level follows the conceptual 
framework of three types of ‘trust’ outlined by Sako (1992). The reason is that 
her conceptual framework on trust considers legal, cognitive and social aspect 
of trust in economic activities and is one of the most clarifying conceptual 
frameworks of studying trust in this area. The three aspects are as follow: 
1. Contractual trust -Mutual trust may exist such that each adheres to specific 
written or oral agreements. For want of a better label this type of trust may 
be called contractual trust predicted on both trading partners upholding a 
universal ethical standard, namely that of keeping promises. Any business 
transaction relies on contractual trust for its successful execution. 
2. Competence trust-This type of trust concerns the expectation of a trading 
partner performing its role competently. Technical and managerial 




                                                        
23 Competence trust in Sako’s (1992) theorizing is similar to ‘economic trust’ in Larson (1992) empirical 
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3. Goodwill -A third type of trust is of a more diffused kind and refers to 
mutual expectations of open commitment to each other. Commitment may 
be defined as the willingness to do more than is formally expected. This 
trust in open commitment is labeled good will trust. 
 
The following section will connect this framework with the fieldwork data to 
explain how the trust of various types develops over time and what the function 
of them is in promoting the vertical cooperative relationships.  
7.2.1 Initiating stage: development of competence trust 
In the first stage, the customer firms were faced with a ‘competence uncertainty’ 
problem of the supplier firm. This is the best explanation for the procedure 
involved in executing ‘quality evaluation and sample tests’ with suppliers. The 
partner selection process helped build up the bottom-line ‘competence trust’ and 
therefore reduced the ‘competence uncertainty’ to an acceptable degree so that 
the customer firm could reap enough confidence when initiating the relationship. 
This clearly shows that the objective of product quality is too important to be 
left to market forces (Coriat and Guennif, 1996) - the visible hand of 
organizational arrangement which acts as a common horizon is, in this case, 
preferred by both partners to the solutions offered by the free market.  
“We need to visit the company, evaluate them. Before that, there is not 
much to say trust or not trust. We simply do not know yet” (Dataset 4, 
customer firm).  
 
“Supplier selection process is very important for choosing a right supplier 
and sustains a long-term relation. We do not concern whether they will like 
to work hard. Normally they will. Mostly we concern if they can do what 
they like to promise. So we need to assess them step by step. That is why we 
                                                                                                                                                    
work of network dyads.  
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have such complicated and detailed evaluation database….” (Dataset 9, 
customer firm)  
 
At the beginning, I cannot say much about trust because we did not know 
each other yet. Trust is more build up in the process of our cooperation. For 
instance the evaluation process at the beginning is a very importance source 
to build up our trust in their ability…of course more trust was built over 
time”. (Dataset 7, customer firm) 
 
In contrast to the customer firms’ concern with ‘competence uncertainty’, the 
supplier’s competence concern is not relevant in this case as most MNEs are 
perceived as ‘competent’ market players. In addition, both sides show 
insignificant concern about the incentives of the partner. For most Chinese 
supplier firms, foreign multinationals from mature market economies and often 
with international reputations are easily trusted as ‘reliable’ partners. The 
foreign multinationals often have a certain degree of acknowledged authority in 
the inter-firm cooperation despite of the separate ownership of their independent 
local suppliers. In this sense, the (western) market economy institution has built 
up substantial trust due to its relatively successful legal system and economic 
performance. This evidence comfirms Zucker’s (1986) view on the distinction 
between personal, social and institutional trust. It also shows that high trust can 
be derived from different resources. It does not always require long-term, 
personal or relationship exchanges (Bennett and Robson, 2004); but it has to be 
admitted this kind of institutional trust itself takes long time to build up. 
However, once it has been established, it becomes an intangible valuable 
resource that organizations can utilize and leverage. While power asymmetry 
exists in all the relationships studied in this research, most Chinese firms felt 
this, even existing, does not negatively influence the cooperation. Ten suppliers 
firms explicitly expressed their trust in their customer firms and positive 
perception about the ‘equality’ of their relations with their customer firms while 
124/201 
 124 
other supplier firms mentioned it in an indirect way.  
  “We trust the customer firm. It is an international brand name. They have good 
business practice….and we found they are! We need to learn from them” 
(Dataset 5, supplier firm) 
 
“The relationship is based on equality…they are much better than most SOEs 
we used to work with, I have to say” (Dataset 10, supplier firm) 
 
“It is not that they are stronger so we have to follow whatever they asked. 
Communication between us is friendly and interactive….we are very equal. 
They have good business ethics, which impressed us”. (Dataset 15, supplier 
firm) 
 
“To sustain a healthy vertical relation, equality is the most important thing. 
Without it the relation will be short-lived. There is always possibility for the 
powerful side to treat the weak side as their branch or something like that. 
Asymmetry in the size between us is prevalent. But business relationships 
have to be equal. Otherwise one side’s benefit will be hurt and no side can 
afford to be repeatedly hurt…. The reason we have good relation is that we 
care each others benefits. In the end it has nothing to do with the company’s 
size. It (whether the relation is equal) actually depends on the company's 
strategy and thinking”. (Dataset 16) 
 
For a country moving out from a socialist economic system, with still prevalent 
low efficient economic infrastructure, the chance to cooperate with foreign 
firms is frequently perceived as a shortcut to a highway of fast development. 
Therefore, the question of opportunistic behaviour of the foreign partner is 
surpassed by the incentives to learn and benefit. Moreover, all the foreign 
customers are indeed reported to be ‘trustworthy’ in their business relations with 
these indigenous Chinese firms. On the other hand, the foreign multinationals 
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seemed to have even lower concern about the motivation (or the willing to work 
hard) of the potential Chinese suppliers. Most foreign managers were impressed 
by the eagerness of Chinese supplier’s commitment and learning attitude. The 
concern of technology leakage is also moderate as most foreign multinationals 
located in China are executing the manufacturing function, whereas their R&D 
centres are mostly in their home country. As a relatively weak side, most 
Chinese firms were believed to have high motivation to work with them if their 
capability reaches a certain acceptable level. 
 
Overall the empirical data shows that effort in information collection helped 
reduce information asymmetry, particularly in the process of building up of 
‘competence trust’ in partners. Nevertheless a comprehensive trust is largely 
found to be incrementally built up via the process of the contacts and 
communications between firms, rather than being a prior condition. Any game 
may start with some degree of ‘uncertainty’ about the partner’s competence and 
motivation
24. The persistent residual uncertainty requires both sides to take 
some risk in stepping into the transaction relationship in the first place. On the 
other hand, once the communication between partners started, trust began to be 
built up, whilst those relationships that cannot get the necessary level of trust 
simply would not be able to proceed. Therefore, the dyadic relationships that 
most research can get access to (including the present study) are those that have 
been developed into certain stage while those relationships that did not proceed 
with trust simply dissolve at very early phase.  
 
Contractual trust has not appeared to be obvious at this stage. All the 
relationships initiated with contract after satisfactory sample test and factory 
evaluation. The degree of formality varies from case to case, however none of 
                                                        
24 As trust can be categorized as competence trust, contractual and good will trust, it will not be surprising 
that broadly speaking, cognition and incentives are two distinct issues associated with contract, be it within 
the firm or in inter-firm cooperation. Clearly Williamson’s TCE puts focused attention to the latter and 
recently literatures such as Madhok (1996) Love (2005) have started developing opportunism-independent 
theory of the firm.  
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the relationships denied the necessity of the legal process. Contractual trust 
probably needs more time to build up in repeated transactions. Goodwill trust is 
even vaguer since the partners have not known each other well at this stage.  
7.2.2 Developing stage: enhancement of competence trust 
The developing stage shows that trust is incrementally built up via the process 
of transacting. All the dyadics signed contracts after passing the sample test 
process, although the extent of the complexity of ‘contracts’ varied from one 
case to the other. Japanese firms are reported to have ‘thick’ contracts delivered 
to the supplier firm and it is hard for these firms to make good sense of the 
clauses listed. But some European firms have quite simple contracts signed as a 
signal of the official start of the relations. Nevertheless contract was preferred 
by the majority of the firms in question even though only a very small number 
of them perceived the ‘contract’ as an important factor in contributing to 
successful cooperation. In some cases, the customer firms reported that signing 
a contract is a necessary step to adjust to their complicated administrative 
system. For a certain supplier registered into their administrative system, the 
contract has to be present. Generally they also believe that contract only plays a 
moderate role in the long-term business relations. That is, it is certainty 
necessary to have a contract, either as a form, or as a reference, but it is not 
sufficient to work out a successful relation.  
“Signing a contract with XXX means that we formally become their 
supplier. We need contract. But in daily work, we need lots of 
communication to make it work, and work well. (Dataset 1, supplier firm). 
 
“Well, we have contract. It is necessary, especially for the supplier firm. 
But it is just a form. We need to work hard to make it work. Contract is not 
enough…..we need to work hard together. Communication and 
performance are important. If they do not perform well enough, we do not 
127/201 
 127 
need to talk about trust. Nothing works if our product is rejected by market, 
right? So performance is the key” (Dataset 2, customer firm) 
“We still prefer to have contract although we won't expect us to come back 
to it again and again. In that case we cannot work. It is just a reference in 
case…..we trust ach other very much now because the experience has told 
us we are both good….we are satisfied with the cooperation” (Dataset 5, 
supplier firm) 
 
“We have quite simple contract. I know Japanese firms have kind of very 
formal ones. Well we do not like that. But our contract work the same way! 
In fact most trust is build in the process of our cooperation” (Dataset 7, 
supplier firm) 
 
The data shows the use of contracts can serve multiple purposes. Although in 
theory, contracts seem to be most relevant for controlling opportunism or shirking, 
as shown above, it is also used simply as an ‘administrative requirement’ of most 
MNEs. The function of contract in ‘governing’ the relationship need not be 
belittled, but the data clearly shows that contract is only part of relationships. The 
data confirms Casson and Della-Guista’s (2004) propositional argument that 
transacting itself is seen as a process of trust-building and the performance of the 
supplier firms is the most important factor contributing to the healthy 
development of the relationship. Whereas suppliers showing high learning ability 
and good performance gain more favour from the customer firm, low performance 
suppliers either cannot even pass the sample test, or are only given a low 
proportion of the sourced components. Multiple sourcing is prevailingly adopted 
by most customer firms to reduce quality risk and keep moderate competition 
between supplier firms. Therefore performance determines the degree of 
‘competence trust’ between the customer and the supplier firms. For most Chinese 
supplier firms, foreign multinationals are reported to be very ‘trustworthy’ in their 
payment and in their assistance offered.  
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However, ‘goodwill trust’ remains an ambiguous concept and difficult to be 
precisely captured in the empirical data. In most business relationships, 
performance – the universal business principle is the dominant discipline for 
partners to evaluate each other. Goodwill only appeared in some relationships 
which were embedded within some long-term personal contacts. However, most 
personal relationships function consistently with business principles and indeed 
most goodwill trust between personnel is a by-product of successful cooperation 
between firms. In addition, when personal goodwill is integrated with business 
relations, there is a certain range or ‘zone’ in which it can be acceptably 
involved, but it is hard to go beyond such a ‘tacitly’ agreed range. Therefore, 
there is no reason to either believe that personal relations will always be 
necessary and helpful in promoting commercial relationships or believe that 
commercial relationships will always have a lower level of trust than personal 
ones (Bennett and Robson, 2004). The reality is that different types of trust are 
founded differently and can be interactive with each other in some 
circumstances. In inter-firm cooperation, especially when the performance, such 
as the supplier firm’s performance can be quite objectively measured, 
commercial principles should be more important in determining the relationship 
development.  
“Personal relations, well, we have some. I mean we (the managers 
have) known each other for ages. But mainly it is business relation. If 
the performance is not good enough it will be hard to ask for any 
personal favour” (Dataset 3, supplier firm)  
 
“The personal relations between bosses can help a little, for instance 
when we need some urgent help from them. I can call him directly and 
he will help for the sake of friendship. But it is limited. Mainly we are 
business relations and personal relationship can work only when it 




7.2.3 Intensifying stage: comprehensive upgrade of trust 
For the dyadic relationships that have involved more technological cooperation, 
interdependence is high. Tacit communication between operational staff became 
quite routinized among the networked staff from the two companies. High level 
managers have frequent strategic discussion as to where the cooperation may go 
further and how to appropriate greater value through more integrated 
cooperation. Both sides were perceived as the ‘extended self’ of each other, and 
trust levels were comprehensively higher. Again, the concern about the 
incentive issues on the partner. Instead what they concerned with is whether the 
firms will continue to have a convergent perception on the development path 
that the firms would like to take. Therefore a shared ‘view’ of the future is the 
cement bounding them together. There is no guarantee that the firms will always 
have shared strategic development plans, but once divergent perception occurs, 
the cooperation might shrink to a less complicated relation, which however does 
not mean it is due to a lower level of trust. Instead it shows that the firms have 
different plans for their future which just happen to be not convergent enough. 
There was no such case at the time of the interviews with these companies, but 
this view is expressed by the managers in the interview.  
“Well, if we continue to be happy with the strategic plan that we are 
undertaking, the technological cooperation will certainly continue. We 
are very good now. But we do not know how long it can last; I mean it is 
not realistic to expect two firms to have same strategic direction all the 
time. But I am positive our cooperation will be quite long-term (Dataset 
14, supplier firm) 
 
This confirms what Mowery, et al (1996) found that in most strategic alliances 
with the primary purpose of knowledge transfer, the development of 
relationship and the realization of the desires knowledge transfer, often ended 
up with an exhibition of technological divergence between the strategic alliance 
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partners. This sharply contrasted with the technological convergence that would 
be expected in alliances geared toward knowledge acquisitions and capabilities 
transfer. However, it is consistent with the division of labour perspective that 
over time, the firms in an alliance will co-evolve and become more specialized 
in their distinctive yet divergent areas.  
 
7.2.4 A summary  
This section will compare the empirical findings with Larson (1992). Since 
Larson’s work primarily concerns a very different research question, 
straightforward comparison is difficult. However, the present work shares some 
similarities with Larson’s work (both are on vertical cooperation development) 
and methodology (both use the multiple case study method). It is therefore 
perceived to be useful to compare this research with Larson’s in a general 
manner to reveal and summarize some common insights into governance issues 
and the organization of economic activities. First of all, there is no doubt that 
economic actors have self-interested trait, that is, their decisions and behavior 
are based on the consideration of their own interest. This is confirmed in the 
present study and Larson’s. The decisions of the firms to cooperate and establish 
long-term cooperation are from their self-interested rationality. Only when the 
decision based on the self-interested rationality of one firm corresponds with 
that from the other, could cooperation come into being. This is often called 
‘double coincidence’ in economics (Campbell, 1996). Therefore, it can be 
equally true that it is still in one’s self-interest to trust another person/firm and 
to cooperate. The pursuit of self-interest has no inherent negative connotations 
because it is not to harm another person/firm (Axelrod, 1984).  
 
Both competence trust and contractual trust are found to be instrumental to 
foster the development of the relationship, whereas the former appears to be 
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very important while the latter only shows moderate importance in the 
long-term relations. Moreover, pure non-calculated trust is hard to be 
empirically captured and therefore the ‘goodwill’ trust remains ambiguous. This 
evidence is close to what Williamson (1993) suggested that ‘calculative trust’ is 
a contradiction in terms (p. 471). In this case, it is hard to see non-calculative 
trust in these commercial relationships and ‘trust’ is largely a by-product of the 
evolution of cooperation.  
 
Secondly, there is no evidence to show that ‘trust’ is an antithetical mechanism 
to legal contracts in facilitating inter-firm cooperation. As one of the 
interviewees wittily discussed:  
“…If two people love each other, they might decide to get married to 
show their love and commitment to each other; but on the other hand, if 
two people genuinely love each other, why do they need a legal contract 
to bind them…in our cooperation, we seem to need both…” (Dataset 9, 
customer firm) 
 
It is hard to provide an exclusive answer to the question that the interviewee 
posed, but the fieldwork shows that generally speaking, trust and legal contract 
exist hand in hand. This is consistent with what Larson found that both 
economic incentives and social dimensions are central in explaining the 
formation and maintenance of the exchange structures. They are two 
mechanisms that complement each other in smoothing and promoting 
cooperation. Not a single interviewee answered that since they trust each other, 
they do not need legal contracts at all; and not a single interviewee reported that 
they totally rely on legal contract and are ready to go to court once something 
goes wrong. Instead, a combination of trust and legal contracts are used. This 
evidence supports the view that contract and trust are overlapping means of 
controlling relational exchanges (Zucker, 1987; Arrighetti et al., 1997; Deakin 
and Micki, 1997; Bennett and Robson, 2004).  
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Thirdly, in observing how the contracts between partners were signed and 
renewed, it is found that the long-term inter-firm cooperation possesses some 
ambivalent hierarchical relationships. The contract often resulted from the 
implementation of routine ‘rules of the game’ which both sides understand and 
agree on. It also can be explained by the fact that once a certain relationship was 
initiated, it showed varying degree of inertia. Practices and routines that were 
adopted at the beginning will be followed again and again until one, or both, 
sides strongly want to revise them. In this sense, reality does contain structure 
which renders on enduring influence on the behaviour of actors (Giddens, 1984). 
In other words, the economic incentives that initiated exchange relations renders 
social dimension in the long-run (Larson, 1992).  
 
To sum up, this section has shown that trust is one of the important outcomes of, 
rather than a major precondition of, the cooperation and it can become an 
intangible asset for the firms to earn more business opportunities. This is also 
consistent with the finding in Larson (1992) that the traditional picture of 
internally driven firm growth was replaced by the creative use of networks to 
gain footholds in markets and to serve as critical conduits to enhance revenues, 
gain information and technology and stimulate innovation. The ex ante 
preparations specified as the main activity of the customer firms in the first 
stage of the cooperation is a process by which they start to obtain first-hand 
knowledge of the supplier. It is a process of building-up competence trust, 
however even with the careful selection and testing process the customer 
engages in, information asymmetry problems cannot be completely sorted out 
and there is no guarantee that the supplier will be competent enough to fulfill all 
the tasks that the customer firms require. Consequently more competence trust 
is build up in the ongoing transaction process. In addition, there is no way to 
assure the motivation/goodwill of either side ex ante. Therefore it is suggested 
that cooperation always contains certain degree of risk which cannot be reduced 
by ex ante information collecting, and economic actors need to take certain a 
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degree of risk to initiate cooperation. Certainly they may reduce the degree of 
risk, however the risk is never going to be totally eliminated. Such risk contains 
two types of uncertainty: one is associated with actors’ motivation and the other 
is performance – that is whether they can achieve what they expect to from each 
other and whether their joint efforts can bear the test of market selection. So the 
residual risk requires a certain degree of risk-taking from both sides of 
cooperation and it is not ‘trust’ per se.  
 
7.3 Ideology, economic institutions and economic performance 
As mentioned in the fieldwork data that “cooperation with multinationals moves 
these indigenous supplier firms into a distinctive market ‘zone’ which is a 
dramatically different sub-environment from doing business with indigenous 
Chinese customer firms even though both exist within the overarching Chinese 
macro-economy” (see section 6.3, page115), this section aims to elaborate one 
of the by-findings of the ‘trust’ issue in the Chinese economy, that is, how the 
overarching Chinese macro-economy differs from the sub-environment created 
by foreign MNEs in their operation and cooperations with local Chinese firms. 
It is noted that the ‘trust’ discussed here is different from the micro-level ‘trust’ 
development within the vertical cooperation which has been presented above. 
The major concern here is to discuss the formation and effect of ‘trust’ or 
‘distrust’, e.g. business ideology, and its impact on economic performance.  
 
First of all, it is noticed that most supplier firms, especially those from private 
sector complained about the low trustworthiness of their indigenous customer 
firms, most of which were SOEs. Even well-known Chinese brand companies, 
such as Haier, did not escape from such frustrating complaints from their 
supplier firms which happened to be in the sample for this study. The prevailing 
degree of trust is perceived to be low by interviewees and most of them 
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expressed their ‘business shock’ in dealing with foreign multinationals, 
especially for those who also supply domestic Chinese customer firms. They 
were amazed by the ‘healthy’ business practice and ethics of the foreign MNEs. 
For example:  
“We trust them very much. They have sound business practice. They 
always pay us on time. We never doubt their trustworthiness.” (Dataset 
10, supplier firm).  
 
 “We were so impressed by their work habit and practice. They never 
stayed here for meal after providing us with technical assistance, etc. it 
is pure business relation…It is much better than those Chinese 
indigenous customer firms” (Dataset 15, supplier firm). 
 
Very different opinions about their domestic customer firms were equally 
easily to spot in the interviews from time to time.  
   “We prefer to have more foreign customer firms. We can learn more 
and …..Business is business with them, which is different from domestic 
Chinese firms. They are so hard to handle and unreasonable sometimes. 
(Dataset 5, supplier firm) 
 
“They often delay the payment. It is like the payment is dependent on the 
manager’s mood rather than the business. Sometimes it is really 
frustrating. (Dataset 7, supplier firm) 
 
“I know that as a SOE, they do not pay their suppliers on time 
sometimes, which in turn causes problems in their supply for us. 
(Dataset 9, customer firm). 
 
“The technical staff from our MNE customers did not even stay for 
lunch…….They came to offer us technical assistance or sometimes for 
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meeting technical staff here for some problem solving and discussions. 
They came and did their work and left. I mean, lunch is not big deal. But 
they have strict business rule and we are not allowed to buy them 
lunch. …..if it were Chinese customers, it would be hard to say. Perhaps 
big meal in some expensive restaurants….? (Dataset 11, supplier firm).   
  
 
At a more general level, some managers talked about their personal business 
experience and feeling about the Chinese business environment.  
“….This involves the trust issue in the Chinese society…. we seem to 
advocate ‘flexibility’ among students and children and believe that 
people with high ‘flexibility’ are smart. However, such flexibility 
encourages people to break principles in doing things, people who 
follow principles and rules are mocked to be stupid and stubborn 
sometimes. As a result, students tend to be ‘flexible’ when they step into 
the society after graduation from universities. But from these foreign 
firms we can see they have strict and comprehensive system and 
everybody is expected to follow. It is these principles, rules that make 
things better. We need change. Over-flexibility only encourages 
dishonest, low commitment and low trust. (Dataset 11, customer firm)  
 
Trust is low in this transition society, which is completely opposite to what its 
traditional culture advocates. However, Chen (2001, p. 182) has insightfully 
pointed out: distrust has been the norm historically in this society. But the 
question remains unanswered: why has the market economic system not 
generated an increasing level of institutional trust within the Chinese society? 
Are Chinese businessmen naturally less trustworthy than businessmen from 
other economies, such as Japan or US? The answer cannot be in the human 
nature. Indeed, human nature is universally same. The answer lies in the fact 
that China is adopting market-oriented economic reform in the absence of 
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capitalist constitutional order (Yang, 2003). While the market economic system 
implies the free market for commodities, the absence of capitalist constitutional 
order in China renders the society with no ‘political market’, or in another word 
the political market is monopolized by the Communist Party. Since a lot of 
transactions have to take place between individuals and the state and between 
business organizations and the state, the lack of trustworthiness and monopoly 
power of the state render the individuals and business organizations less security 
or bargaining power. As such, state opportunism becomes the top-bottom 
mechanism that generates the low trust level to the whole society. The following 
part will unravel the theoretical foundation for this statement.  
 
New institutional economists, such as North (1990), have stressed that capitalist 
economic development is a result of capitalist institutions; the capitalist 
institutions affect the level of division of labour and the related extent of the 
market via their effects on trading efficiency; while the level of division of 
labour and the extent of the market affect development performance, which in 
turns drives institutional change. What has happened and is happening in China, 
like lots of other developing countries, is that it mimics successfully the 
efficient pattern of division of labour that developed countries have already 
found by gradual social experiment. The free organizational information created 
by capitalist developed countries creates an opportunity for big-push 
industrialization for latecomers. However, what makes China a departing 
example from other developing countries such as Taiwan and South Korea is 
that its political system remains largely untouched. This is often called ‘dual 
track’ reform approach by adopting market-oriented economic reform but 
sticking to the single party polity system. The unchanged polity system renders 
the communist party an absolute political monopoly.  
 
The implication of one party monopoly in the polity system for a country is not 
hard to see. In China, the ideology of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism where 
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the legitimacy of the communist party’s ruling power is based on is taken and 
must be accepted with no justification. Its notions on the source of power are 
similar to the old notion of the origin of power being Divine (Yang, 2003). It 
gives no indication how citizens join alone in or consent to the political system 
of the country. Such constitutional order is in sharp contrast with the one created 
in UK in 1688 with free association and an independent judiciary (Yang, 2003). 
As all citizens’ rights, in China’s system, are ‘given’ by the state and can 
therefore be ‘withdrawn’ by the state, which means that the constitutional 
system gives no solid protection of private property rights in a political sense 
even though it is imitating the capitalist private property rights system. Vanberg 
(2005) also suggested that there are two ‘parallel’ markets in a country: 
commodity market and political market. It is argued that improving commodity 
markets means to adopt and to maintain an economic constitution that enhances 
consumer sovereignty, and that improvement in the political arena means to 
adopt and to maintain constitutional rules that enhance citizen sovereignty. 
Clearly what is taking place in China is the former not the latter. Moreover, the 
two ‘markets’ are not totally separated. When the state intervenes the 
‘commodity market’, both the consumer sovereignty (affected by commodity 
market competition) and citizen sovereignty (affected by political market 
competition0 are constrained by the state power. Therefore, the institutional 
power structure of China gives rise to state opportunism, which in turns 
becomes a top-down mechanism that transmits the impact of the ‘state 
opportunism’ to every aspect of the society (He, 1997).  
 
As illustrated in this study, most Chinese firms are used to the opportunistic 
behaviour and lack of trustworthiness of some SOEs and the government. The 
short-term implication is that low trust levels mean some cooperation 
opportunities that would have been taken to achieve mutual benefits are 
foregone. For instance, the SOEs’ behaviour in squeezing their supplier is 
certainly an unwise behaviour if SOEs are rational profit maximizes because it 
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will weaken their own competitive advantage by harming their partner’s 
motivation to cooperate. However it makes sense for those SOEs managers of 
doing so to appropriate private interests while sacrifice the interests of the SOEs. 
Therefore the high agency costs prevent SOEs behaving rationally and 
achieving higher organizational efficiency (Cauley and Sandler, 2005). For 
instance, an experienced manager of a supplier firm reported: 
 
“Sometimes they suddenly returned our products or reduce the purchasing. 
We had to meet them and enquiry the exact reason. When we got no explicit 
answer, it might mean that we have to do some ‘homework’ by visiting and 
having some meal with the managers to improve our communication. In 
fact, it is bribery….some of them have the power to allocate their 
purchasing to different firms and we have to give them ‘personal favour’s 
to keep our business……It is China, even big firm like Haier has such 
thing.” (Dataset 5, supplier firm).   
 
“The purchasing managers of some SOEs are very wealthy, although the 
salary in SOEs is much lower than that in foreign firms. Lots of personal 
favours can be derived from their job.” (Dataset 9, supplier firm) 
 
“…it is said to be one of Haier’s, or TCL
25
’s supplier, you have to buy their 
managers with at least XXXX RMB……I do not think we have such 
financial resource to do that. We are very happy to cooperate with our 
foreign customers. It is so straightforward and business is business”. 
(Dataset 13, supplier firm).    
 
Fewer Chinese suppliers want to cooperate with SOEs whenever possible. This 
will render a dilemma that those SOEs within the same sector of MNEs will 
find it hard to find qualified suppliers to cooperate or capitalize on local 
                                                        
25 TCL is one of the largest electrical product providers (white goods) in China.  
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suppliers’ improving capability, unless they decide to adjust their business 
practices to the standard of MNEs. However, through the cooperation with 
MNEs, most Chinese firms started to recognize that trust is so important to 
facilitate ‘productive cooperations’, such as:  
“We seem to understand that we can cooperate with another firm over 
long-term, even though, we are both independent firms with our own 
ownership. It is hard to imagine years ago, where all the practices 
surrounded us is that the big (such as SOEs) take advantage of the small, 
and the small have to work hard to survive. …it is kind of a completely 
new idea that firms actually can cooperate and benefit both” (Dataset 8, 
supplier firm)  
 
As such, the ideology of the most Chinese firms in the study is evolving. A 
‘never-cheat-first’ strategy seems to be replacing ‘cheat-first’ strategy. 
‘Flexibility’, which used to be kept as golden rule, is now widely suspected by 
these Chinese firms. However, since the state monopoly remains, the bottom-up 
trustworthy behaviour will be hit by opportunism from the state sector at certain 
point of economic activities. It is not clear that when these newly ‘learned’ 
business ethics for business organizations can remain or will fade over time. But 
the state monopoly will be an enduring constraint factor that makes the 
complete ideological adjustment in China impossible.  
 
However the short-term benefits of such ideological adjustment in Chinese 
firms are various. A more fair and amicable business sub-environment can 
improve the X-efficiency factor within the firm (Leibenstein, 1978), especially 
for SOEs (Yang, 1993). Even if the technological resources remain the same, 
there is still much room for the firm to improve the low efficiency situation 
rendered by the negative aspect of the organizational incentive structure. In fact, 
the fieldwork found that most SOEs are learning to adjust their internal human 
resource management, which include personnel recruiting, training and reward 
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practices. These changes are helpful to improve the incentive structure within 
the firm and are supposed to promote the organizational efficiency. Secondly, a 
long-term business orientation and strategy can be encouraged, which is helpful 
for innovation and higher-value activity which often demand complex 
cooperation between economic actors, whether within, between firms or 
between group of firms. Thirdly while these Chinese firms will do business with 
other domestic firms, their business practice and ethics will be communicated to 
others, and therefore can produce a positive externality.  
 
These benefits will have more significant social and economic implications in 
the long-term. The theoretical foundation of this empirical finding also can be 
found from Nee and Cao’s recent research (2005). They suggested that that 
China’s greater success in its transition period of time is driven not so much by 
new formal rules instituted by the central authority. Instead, the success largely 
lies to its bottom-up realignment of interests and power as new organizational 
forms, private property rights (mainly refer to the booming private-owned sector 
and foreign invested firms) and new market institutions evolve in an economy 
sharing away from state control over economy activity. In China, changes in the 
formal rules governing the emerging market economy have tended to follow ex 
post changes in the informal economic practices and the competitive 
environment. A parallel process has occurred in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, where following failed attempts at designing capitalism in one 
fell swoop, a more incremental bottom-up approach tacitly replaced the 
big-band approach of top-down legal and regulatory changes, as political and 
economic actors grappled step-by-step with the concrete problems of their 
emergent market economy (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998; Sachs and Pistor, 
1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1998). As such, we can see that firms are not the 
passive recipient of the institutional environment of a country; they can exert 
their voice into the adaptation of the institution by adopting more economically 
valuable business ethics and practices.   
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With the shifting ideology, a more positive and active business environment is 
hoped and may give the system new source of growth. What seems to be still 
problematic is that in China SOEs still hold a considerable proportion of 
economic undertaking. As a privileged group they often enjoy unfair priority in 
getting financial resource and other legal back-up from governments (Nee and 
Cao, 2005). For example, SOEs have easy access to capital in China, which 
means capital market in China’s economy still puts high barrier for free entry, 
which in turns produces distorted capital competitive environment, where 
business organizations’ assess to capital is not judged by their performance but 
depends on their ‘guanxi’ with government (Yang, 1993).  
 
In essence, the existence of SOEs is the direct participation of government into 
economic life, which often leads to undesired effects, such as they exploit 
privileged resources for their own interest. The reason is that this agent – ‘the 
state’ is an absolute monopoly which is subject to no other’s competition or 
monitor. It is argued that social institutions such as the state and the commercial 
firm are supposed to have clear horizontal division of labor, with the former 
taking care of the issuing and enforcing the rules and norms of economic 
competition and other public issues, and the latter creating and competing 
economic wealth based on the institutional infrastructure governed by the 
former. Since the existence of the government/state and its intervention into 
economic life is widely adopted practice around the world and each country has 
state-owned business sector, whether there is possibility to complete privatize 
the state sector and dissolve the institution of the state is beyond this research. It 
is however suggested that, in China, effort is supposed to put to constrain the 
state’s direct participation into economic life for its own commercial interests.  
 
A similar viewpoint can be found from Yang (1993). Yang (1993) suggested 
although privatization of state owned firms is on the top priority of the agenda 
of China's reforms, which is a precondition for the separation between profit 
142/201 
 142 
seeking activities and the civil service sector and for a clean and effective 
government, privatization should not be used as a slogan for any reform 
campaign. The government should develop an independent legislation body and 
let it work our property law (or revise the relevant provisions of the existing 
civil law), fair competition law (consistent with internally recognized standard) 
and corporation law. The previous practice in China that assigned a government 
department to draft a law should be abandoned and the new practice that 
assigned independent scholars to draft a law for People's Congress should be 
encouraged. As the new legal system evolves and cases based on the new legal 
system are built up, a strong private sector will spontaneously emerge from the 
legal system even if no privatization campaign is pursued. A privatization 
campaign pushed by the government is inconsistent with the spirit of the rule of 
law and incompatible with Hayek's insight that the efficient institutional 
arrangements can emerge only from a spontaneous process based on fair 
competition and voluntary trade of property rights (Yang, 1993). 
 
7.4 A Summary 
This chapter has summarized the two aspects of the motivational issue of 
economic organizations and performance. Fieldwork data has revealed the 
process of the build-up of trust and the functions of different types of trust in 
promoting inter-firm cooperation. While the economic incentives are revealed to 
play the dominant role in such a process, a social dimension does emerge 
afterwards. Secondly, a theoretical discussion has provided as to why the 
China’s economy still suffers from low levels of trust and how the Chinese 
supplier firms have experienced the ideology adjustment in their cooperation 
with MNEs and what the long-term implication can be of such adjustment for 
the economic performance of the country. The next chapter will be devoted to 
elaborating which, technological knowledge or managerial knowledge, is more 
143/201 
 143 
easily to be learned and assimilated by local Chinese suppliers and why. The 
Chinese suppliers firms are then categorized into State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and Private-Owned-Enterprise (POEs) and their different learning 




Chapter 8 Assessing the extent of knowledge transfer 
8.1 Introduction  
Following the conceptualization of technological and managerial knowledge in 
chapter 6, this chapter assesses the extent of managerial knowledge and 
technological knowledge integrated by the Chinese supplier firms. A refined 
picture is then presented to elaborate the differences between 
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned-enterprises (POEs) in their 
knowledge learning and assimilation.  
 
8.2 The extent of knowledge transfer: managerial vs. technological  
Much literature in international business focuses its attention largely on 
technological transfers. Yet chapter 6 has demonstrated that technological 
knowledge transfer particularly in young supply relationships is actually quite 
limited (blueprints, product assessment reports, sometimes new equipment etc, 
please see Table 6.1, p.102). In the most successful and enduring of supplier 
relationships, some Chinese suppliers more latterly received knowledge 
transfers with respect to new product designs and new product testing. In fact 
what was transferred more freely and intensely, and indeed most appreciated by 
the suppliers, was less tangible managerial knowledge (how to establish quality 
systems, how to meet environmental protection requirements, materials 
management etc). From the fieldwork interviews, it was evident that Chinese 
supplier firms all found that their learning about managerial processes exceeded 








Table 8.1: The extent of knowledge transfer: managerial knowledge versus 
technological knowledge  
 
 Managerial knowledge  Technological knowledge  
Chinese supplier firms  High-medium  Medium-low 
 
Generally, the supplier firms report that technological knowledge transferred by 
MNEs appears to be of a low level, specific to the individual component only 
and so relatively insignificant. The MNE customer firms who often said they 
did not transfer any patented knowledge to the supplier confirmed this. 
 
“We did not get technology of a patent nature or anything like that from our   
customer firm. But we do believe we have technological improvement in the 
cooperation” (Dataset 2, supplier firm) 
 
“We did not transfer technologies to any of our supplier I think, but for sure 
we have technological information exchange…I think the technological 
information exchange can seem quite trivial, but still important in 
practice.” (Dataset 2, customer firm) 
 
 “They did not transfer us any of their core technologies. Most things we 
learnt were about operation skills and quality management” (Dataset 10, 
supplier firm) 
 
In contrast, managerial knowledge is more about the quality systems 
implementation, maintenance, operations control, and higher-order ideological 
adaptation.  
“What we learned from the cooperation is efficiency and accumulation of 
skills. We cannot stop at any time. Continuous improvements are always 
expected and over time we get used to it and internalize such external 
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requirements into internal routines…” (Dataset 10, supplier firm) 
 
“At the beginning we only required them to have qualified sample   
production. But now we want them to keep the stability of quality and 
delivery performance…now we are’ coaching’ them, and the incremental 
changes in them would make big difference over time”. (Dataset 16, 
customer firm)  
 
It also seems that learning relevant managerial practices from the customer firm 
is something the supplier firm can largely control. The supplier firms can decide 
how much conscious effort they wish to put into improving their managerial 
skills and upgrading their processes and systems, but they cannot pressurise the 
MNEs into transferring more technology to them. Because most MNEs do not 
feel they are giving away core assets by sharing managerial process knowledge, 
and ultimately it will improve the products they receive from the supplier, they 
are more willing to help suppliers. In fact, when relationship has been relatively 
well established, the transfer and benefits of managerial knowledge is 
consistently reported to exceed that of technological knowledge.  
 
This finding confirms one of the empirical conclusions of Wang et al. (2001) 
that management knowledge transfer largely depends on the learning intention 
of the recipient. More importantly, when compared to technology transfer, it can 
have a more fundamental influence upon the performance of the supplier firm. 
Yang (2001) suggested that the positive spillover effects of FDI may not only be 
from the direct spread of ‘hard’ technologies, but rather from the spread of ‘soft’ 
technologies, i.e. management knowledge.  
 
However the finding contradicts the stereotypical perception that because 
management knowledge is has more tacit content and is often organizationally 
embedded, the difficulty of its transfer can lead to its relatively lower level 
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transmission. The reason for the conflicting viewpoints may lie in the fact that 
the time dimension is not sufficiently considered in cross-sectional studies. 
Whilst we do not dispute that managerial knowledge is highly embedded in 
firm-level or national-level systems and time-consuming to transfer, we believe 
the difficulty of management skills transfer or learning only represents an 
objective cognitive factor. That is, difficulty does not necessarily lead to less 
knowledge transfer and learning. Given sufficient time and effort, economic 
actors can manage to overcome difficulties and learn the things that they 
perceive to have important value (North, 1990). Therefore the logic between the 
difficulties of transfer leading to less learning is not always as direct as we 
might expect. The suppliers’ motivation and effort in learning, and time-taken to 
do so, are the other important components.  
 
“I feel that XXX has achieved a lot of improvement during the four years of 
cooperation…their general manager pays lots of attention to their 
development and learning.” (Dataset 3, customer firm) 
 
“We had a learning process, from new product development to the sample 
test and the skill learnt in the operations process by employees. It is a chain 
learning process for us. Management learning is indirect…but I believe it is 
fundamental and has longer-term benefits for our firm (Dataset 5, supplier 
firm) 
 
“Although they had low purchasing volumes from us, we treated it as a 
valuable opportunity to learn. Such relations can give us know how about 
how foreign invested firms are operated, their work practices etc. It 
enlarges our horizons and enables us to make improvement in the 




Additionally, some knowledge such as R&D management is recognised to be 
the bridging intelligence between managerial skills and technology within the 
firm. Most managers’ perceived it as a set of general management techniques in 
monitoring, controlling and promoting R&D projects rather than the delivery of 
any specific technology. It also contributed to the perceived higher-level 
management knowledge learning by the supplier firms, for example:  
 
“Management and technology are interconnected. Their products can reflect 
if they have good management systems. The products are collective products 
which include their technology and management ability” (Dataset 4, 
supplier form) 
 
8.3 From knowledge transfers to sustainable firm-level capabilities  
This part further elaborates upon whether supplier firms’ characteristics have 
different influences upon their knowledge learning and capability development. 
Young and Lan (1997) suggested that ownership status is a factor in technology 
transfer in China and worthy of further investigation. In fact, the persistent 
differential performances between SOEs and POEs have been a major concern 
to both scholars and practitioners in China. Basically there are two opinions 
about SOEs and its relation to China’s economic development. One is that SOEs 
need attention. Reform should improve their performance and enable them to be 
an important pillar to sustain the long-term and large-scale development of 
China. The other view is that to stimulate China’s economic development, the 
role of SOEs should gradually be reduced so as to facilitate greater 
opportunities for POEs. While it is beyond this study to solve this debate, it is 





On analysing the interview content to address this question, it became clear that 
governance structures affected the way Chinese suppliers tried to upgrade 
themselves and the extent to which this allowed them to develop sustainable 
firm-level capabilities. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned 
enterprises (POEs) face different barriers when improving both their managerial 
knowledge and technological knowledge.  
 
SOEs are larger than those of POEs (average size of the 5 SOEs interviewed is 
620 employees and only 183 employees for the 10 POEs) in the study. The large 
size of the SOEs appears to be an advantageous factor that allows them to 
imitate some managerial practices that are often utilized by large administrative 
systems in the firms from developed world nations. They can learn what their 
systems are because larger firms have a more visible presence either through the 
direct presence of an MNE subsidiary or through access to western management 
textbooks that have analysed a number of such firms. However, although most 
SOEs have reformed their internal incentive structures this is only partial. The 
people who are subject to the new management practices, such as the practice of 
performance-related rewards, are mainly lower level employees (e.g. shop-floor 
workers). The reform of the internal incentive system has not yet reached the 
higher-level management staff, especially the leading management team. 
Double standard exists; lower level employees are under strict monitoring 
whereas high-level employees are not subject to the same levels of scrutiny and 
accountability. Excess numbers of high-level managerial staff and difficulties in 
the decision-making process are reported in most SOEs. This inconsistent 
incentive structure makes the full implementation of new managerial practices 
problematic.  
 
In contrast, the relatively small size of POEs means they are less able to 
mechanically imitate the managerial practices of these large administrative 
systems, as they do not suit small firms. It is also almost impossible for them to 
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imitate smaller advanced nation firms because often such firms do not have an 
extensive physical presence in the emerging economy and because the 
managerial systems of small firms in the West are less studied and less well 
documented than those of large firms. As a result, they have to take what they 
can from the practices of large firms and adjust this information so that it is 
compatible with the firm’s existing system. This invokes a process of learning 
by-doing (Arrow, 1962; David, 1975, Rosenberg, 1976), by using (Rosenberg, 
1982, Nelson and Winter, 1982) and by-failing Malerba & Orsenigo (1996). 
Learning allows them to develop firm-specific managerial systems and allows 
them to develop capabilities in these areas. 
 
Further differences arise when assessing the amount of knowledge each type of 
firm receives and how they utilize it. In order to present these differences I 
conceptualize a pair of terms to represent two components of the potential 
knowledge benefits. Firstly we present the term ‘Knowledge Level’ (KL) which 
we mean to represent an abstract notion of the quantity of knowledge the 
supplier firm possesses. I identify it from the interview data as the instances 
when the interviewee mentions items like purchasing new capital equipment in 
order to meet the MNE’s demands for the product, or the receipt of blueprints, 
manuals, formal training schemes etc (Basically any item that might be 
indicative of the capacity of the firm to produce). It is specifically relevant to 
technical capability of the firms. However, KL only reflects the quantitative 
amount of knowledge or technology a firm has, but should not necessarily be 
taken to be indicative of its overall effectiveness.  
 
The second term is ‘Knowledge Efficiency’ (KE) by which it is to indicate a 
more qualitative factor – evidence that learning processes are being engaged in, 
the extent of knowledge utilization and its overall coherence within the firm; in 
other words, the use of knowledge to develop capabilities. We identify this in 
the interview data from instances when suppliers said they were learning, or 
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using the knowledge transferred to it from the MNE in secondary areas – like 
application of the capital equipment or knowledge to a broader scope of 
products or in the servicing of additional customers, or indeed extending that 
original knowledge into new product developments. Table 8.2 shows the 
differences between SOEs and POEs in terms of KL and KE from the analysis 
of the interview data. 
 
Table 8.2: Extent of vertical knowledge transfer: SOEs versus POEs  
 SOEs POEs 
Knowledge Level (KL) High Medium-low 
Knowledge Efficiency (KE) Medium-low High 
 
It is found that SOEs are not only bigger in terms of employees, but also have 
distinctive advantage in their ability to purchase capital-intensive equipment. 
More importantly, because SOEs have the backing of the State, they have 
greater access to financial capital without the pressures of having to make 
repayments on the loan in the short term. This makes it possible for the firm to 
undertake R&D investment, which should help it improve its potential 
technological capability in the long-term. This advantage turns out to be very 
important for manufacturing-oriented firms where the automated systems enable 
the degree of precision that is difficult to consistently achieve by manual work. 
In addition, SOEs are more able to dedicate funds to invest in relations-specific 
‘hardware’. In fact some of the successful SOEs’ growth histories are closely 
related to their history of cooperation with different foreign customers, where 
they continuously invested in capital-intensive facilities to upgrade their 
technology capacity and therefore achieved continuous expansion. Thus SOEs 
have both extant higher technology capacities and a financial situation that 
allows them to purchase new capital equipment for each new customer and so 
relatively quickly attain high knowledge levels. This is especially advantageous 
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in producing technologically complex products, which often requires heavy 
capital investment to maintain economies of scale.  
 
To provide an example, in two of our dyadic cases the supplier firms were in 
industries where high capital investment and substantial economies of scale are 
requisites. Unsurprisingly such an initial scale could only be obtained by SOEs. 
Access to financial capital through state support meant, and in many cases 
continues to mean, that physical, technological capacity upgrading can occur 
relatively quickly. Therefore the knowledge levels within SOEs are generally 
high. 
 
However, it is speculated that this ability to buy-in technology in the form of 
new capital equipment does not necessarily reflect greater knowledge efficiency 
in these technological aspects. Firms may learn how to use one set of equipment 
to produce a certain set of products yet a new set of products may be produced 
by a different set of equipment. In this way the SOE learns about new 
technologies in a series of discrete steps, as they purchase new equipment, but 
these are not leading to the utilization of this knowledge into know-how and 
capabilities building. These only occur through incremental and cumulative 
learning. So the knowledge efficiency associated with the use of technology 
within SOEs is medium-low. 
 
Additionally, as most SOEs in China were born big through the intervention of 
the State (rather than being the products of market competition) these firms have 
inherited administrative deficiencies from the previous era. Their cooperation 
with foreign multinationals has contributed somewhat to improvements in their 
managerial abilities but because managerial upgrading is a systemic change 
involving multiple aspects of the organization, improvements take place slowly 
and are frustrated by bureaucratic elements of the governance structure inherited 
from a centrally planned economic system. Both MNE customers and the SOE 
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managers themselves recognized this:  
“Normally all the suppliers have good intentions to cooperate. But 
sometimes they may have difficulty in implementing their intentions. I 
mean their organizations are different from one another. It is related to 
their ownership and systems. Sometimes SOEs managers are also 
committed, but their commands or ideas are not easy to completely 
execute in their organizations. Private firms react faster to our 
requirements” (Dataset 3, customer firm)  
 
“In such a structure, some important positions are taken by the assigned 
personnel from government, and some people cannot utilize their talent 
and leave the company” (Dataset 9, supplier firm) 
 
“As a SOE it is difficult for us to adopt some good management practice 
as foreign firms do” (Dataset 12, supplier firm) 
 
“It seemed that nobody could make final decision. I think it is the problem 
associated with the firm’s ownership structure…I think the ownership is a 
problem, although the recent rapid development has in some way covered 
this problem, it still is a problem and needs to be sorted out” (Dataset 12, 
customer firm) 
 
“There are unreasonable work processes and an unclear division of labor. 
For example we often argued over who is supposed to take the 
responsibilities. In addition it is difficult to deal with personal relationships 
in such SOE” (Incomplete dataset 3, supplier firm) 
 
Such imbalance in technological capability and administrative upgrading shows 
a lack of organizational coherence in SOEs, which in turn, brings about 
relatively low levels of knowledge efficiency (KE). That is, the dissonance 
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between technological capacities and administrative capabilities means that the 
firms cannot fully leverage their existing capabilities nor build up new ones 
effectively. In stark contrast, the advantageous characteristics possessed by 
SOEs are the very constraints faced by most POEs. The right hand column of 
Table 8.2 shows how POEs perform with respect to KL and KE. 
 
POEs appear to be very cautious about investment decision-making and even 
when they did invest they did so relatively late. We believe this to be related to 
the difficulties POEs face in getting access to capital through standard capital 
markets. The banking and finance sector within China is still highly regulated 
and under-developed; it is not easy for POEs to get loans for the purchase of 
capital equipment. The banking sector in China has traditionally discriminated 
against private firms, based on the argument that most POEs are small so 
loaning to them increases transaction costs compared to loans to a few large 
firms. In most cases POEs deliberately maximized their usage of existing 
equipment by adapting it and stretching its use into new tasks. Thus, compared 
to the state supported SOEs, POEs have relatively low knowledge levels (KL). 
This has at least two implications.  
 
For one, because these firms were often relatively capital-poor, any replication 
of the established manufacturing process of the other suppliers from which 
MNEs sourced their components from became impossible. The highlighted 
capital scarcity and labor abundance made it sensible for POE firms to adopt 
more labor-intensive techniques to make use of their existing production 
endowments or their ‘comparative advantage’26. It also meant any efforts at 
imitation were complicated because they required a strong reinterpretation of 
technological specifications and adjustment of operational processes within the 
supplier firm. However, isolated adjustments in process adaptation could lead to 
                                                        




products failures. Therefore the supplier firm often had to systemically 
reengineer its entire manufacturing process to adapt the new production 
procedures. As a result the knowledge transfer process was very lengthy. It was 
a combination of direct ‘teaching’ from the customer side based on its 
technology documents and instructions, and the ‘experimental’ learning by the 
supplier firm to ‘fit’ these requirements into its organizational context. Thus the 
combination of a lack of capital but the transfer of codified technology-related 
documents meant that POEs have medium knowledge levels. 
 
Despite of the downside of this lengthy process (which might be filled with 
trials and errors) this learning strategy, contributed to greater resource utilization 
and knowledge efficiency in these firms. Unencumbered by the bureaucratic 
structures associated with SOEs, POEs as mentioned previously, had to engage 
in learning processes in order to develop firm-specific managerial systems 
adjusted to their own circumstances, which in turn and in combination with the 
more effective use of technological knowledge, allowed them to develop 
capabilities in these areas. As a result, greater organizational coherence is 
apparent in POEs compared to SOEs. In the short-term these firms may appear 
to be relatively slow to achieve higher knowledge levels, but they enjoy far 
greater knowledge efficiency, which probably accords them with stronger 
competitive advantage and more sustainable development in the long term.  
 
The above evidence is consistent with Nee and Cao’s (2005) argument: that 
SOEs face powerful forces of inertia that lock them into long-standing 
organizational routines limiting their ability to adapt and compete in the 
emergent market economy even though they still possess privileged access to 
financial capital, raw materials and markets. Hence for SOEs, political capital 
confers them advantages based on positional power. In contrast, new firms, 
mainly domestic POEs are faster at adapting to, and learning the new rules and 
approaches to competition and cooperation in an expanding economy. Yet they 
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are constrained by the privileged positions of SOEs with respect to access to 
financial capital and other resources. Compared to the superior political capital 
of SOEs, POEs have to choose an approach to fostering organizational rules and 
routines that creates other forms of capital, such as human capital (through well 
trained employee teams and a means for competing with SOEs for better human 
resource from deregulated labor markets) and social capital (trust, cooperative 
relationship with MNEs, etc). Variations in governance structures influence 
returns to investments in different forms of capital and the period of time over 
which investments must be made before a return on investment is seen. Both 
governance structures have their advantages and disadvantages right now, but in 
the long-term with the deepening co-evolution of socio-economic institutions in 
China, it is expected that POEs would be able to yield more benefits in the long 
run.  
 
8.4 A summary 
International business scholars have long recognised the potential contribution 
of inward FDI to assist in the economic development of emerging economies. 
What they seem to have failed to consider was the role and responsibilities of 
the recipient firm to utilise any transfers from such activity to develop their own 
capabilities. What is found through the examination of interview data in this 
research, is that two types of knowledge transfers occur: technological and 
managerial and that the latter is the one which is most immediately useful to the 
Chinese suppliers to electronic and electrical MNEs. The actual type of 
technology transferred is low-tech.  
 
Moreover, there are large differences between the ability of state-owned and 
privately-owned supplier companies to utilise such transfers to generate 
firm-specific capabilities. In terms of knowledge levels, larger size, 
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state-support and freer access to capital for purchases of equipment give SOEs 
considerable advantages over POE suppliers. However, precisely for the lack of 
such characteristics and support, the POEs appear to be more innovative in their 
adoption of new products of processes, invest in more social and human capital 
and are more engaged with a process of cumulative learning. It seems that these 
characteristics will enable POEs to have the ability to generate firm-specific 
capabilities that will help sustain their longevity in a competitive environment. 
However, government intervention in the continued and more in-depth reform 
of SOEs and the financial sector are still required for POEs to attain their full 
potential as engines of economic growth and development in China. 
 
This finding regarding SOEs vs. POEs in terms of KL and KE actually can also 
be interpreted to refute technology fundamentalism and support the core thesis 
of institutional economics (e.g North 1990, Yang, 2003, etc). Technology assets 
and capabilities of SOEs are clearly superior to that of POEs, however the 
general performance of SOEs are persistently lower than POEs in China and 
therefore has become a central concern of the nation’s economic reform. If 
technology fundamentalism is right, then SOEs which possessing higher 
technology assets and capabilities should be found to perform much better than 
POEs. The limitation of technology fundamentalism is that technology is largely 
considered as an exogenously given factor leading to economic development. It 
fails to address why some countries/firms possess higher technological 
capability than others in the first place. When developed counties have invented 
advanced technologies, firms from developing countries can simply buy them in 
or imitate to upgrade; however, what is more pertinent for us to understand is 
that how developing countries (with better social and economic infrastructure) 
especially those in transition can develop their own technology capability in a 
endogenous manner by adjusting their governance structure to inject the 
economy with sustainability. With a more profound perspective in making sense 
of the development of economics, institutional economics provide deeper 
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insights into the engine of the development of society, where technology 
fundamentalism only captures some permeated empirical evidence on the 
surface while fails to address what is behind the technology advancement of 
most developed economies is actually their better social and legal infrastructure 
which encourages and breeds more advanced and faster development of 
technologies that are needed for economic development. 
 
8.5 Strategic recommendations 
Following the empirical findings presented in chapter 5, 6, 7 and the above 
sections of this chapter, this section discusses the practical recommendations for 
the Chinese suppliers, the Chinese governments and the foreign MNEs. First of 
all, for managers of Chinese firms that are cooperating or want to step into such 
relationships, much more effort is required to ensure the efficient 
implementation of internal quality systems. More importantly, a clearly defined 
and consistent quality system combined with appropriate training and guidance 
can gradually shift the employee’s attitude to maintaining or even raising quality 
standards over time. This is consistent with Hayek’s (1978) view that 
knowledge assimilation is the evolution of system of rules of actions. Similarly, 
based on their empirical investigations, Helper and Kiehl (2004) have also 
pointed out upgrading systematic production capabilities is a complex technical 
and behavioral task; it involves not just streamlining flows of work through the 
production process, but requires changes in embedded attitudes to facilitate the 
required employee involvement.  
 
Secondly, small sized POEs producing similar products and located close to 
each other are suggested to either establish close cooperation or merge to raise 
their manufacturing and financial capability. It is found that there are many 
small sized private firms at the very low end of the supply chain with foreign 
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invested firms. The components produced are mainly low technology intensive, 
such as metal parts or plastic parts. Customer firms sometimes source similar 
products from different firms due to each one’s limited manufacturing capacity. 
For instance, a Japanese firm was found to source the metal parts from three 
local Chinese firms within the same city (Wuxi). It is reported that these firms 
produce quite similar products; but due to their small size, the customer firm 
claims that it has to use multiple sourcing. This, however, increases the 
customer’s bargaining power. The viewpoints from the Chinese firms are similar. 
That is they are aware that their manufacturing capability lags behind the total 
demand required by the customer firm, which makes the multiple sourcing 
strategy of the customer firm a necessity. In turn, this strategy sometimes puts 
pressure on the supplier firms because the customer firm can adjust the 
procurement proportion to one from the other depending on the performance of 
the supplier firm. However, although, most firms in the game know each other, 
none of them expressed any interest in cooperation.  
No, we do not consider it. One we can keep the proportion of the order 
from XXX, we do not care to cooperate with others. I mean, we are fine. 
We are a small firm. We are not able to produce more, but the proportion 
is pretty enough for us to live. (Dataset 3, supplier firm)  
 
It is noticed that most of these firms define competition in a narrow sense and 
therefore the strategy of cooperation is neglected. However it is argued that the 
close cooperation or merger of these firms with similar products could on one 
hand increase their manufacturing capability. By pooling their resources and 
business together, they can stretch their business network, which will help them 
increase their credit in getting financial resource. The banking sector in China 
has discriminated against private firms, especially those small ones based on the 
argument that loaning to small firms increases transaction costs compared to 
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that for big sized firms27. Increasing size, at least, can be one of the quick 
recipes for them to improve the chance to get capital. On the other hand, the 
cooperation or merger is supposed to improve the production efficiency since 
they can cross-utilize the resources and complement each other. However such 
strategy only can be successfully implemented when both sides fully understand 
the potential benefits of the cooperation, and also work hard together to reduce 
the possible side-effects, such as the integration of management style, the 
communication of employees from both sides and the real cooperation of the 
managers to ensure that benefits of doing can be achieved. Improved 
manufacturing capacity, integrated management practice and pooled resources 
can in turn increase their bargaining power to both negotiate to (get more deal) 
and cooperate (perform better) with their foreign customers.  
 
Thirdly, SOE suppliers are encouraged to deepen the reform of their incentive 
structures, especially at the higher levels of their organizational system, and 
engage in more extensive technological cooperations with MNEs, given that 
most of them possess higher technological capabilities than POEs. The 
interview data found that most SOEs have adopted performance-related reward 
systems; however the incentive seems to be less relevant to high-level 
managerial staffs. An excessive number of high-level managers and the 
difficulty in decision-making are reported in most SOEs. There is a double 
standard in most SOEs where lower level employees are strictly monitored 
whereas high level employees are not subject to the same monitoring. It is 
suggested appropriate tools to measure the performance of high level staff are 
needed. A large part of the challenge for China’s SOEs is therefore to move 
high-level management teams from collective to individual accountability.  
                                                        
27 This view of the banking sector is certainty wrong because the mere transaction cost consideration 
cannot justify the loan to those low performance firms, particularly SOEs. Even the (ex ante) transaction 
cost to SOEs is relatively low due to the large amount of capital loaned, the ex post poor financial 
performance of SOEs will fail the loan efficiency of the banking sector. Therefore a fair loan policy should 
consider the overall viability of the firm, regardless their ownership structure per se, because type of 
ownership is not a guarantee of their performance. Each type of firm, public or private can vary from best 
to worse and for a variety of reasons (although POEs generally perform better than SOEs in China).   
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In order to make this feasible another problem needs to be addressed. CEOs in 
big SOEs have much less power than their counterparts in developed countries 
as they often cannot control the promotion and compensation of their 
management teams (Desvaux, et al., 2004). Decisions about senior personnel 
still remain largely within the power of the government. Therefore the 
government’s direct intervention into the management of SOEs needs to be 
further reduced. Their attention is needed to distribute to macro economic issues, 
such as the reform of the banking system. To sum up, a matching administrative 
system facilitating information flows, decision making, and performance 
monitoring need to be built up and a performance-oriented corporate culture is 
needed not only applied to low-level employees but also to the management 
level of SOEs. 
 
Fourthly, governments at various levels in China may find it beneficial to 
improve their function in information dissemination to both local firms and 
foreign MNEs, which will reduce transaction costs for both sides in searching 
for appropriate business partners and thus promote more potential cooperation 
between them. For example, only very small number of the relations in the 
study suggested that they got helpful information from the local government in 
searching local partners. The way that most relations got established was either 
by the foreign MNE’s survey in searching local partners, or they met at some 
national or international commercial conferences. Local firms got to know the 
MNEs often by word-of-mouth information accorded by co-location. The local 
municipal government has clear advantages for organizing and distributing 
information to both foreign MNEs (since all foreign MNEs located in the city 
have to get registered with them) and local business organizations, and their 
effort of ‘channelling’ information for both sides could be very helpful in 
shortening the information gathering process and promoting the foreign-local 
linkages. On the other hand, more effort is required to create more transparent 
information and a fair competitive environment (Farrell, 2004), such as a fair 
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policy in providing loans for enterprises regardless their ownership status.  
 
Finally, for the managers of US firms seeking to establish, or with existing, 
relationships with indigenous Chinese suppliers, they should continue to select 
suppliers with relatively high levels of competency if they have this luxury, but 
as was pointed out, more often than not, Chinese suppliers are starting with a 
very low base. In such instances the amount of information and knowledge that 
is passed on to Chinese firms is very welcome but perhaps a little overwhelming. 
It takes time for the Chinese firms to absorb all the information, to figure out 
how to adapt it from one cultural and business environment to another. It takes 
even more time to develop technical capabilities and managerial skills that 
enable firms to move down the average cost curve. It would perhaps be in the 
US manager’s interest to develop relationships with a few Chinese suppliers at a 
time. They will have different phases of learning and improvement, so that slow 
periods of knowledge accumulation by one may be offset against a fast period 
of accumulation by another. This way the sunk costs of finding, selecting, and 
initiating supplier relationships is not completely lost when they switch between 
suppliers. Also it means the US firm will have a diversified portfolio of Chinese 
suppliers that can ensure a constant supply of components, which hopefully 
continually improve in quality as the suppliers enter a semi-competitive 
environment, in much the way Japanese firms play-off their multiple suppliers. 
For Japanese managers, it appears good to ‘test’ the potential of Chinese 
suppliers, but perhaps a greater proactive stance in providing assistance sooner 
could lead to a quicker establishment of a firm relationship so that progress to 
the ‘developing stage’ could occur earlier. 
 
Another lesson for Chinese managers is to be aware of the temporal dimension 
differences between transfers from Japanese and American MNE partners. 
Recognition of the pattern of Japanese behaviour should mean that Chinese 
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firms need not necessarily be fearful that they are about to lose a partnership 
with a Japanese firm if transfers are not forthcoming in the early stages of the 
relationship, but they should endeavor to prove themselves worthy of a 
long-term relationship. Similarly by recognizing the American pattern of 
behaviour Chinese firms in the knowledge that transfer intensity drops of quite 
substantially in the developing stage of the relationship, the Chinese firm can 
either try to encourage the American firm to transfer more to them, or establish 
a contingency strategy whereby the next stage of their learning might have to 
take place with another MNE partner if no more is to be gained from the US one. 
Nevertheless, for all indigenous firms good relationships with multiple customer 
firms is recommended, since single supply relationships are rare, and on the 
other hand it can reduce the risk of over dependency on one firm. This may be 
more pertinent for those Chinese firms supplying primarily U.S. firms than 
those who are supplying Japanese firms because of their focus on the short-term. 
In addition, by supplying different MNEs, supplier firms obtain more chances to 
learn different competences from their customers (Bessant, et al., 2003).  
 
This chapter has presented the final finding of the extent of knowledge learning 
within the local suppliers firms. Differences of knowledge level and knowledge 
efficiency also have been compared between SOEs and POEs; corresponding 
practical recommendations to both Chinese firms and MNEs are suggested and 
policy implications to the Chinese government are also discussed. The next 
chapter will summarize the hypotheses developed on these qualitative findings 
and concludes the research.  
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Chapter 9 Hypotheses Development, Discussions and Conclusions 
9. 1 Hypotheses   
This chapter firstly provides a model summarizing the important factors 
influencing the vertical inter-firm knowledge transfer. A couple of new concepts 
have been introduced here to facilitate a brief yet accurate presentation of the 
model. The purpose is to extend the qualitative conclusions for the future 
quantitative verification. Secondly, the strengths and weaknesses of this 
research will be discussed and its empirical and theoretical contributions 
justified. The chapter concludes with some theoretical discussion of the 
empirical findings.  
 
 













The hypotheses and the important factors are presented in Figure 9.1, in which 
the horizontal axis is consistent with that of Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, showing 
Initiating Developing  Intensifying  
Time  
H1: Country of origin 
H2: Experience  
H3: Magnitude of exchange 
H4: Quality of relationship 
H5: Supplier firm’s ownership 
H6: Dynamism of chain  





transfer   
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the stages of the developing relationships and knowledge benefits associated 
with the stages. In the first stage, as has been discussed in section 5.2, the 
country origin of the foreign multinational influences the vertical knowledge 
transfer. Japanese MNEs are conservative in knowledge transfer in the early 
stage of cooperation whereas US firms appear to be very ‘giving’. Therefore,  
H1: the origin of the foreign multinationals has an impact on the vertical 
knowledge transfer in the short-term.  
 
In addition, supplier firms which have had experience in cooperating with 
foreign multinationals could quickly pass the initial sample tests stage because 
of the firms’ prior experience. Therefore, the degree of learning potential with 
any new customer is likely to be marginally smaller with each new customer. In 
contrast, for those with little such experience, this stage would be longer 
because the gap to be bridged by learning is greater, but this in turns signifies 
the greater learning potential. Hence: 
H2: the experience of supplier firms is inversely related to the learning potential 




As the cooperation moves up to the developing stage, things change. The 
influence of the country of origin of the foreign multinationals becomes less 
significant over time. What becomes important are the characteristics associated 
with the relationship itself. First is the magnitude of the exchanges. This 
concept is induced from the fieldwork data and represents the scope and scale of 
the exchanges in the vertical relations. Scale is basic volume commitment and 
scope refers to the number/type of products. The magnitude is a physical 
mechanism that can promote the embedded vertical knowledge transfer. 
Exchange magnitude manifests satisfaction and interdependence on each other. 
Large magnitude of the relationship is necessary to build up common 
communication codes and to ‘channel’ the desired knowledge and information 
                                                        
28 This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical evidence of Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004).  
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transfer. However the positive correlation between exchange magnitude and 
knowledge transfer may decline at a certain degree. The reason is that at a 
certain magnitude may have saturated the level of knowledge transfer that is 
realizable within the cooperation. Vertical exchanges can be maintained but not 
necessarily be associated with further knowledge transfer. Thus:  
H3: the magnitude of cooperation is ‘r’ shaped with vertical knowledge transfer.  
 
Second is the quality of the relationship which is defined as the subjective 
perception of the satisfaction and trust of between the firms. This should be 
based on the holistic feeling of the firms (interviewees). This is an indicator to 
show the how ‘relationships’ can actually contain quite different degrees of 
cooperation. On the one hand, it is found that relationship quality is related to 
the magnitude of the exchanges. That is, in the circumstances of frequent and 
high volume exchanges, when both sides perform well and get satisfied with 
each other, a good relationship can be quickly established which in turn will 
lead to more satisfactory and mutual beneficial cooperation. However frequent 
exchanges also can quickly reveal problems of the relationships; when the 
problems cannot get solved, relationship quality is negatively influenced. So the 
magnitude of exchanges alone does not lead to a high quality relationship. 
Magnitude of exchanges plus satisfactory performance produces it. The 
relationship quality is especially relevant when the customer firms have 
multiple choices among suppliers whose similar characteristics make them 
easily substitutes for each other. When suppliers are equally qualified to produce 
some components or get new orders, a good relationship becomes crucial for 
them to gain favorable deals from MNEs. Thus comes with the following 
hypothesis:  
H4: Cooperation quality has positive influence upon the vertical knowledge 
transfer.  
 
Third is the ownership of the supplier firms. This mainly refers to their different 
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benefit in knowledge level and knowledge efficiency, which has been discussed 
in details in section 6.2. Therefore:   
H5: SOEs and POEs benefit differently in terms of knowledge level and 
knowledge efficiency via the cooperation with foreign multinationals. 
 
If the cooperation can move up to the intensifying stage, first of all the 
dynamism of the end market will have significant impact upon the motivation of 
the technology cooperation. Facing fierce market competition, the customer 
firms might either have much pressure or strong motivation to maintain and 
achieve long-term profits. This environmental/external factor has important 
impact on the direction and operation of the whole value chain. On the 
condition that the supplier firms have the capability to cooperate, vertical chain 
cooperation could go up to a qualitatively new stage. With the change of 
cooperation content, the supplier firms will have more benefits in their R&D 
management and system. This has been discussed in section 6.1, therefore: 
H6：The more dynamics of the end product market, the greater the positive 
influence on the vertical knowledge transfer.  
 
H7: the greater the technology capability of the supplier firm, the more positive 
the influence upon the vertical knowledge transfer.  
 
Last but not least, time has been found to moderate the simple linear 
relationship between the extent of tacitness of knowledge and its transmission in 
chapter 6. Longer relationship itself demonstrates the satisfactory of the MNEs 
and local suppliers and should help promote their cooperation and the associated 
knowledge transfer. However, knowledge transfer can saturate after certain time 
period when the possible knowledge transfer is exhausted, therefore:  





According to the overall empirical evidence and these hypotheses it is found 
that when a short-term view is taken, foreign multinationals nationality has 
immediate and strong influence upon the vertical knowledge transfer. However, 
when a medium range view is taken, the relationship quality and the magnitude 
of exchanges are the most determining factors of the vertical knowledge transfer.  
Moreover, when a long range view is taken, the dynamics of end markets has an 
ultimate fundamental impact on the direction of the vertical chain and the 
associated inter-firm knowledge transfer. As such, simple and linear causality 
are inappropriate and inadequate in tackling this question. What was found from 
the fieldwork data is rather a series of conditional factors influencing the 
vertical knowledge transfer at various stages of the cooperations. Among these 
summarized factors it is found that the ones in hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 are most 
significant factors of vertical knowledge. In particular, hypotheses 5 and 7 
represent the most fundamental endogenous (endogenous to the supplier firm) 
factors of the vertical knowledge; while hypotheses 6 represent the market 
condition leading to the customers’ motivations of knowledge transfer. 
Considered together, they actually support what Smith (1976) suggested: the 
division of labor and expansion of market simultaneously contribute to 
economic growth. 
 
The above hypotheses constitute a proposal for a quantitative study. To my 
knowledge, vertical linkage between MNEs and local supplier firms in a host 
country is a much under-explored area. Apart from scattered studies that have 
been discussed in section 2.5 (p.43), such as Wong (2000) in Singapore, Giound 
(2000), Crone and Roper (2000) in Northern Ireland, Gioud (2000) in Malaysia 
and Cyhn (2002) in South Korea, very recent systematic efforts come from 
Javorcik (2004) based on panel data in Lithuania and Ivasson and Alvstam’s 
(2004) single case study of Volvo’s Indian indigenous supplier firms. For the 
former, the author acknowledged the limitations of his research and also 
strongly suggested that it would be useful to use data that allow for 
169/201 
 169 
identification of individual firms as suppliers to multinationals rather than 
relying in on input-output matrices to measure interactions and positive 
spillovers between MNEs and their suppliers. Moreover, no attention has been 
paid to how the local supplier’s ownership attributes might make difference in 
the vertical knowledge transfer in Javorcik’ study (2004). The author indicated 
that future research should incorporate both the MNEs’ and the suppliers’ 
attributes in investigating the vertical knowledge transfer taking place between. 
It is believed that the present study has provided interesting and detailed 
information about how the MNEs’ and local supplier’s characteristics could 
shape the vertical knowledge transfer.  
 
On the other hand, Ivasson and Alvstam’s study (2004) has capitalized on the 
advantage of single case study in providing in-depth information of Volvo’s 
technology transfer and assistance to Indian suppliers, their study is even harder 
to generalize than the present one. Therefore the future research plan based on 
the above hypotheses is hoped to overcome the shortcomings of both by 
obtaining bilateral data from MNEs and suppliers on a one-to-one case to 
systematically capture the determinants of inter-firm knowledge transfer. The 
data collection at the inter-firm level is bound to be painstaking, however 
without such effort; no reliable and valuable research outcome can be expected.  
 
9.2 Strengths weaknesses and contributions of the research  
The first strength of the research is that it poses a pertinent question and 
addresses it with a sensible methodology. The research gap of the vertical 
linkage of MNEs is pronounced and the literature review has provided ample 
evidence. Although this research, like many other qualitative studies, might be 
criticized for its lack of generalizability, the strength lies in its fine-grained data, 
limited presumptions and use of multiple theoretical perspectives intertwined in 
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the empirical investigation. Correlations will normally be found in any set of 
data; yet without sound theoretical foundations neither positive nor negative 
results would be able to explain the real effects of FDI. This has been a chronic 
deficiency of most spillover studies (Meyer, 2004).  
 
It is admitted that the impact of FDI is a very complex issue, and with the 
networked economy based on the ever-refined division of labour in the 
globalization of the world economy, any effect upon one linkage has chain 
effects on the others. Therefore it is difficult to separate one from the others. 
Also sometimes conclusions might be different when a short-term perspective is 
taken compared to that if a long-term one. Whilst some of the difficulties in 
providing powerful explanations lie with the problem of obtaining reliable data 
(a notorious problem of research on China) another major reason for the 
difficulty is that lack of theoretical foundations guiding the direction of the FDI 
investigations. FDI studies have tended to put ‘measurement ahead of theory’. 
The present study, by focusing on a specific channel through which the impact 
of MNEs on their local partner firms takes place, does not suffer from this 
typical limitation that most FDI studies suffer from. The rich and in-depth data 
provides us with an explicit understanding of the vertical impact of MNE’s local 
sourcing on the development of the indigenous supplier firms.  
 
The empirical contributions of the research are summarized as follows. The first 
finding provides us with an important conceptual framework as to how 
successful supply cooperation might develop over time. It also crystallises the 
point that the transaction cost minimizing perspective is only a partial view 
derived from traditional TCEs. The reality is more complex than this. 
Specifically, when the value added expected from increased relationship 
specific investment is expected to outweigh the value of the investment itself, 
higher transaction costs can be deliberately dedicated for developing required 
speciality. Moreover, economic actors are still rational in their investment 
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decision because the eventual ratio of the value-added to the transaction and 
coordination costs involved justifies the decision as economically viable. As 
such, this transaction-production related perspective turns out to be more 
comprehensive than the notion of transaction cost alone and can profoundly 
reveal the dynamic relationships between the value-added, coordination and 
transaction costs that have to be consumed and evolved in the inter-firm division 
of labour. In addition, the organization form, such as the inter-firm linkage, is 
not merely a transaction cost controlling device. The relationship itself is not 
only a ‘medium’ for the inter-firm cooperation, but also a value-added entity 
that itself contributes to constructive economic cooperation. As such, the firms’ 
ability to cooperate with others represents one of the important elements of 
dynamic capabilities that firms have to possess to achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage in the network economy based on ever-refined and 
complex division of labour.  
 
The second finding provides tentative evidence of the differences between 
Japanese MNEs and non-Japanese MNEs in their attitude and approach to 
transferring knowledge to supplier firms. The Japanese can be described as 
‘conservative’ yet ‘reliable’ and U.S. firms are relatively ‘giving’ but more 
‘footloose’. However, it was also found that factors such as the local firm’s 
learning ability plays an important mediating role in reducing such different 
behaviors. There are, as yet no apparent COO effects with respect to how 
cultural differences might constrain knowledge transfers to Chinese supplier 
firms. If there are, they are largely reduced by Chinese managers in the foreign 
MNEs acting as mediators or bridges that allow these cultural distances to be 
reduced. As a result, the differences in COO effects appear to be indicative of 
managerial preferences rather than cultural traits. The finding fits with what 
supply chain management literature suggests of the differences between 
Japanese firms and non-Japanese firms.  
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The third finding provides highly detailed information as to what types of 
knowledge are transferred and how they are related to the different cooperative 
stages in the vertical linkage. Managers of supplier firms therefore obtain a 
picture of what type of supplier firms they are, at what stage their relationship 
with the MNE is at, and how they can adjust their behaviour and strategy to 
promote the potential benefits of learning from MNEs.  
 
The fourth finding refutes the stereotypical perspective that the difficulties 
associated with managerial knowledge necessarily leads to its low transmission 
level. The simple linearity can be deviated when the time dimension is 
considered as a mediating factor. Once the supplier firms perceive the 
knowledge to be of significant value and therefore worth the extra effort in their 
learning, they will work hard to overcome the difficulties given sufficient time 
and effort is allowed. Therefore the attribute of knowledge itself is only one of 
the cognitive factors influencing knowledge transfer; there are other factors, 
such as the supplier firms’ motivation, also at play.  
 
In addition, the time dimension also needs to be considered when we assess the 
short-term and long-term effect of knowledge transfer on the development of 
the local Chinese supplier firms. In the fourth finding, SOEs appear to be able to 
quickly benefit from such linkages with MNEs by ‘buying-in’ technologies. 
However, in the long-term perspective, POEs are believed to be able to gain 
higher market viability due to their incremental and cumulative endogenous 
development path. These research findings remind us to be cautious about the 
linear models that prevail in management science and calls for us to use more 
in-depth and penetrating analysis to reveal the underlying mechanisms and 
causalities behind the empirical reality that we observe.  
 
The research also advances our understanding on the limitations of TCE. 
Regarding the traditional TCE studies on ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision, a hidden 
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assumption is that ‘market’ is always available to provide the products that can 
be produced by the firm and hence the decision only lies on the transaction cost. 
This assumption is revealed to be unrealistic when MNEs’ outsourcing strategy 
is constrained by the unavailable or incompetent ‘market’ in the host economy. 
Therefore, firms and markets are highly diversified properties across the 
countries. They are both the evolutionary products of the division of labor and 
the conditions of transaction efficiency and neither of them can be taken for 
granted. It is also found that the transaction cost per se cannot fully justify the 
relationship specific investment in the inter-firm cooperation. A dynamic 
perspective is needed to incorporate the total value and cost analysis to uncover 
a holistic understanding of economic organization.  
 
In addition, there is some theoretical gap between traditional production theory 
and TCE. Clearly, most MNEs’ outsourcing is driven by lower production cost 
in developing countries, such as China. This has been undisputed empirical 
reality. In this sense, firms buy or outsource because of the saving from 
production cost. However such scenario has little to do with what TCE suggests 
that the firm’s decision of ‘make’ or ‘buy’ is dependent on which yields lower 
transaction cost. In this TCE scenario, firms ‘buy’ rather than ‘make’ because of 
the lower transaction cost of the ‘market’. Connecting this classic mainstream 
microeconomic question to MNEs, we can deduce that MNEs ‘buy’ rather than 
‘make’ in the host market because of the saving from the transaction cost in the 
host market. Both makes sense in their respective theoretical world, but 
empirical reality calls us to connect the two isolated theories into a coherent 
story.  
 
The key to solve the tension or bridge the gap lies in the necessity to view the 
market and the firm as themselves diversified properties. After all, there is no 
unified market in the world and firms also cannot be treated ‘styled’ as if they 
are all the same to each other. Markets are always segmented by geographical 
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dispersion (by the country’s boundary in particular) and by time, if not include 
other human-made factors. Similarly, firms are also diversified properties where 
each of them has their distinctive advantage and specific position in the 
complex networked economy and therefore contain different comparative 
advantage in their specialty. Consequently, the ‘make’ or ‘buy decision has to 
consider both the transaction cost element and different production cost 
advantage (comparative advantage) to jointly determine (1) whether the firm 
should buy from the market? (2) and buy from which market and which firm? 
The first question deals with generally whether it is worthwhile to outsource 
certain business activity by using market? And the second question helps shape 
the decision as to where (which market and which firm) to source the desired 
service/products?  
 
For MNEs from developed economies where labor cost is pronounced higher 
than that in developing countries, the decision to outsource in developing 
countries certainly is very appealing. It also can be deduced that some business 
activities that cannot be economically outsourced (according to transaction cost 
criteria alone) in the same market as where the MNEs come from could be 
outsourced in developing countries due to the significant reduction in 
production cost. That is to say that sometimes slight higher transaction cost 
spent on ‘searching and teaching’ suppliers can be justified by sustainable 
(larger proportion) saving from lower production cost while in some other cases 
it could be that the saving in transaction cost by using market may not able to 
sufficiently justify ‘buy’ decision due to the prohibitively high production (labor) 
cost. Therefore there are two layers for this ‘make’ or ‘buy’ question and the 
traditional TCE and production theory both over simplify it by focusing only on 
one aspect It is justifiable to focus on only one of the two dimensions in some 
studies (especially those in a single-country context where labor cost, as an 
important element of production cost, is largely unified); however for the 
question of MNEs’ outsourcing in a foreign market, two dimensions 
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simultaneously relate to each other in shaping the decision of using ‘market’ and 
neglect any one of them could not yield a complete understanding of the full 
rationality of firms’ decision and behaviour.  
 
The research also has its limitations. First the case selection process was 
constrained by the locational focus of Wuxi, which leads to an unbalanced 
presentation of Japanese MNEs compared to MNEs from other countries in the 
study. This makes the empirical finding regarding the country of origin effect a 
very inconclusive summary. This can be amended by including MNEs from 
other countries for a balanced comparison.  
 
A second limitation of the study is that in studying the supply chain practice of 
MNEs in China, it deliberately excluded the non-Chinese suppliers, that is, 
foreign invested supplier firms. Although it is justified, given the focus the 
research is to understand how indigenous Chinese firms can benefit from the 
vertical cooperation with MNEs, an inclusion of foreign invested firms and joint 
ventures would have facilitated a comparison between Chinese indigenous 
supplier firms and foreign invested supplier firms. Indeed this exclusion has 
very much shrank the researchable subjects and made data collection a very 
tough process because a higher proportion of MNEs’ local procurement is 
sourced from foreign invested firms, whereas local sourcing from indigenous 
Chinese firms only constituted a small part. Future research can include both 
groups of supplier firms for a benchmark comparison.  
 
Thirdly, by focusing the investigation on Wuxi, the study capitalized on the 
concentration of the location for the conduct of fieldwork, however Wuxi is not 
necessarily able to represent China as a whole. Generally it is acknowledged 
that China contains sustainable regional differences in their economic 
development and it is practically hard to claim any single region to be the 
representation of China. Wuxi, as a city located in Changjiang Delta (Yangzi 
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River Delta), can represent the surrounding region of China but not others.   
 
Fourthly, the inductive feature of the research facilitated the important 
conceptualizations such as technological knowledge and managerial knowledge, 
knowledge level and knowledge efficiency, which are generated from fieldwork 
data. Based on the hypotheses generated in chapter 9, effort needs to be spent to 
transform these important conceptualizations into tangible dependable variables 
for quantitative verification. Therefore literature reviews on various areas such 
as microeconomics, international business and management studies are needed 
in the search for a sound operationalization of these concepts. This will be an 
important part of the future research.  
 
9.3 Conclusions  
This research has, as discussed above, generated valuable understanding of the 
vertical linkage and knowledge transfer of MNEs to indigenous Chinese firms. 
While not being immune to limitations, the research has made both empirical 
and theoretical contributions to the subject. To facilitate good quality and 
pertinent empirical investigation, the quality of data is one of the keys, which is 
one of the strengths of the present study. The quantitative investigation based on 
the hypotheses in chapter 9 needs to continue this principle and generate 
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Appendix 1: Pilot interview questions 
The following were the questions used in the pilot fieldwork.  
 
1.1: Interview questions to the customer firm: 
1. How long have you had the relationship with the local supplier? 
 
2. How did you select the local firm as your supplier? 
 
3. What knowledge did you have about the local firm prior to the relationship? What 
affected your confidence about its potential to be a qualified supplier? 
 
4. What does the local firm produce or your company? Would you regard this component to 
be technologically complex? 
 
5. What kind of technological and organizational assistance have you offered the partner 
firm? 
 
6. Did you invest in equipment, personnel training, etc, in order to ensure quality standards 
and other organizational requirements? 
 
7. How do you perceive the potential benefits of these investments to your firm? 
 
8. Has the partner assimilated the technology and other experience from you to your 
satisfaction? If so, what do you perceive as important factors influence their successful 
learning? 
 
9. Do you have concerns about the unintentional knowledge leakage? 
  
10. Do you think the relationship will continue? 
 
1.2 Interview questions to the supplier firm: 
1. How long have you had a relationship with the customer firm- XXX? 
 
2. How did the relationship with the foreign firm begin? 
 
3. What knowledge did you have about the customer firm prior to the relationship? Did you 
feel confident about your ability to be a qualified supplier? 
 
4. What do you produce for the foreign partner? Would you regard the component to be 
technologically complex? 
 





6. What kind of technological and organizational improvements have you made since the 
relationship established? 
 
7. Did you invest in equipment, personnel training, etc in order to ensure quality standard 
and other operational requirements of the product? 
 
8. To what extent did you receive assistance from the foreign customer firm? Are you 
satisfied with the cooperation? 
 
9. Do you perceive the co-operation and exchange is fair and valuable in terms of finance 
and capability? 
 
10. Have you been able to learn and benefit from your interaction with the foreign partner? 
 
11. What have been the important influences on your learning process? 
 
12. Do you believe the relationship will continue? 
 
13. What keeps the relationships stable? 
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Appendix 2: Interview questionnaire 
The following questions were used during the interviews based on the one used in the pilot 
interviews. They were used as a guide to gather factual information and generate discussion. 
The first questionnaire targeted at customer firm and the second, the supplier firm. There are 
overlapping questions which was in order to ensure the consistency of the data collected from 
two sides.  
 
2.1: Interview questions to the customer firm:    
1. When and how did the relationship start? On what base was the supplier chosen?  
 
2. What are the benefits in establishing with such a local supplier? What are these benefits 
based on? And how did you realize such benefits?  
 
3. How was the situation at the beginning of the relationship? Was the purchasing volume 
high in the initial stage? How was the quality of the product of the supplier firm?  
 
4. Was the expected benefit obvious at the initial stage?  
a) If yes, how did you realize it in a short period of time?  
b) If no, why? What did you do to overcome the difficulty and sustain the development 
of the relationship?  
 
5. What were the key issues during the initial stage of your relationship?  
 
6. Did you trust each other at the stage?  
c) If yes, what was the trust grounded on?  
d) If no, how did you develop the trust? Do you think trust is important in your 
co-operation? Why?  
 
7. How did you communicate with each other? Does relationship such as trust affect the 
communication? How? Examples.  
 
8. Do you find that documented knowledge, such as instructions, manuals tend to be easy to 
teach compared to some knowledge based on long-year experience? Could you give me 
some examples?  
 
9. How do you remedy misunderstanding between staff if you spot it? Are there regular 
measures to increase the interaction and feedback between each other to improve the 
communication accuracy? 
 
10. What is the period of time that you feel the supplier firm learning the most from you? 




11. Do you feel the importance of contract in your relationship?  
a) If yes, how?  
b) If no, what is more important? 
  
12. After the formal set-up of the relationship, do you perceive any changes in co-operation 
attitudes, and behaviour? Is there any change of the products and volume that the supplier 
firm produces for you?  
 
13. Do you have more stable and intimate relationship? Is there any change associated with 
the deepening relationship?  
 
14. Is there change in the communication behaviour between each other? If yes, could you 
give some examples? 
 
15. Do you have strategic integration besides operational linkage?  
 
16. Is there continuous knowledge transfer to your suppliers at the later stage of your 
co-operation?  
a) If yes, why and how?  
b) If not, why?  
 
17. Do you think that the information and knowledge transfer to the supplier is simply for 
cost reduction? If not, why other benefits can result from such information and 
knowledge flow?  
 
18. Do you think that information and knowledge flow will continue? If yes, Why?  If not, 
why? 
 
19. Could you summarise what are important factors in building up a high quality vertical 
relationship? What are the implications of such relationship to your firm? What role does 
knowledge transfer play in enhancing interfirm relationship and the performance of the 
value chain?  
 
20. How do you understand outsource? How do you think if you can make the most use of 
this strategy?  
 
2.2: Interview questions to the supplier firm:  
1. When and how did the relationship with the foreign firm get started? 
 
2. What are the benefits you expect from establishing with such a foreign customer firm?  
 
3. Could you generally describe the situation of the relationship at the initial stage? For 
instance, was the purchasing volume high or low? Was your customer firm satisfied with 
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the products and services you provided?  
 
4. What were the key issues that you needed to cope with at the initial stage of your 
relationship? 
 
5. Did you trust the customer firm at the stage?  
a). If yes, what was the trust grounded on?  
      b). If no, how did you develop the trust? Do you think trust is important in your 
cooperation? Why? 
 
6. How did you communicate with each other? Do relationship properties, such as trust, 
affect the communication between each other? How? Examples.  
 
7. Did you find that documented knowledge, such as instructions, manuals from the 
customer side are important? Are they easy to assimilate and utilize compared to 
knowledge based on accumulated experience? Could you give me some examples?  
 
8. Was there sufficient communication between each other for cooperation and coordination? 
If yes, is it vital for you to learn from your partner? If not, what were/are the main 
barriers?  
 
9. Did you find misunderstandings between each other? How did you remedy them? 
Are/Were there any regular measures to increase the interaction and feedback between 
each other to improve the communication accuracy?  
 
10. During the audit process by the customer firm, what were your weaknesses and strengths 
that were identified by your partner? How did you sort out those weaknesses? Looking 
into the internal firm, what are the important factors lead you to successfully passing 
these ‘tests’?  
 
11. How do rate the importance of contracts in governing the relationship? Are there other 
factors are important in governing an efficient cooperation relationship?  
 
12. How long did it take for the relationship move from the initial set-up stage to a relatively 
stable cooperation stage? Were there changes in your cooperation, such as changes in 
attitudes and behaviour in the relationship? Was there any change in the type of products 
or volume that you provided for the customer firm?  
 
13. Associated with the development of relationship, was there any change in the 
communication behaviour between each other? If yes, could you give some examples?  
 





15. Besides operational linkages, do you have other integration with each other? 
  
16. Did you ever experience some difficulty in understanding what the customer firm’s needs 
or requirements? Could you give me some examples? Are there other communication 
difficulties in your cooperation? What caused these problems? How did you cope with 
them? Could you give me some examples? 
 
17. Do you perceive that at this stage the legal contract is important in governing the 
relationship? If yes, why? If no, what other factors are important?   
 
18. Could you describe how the operational linkages gradually stabilized with time? Were 
there stable procedures for you to solve problems, negotiate with each other and some 
common procedures for staff from both firms to cooperate with each other? What are 
they? 
 
19. What was the main knowledge that you have learned from your customer firm at the 
stage?  
 
20. With the relationship coming into mature stage, did the stable relationship bring about 
stagnation of information and knowledge transfer? If yes, how was it reflected in 
day-to-day operation? If not, what drove your two sides to have continuous information 
and knowledge flow? What type of information or knowledge do you receive now? 
  
21. Have you progressed in terms of your technological and administrative capability during 
the process of such cooperation? Do you feel changes in the quality of the relationship 
with the customer firm are associated with your improvement? If yes, could you give me 
some examples? If not, what prevent you making progress and improvement?  
 
22. How do you perceive the relationship between your own capability and the cooperation 
with the foreign customer firm now?  
 
23. Has there been a qualitative change in the cooperative relationship as your capabilities 
have improved? That is, do you feel the customer firm treats you as a partner, instead of 
just a ‘contractor’? If not, why? If yes, what are the factors leading to it? 
 
24. Could you summarize your experiences of building up a successful long-term relationship 
with the customer firm?  
 
25. How do these experiences influence your attitude and behavior if you set up similar 
relationship with other firms in future?  
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Chinese supplier firm 










2 Sino-Japanese JV 1 SMT SOE 1 
3 Sino-Japanese JV 1 Chassi Private 2 
4 Japanese WOE 1 Plastic parts Private 1 
5 Italian WOE 3 PC controller Private 2 
6 Japanese WOE 1 Porcelain shell Private 1 
7 Japanese JV 1 Outer bucket Private 1 
8 Japanese JV 1 Pressing parts Private 2 
9 Japanese JV 3 PC controller SOE 3 
10 Japanese JV 1 Radiator Private 1 




12 Japanese WOE 1 Nickel foam SOE 1 
13 Sweden WOE 1 Metal parts Collective 2 
14 Japanese WOE 1 Manganese SOE 2 




16 Japanese WOE 1 Electrical parts Private 1 
Incomplete 
data 
      
1 U.S. WOE 1 Electrical parts No access NA 
2 German WOE 2 Electrical parts No access NA 
3 South Korea No access NA 
Electronics 
parts 
SOE 2 
 
  
 
